

Analysis on the Security of an Identity Based Proxy Re-encryption

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Outline

- Introduction
- Review of Identity Based Proxy Re-encryption Proposed in Pairing'07
- Attacks
- Conclusions
- Acknowledgements

Introduction

- M. Blaze, G. Bleumer, and M. Strauss introduce the concept of **proxy re-encryption(PRE)** in their paper **Divertible Protocols and Atomic Proxy Cryptography** in Eurocrypt'98.
- The goal of proxy re-encryption is to securely enable the re-encryption of ciphertexts from one key to another, **without relying on trusted parties**.
- Three roles in PRE: Delegator, Proxy and Delegatee.
Basic requirements: **Proxy can not know any secret keys of Delegator or Delegatee; Proxy can not get any useful information about Delegator and Delegatee's ciphertexts; Delegator and Delegatee needs not any extra secret key to implement PRE.**

Introduction

- In 2005, G. Ateniese, K. Fu, M. Green, and S. Hohenberger proposed a few new proxy re-encryption schemes and discussed its several potential applications.
- In ACNS'07, M. Green and G. Ateniese proposed the first identity based proxy re-encryption scheme.
- In Pairing'07, Matsuo proposed new proxy re-encryption schemes in identity based setting. They constructed two proxy re-encryption schemes: **one is the hybrid proxy re-encryption from CBE to IBE, the other is the proxy re-encryption from IBE to IBE.** Now both of the schemes **have been standardized by P1363.3 workgroup.**

Review of Definition of IBPRE(1/2)

Definition

An identity-based proxy re-encryption system consists of: 1) the four algorithms making up an IBE system $\text{Setup}_{\text{IBE}}$, $\text{KeyGen}_{\text{IBE}}$, Enc_{IBE} , and Dec_{IBE} . 2) and five algorithms for re-encryption, which are

- $\text{EGen}(sk_{\text{ID}}, \text{params})$. Given an IBE secret key sk_{ID} for ID with params , generate e_{ID} for re-encryption key generation.
- $\text{KeyGen}_{\text{RKG}}(\text{mk}, \text{params})$. Given an IBE master-secret key mk with params , generate a secret key sk_{R} for re-encryption.
- $\text{KeyGen}_{\text{PRO}}(sk_{\text{R}}, e_{\text{ID}'}, \text{params}, \text{ID}, \text{ID}')$. Given sk , $e_{\text{ID}'}$, the delegator's identity ID and the delegatee's identity ID' with params , generate a re-encryption key $rk_{\text{ID} \rightarrow \text{ID}'}$.

Review of Definition of IBPRE(2/2)

Definition

- $\text{ReEnc}(rk_{ID \rightarrow ID'}, \text{params}, C_{ID}, ID, ID')$. Given the delegator's identity ID , the delegatee's identity ID' , the re-encryption key $rk_{ID \rightarrow ID'}$, and an IBE ciphertext C_{ID} with params , re-encrypt C_{ID} into the different IBE ciphertext $C_{ID'}$.
- $\text{Check}(\text{params}, C_{ID}, ID)$. Given the delegator's identity ID and an IBE ciphertext C_{ID} with params , output 0 if C_{ID} is a malformed ciphertext for ID . Otherwise, output 1.

Furthermore, the PKG deploys the digital signature scheme $(\text{KeyGen}_\Sigma, \text{Sign}, \text{Verify})$ to sign e_{ID} for authenticating e_{ID} .

Review of Security Model of IBPRE(1/6)

Definition

IND-ID-CPA security for identity based proxy re-encryption is defined as a game between the adversary \mathcal{A} and challenger \mathcal{C} like following:

Setup The challenger \mathcal{C} selects a digital signature scheme $(\text{KeyGen}_\Sigma, \text{Sign}, \text{Verify})$. \mathcal{C} generates

- 1 (sk_Σ, vk_Σ) by running KeyGen_Σ ,
- 2 (params, mk) by running $\text{SetUp}_{\text{IBE}}$ and
- 3 sk_R by running $\text{KeyGen}_{\text{RKG}}$. \mathcal{C} gives (params, vk) to calA , keeping (mk, sk_Σ, sk_R) to itself.

Review of Security Model of IBPRE(2/6)

Definition

Phase 1 Given $(\text{params}, vk_{\Sigma})$, \mathcal{A} adaptively queries \mathcal{C} . When \mathcal{A} queries \mathcal{C} , it responds as following:

- **Secret key queries.** When \mathcal{A} queries \mathcal{C} at a point ID , \mathcal{C} generates a secret key sk_{ID_i} for ID by running $\text{KeyGen}_{\text{IBE}}$. \mathcal{C} computes e_{ID_i} by running EGen with the input sk_{ID_i} . \mathcal{C} generates a signature σ_{e_i} for $ID_i || e_{ID_i}$ by running Sign , and \mathcal{C} returns $(sk_{ID_i}, ID_i || e_{ID_i}, \sigma_{e_i})$ to \mathcal{A} .
- **Type-1 re-encryption key queries.** When \mathcal{A} queries \mathcal{C} about $ID_i \rightarrow ID'_i$, \mathcal{C} generates an IBE secret key $sk_{ID'}$ by running $\text{KeyGen}_{\text{IBE}}$, and computes $e_{ID'_i}$ by running EGen with the input $sk_{ID'}$. \mathcal{C} generates a signature $\sigma_{e'_i}$ for $ID'_i || e_{ID'_i}$ by running Sign .

Review of Security Model of IBPRE(3/6)

Definition

\mathcal{C} runs KeyGen_{PRO} with the inputs $e_{ID'_i}$, and returns the resulting re-encryption key $rk_{ID_i \rightarrow ID'_i}$ with $(ID'_i, e_{ID'_i})$ to \mathcal{A} .

- **Type-2 re-encryption key queries.** Suppose that \mathcal{A} queries \mathcal{C} about $(ID_i \rightarrow ID'_i, ID'_i || e_{ID'_i}, \sigma_{e'_i})$. If $(ID'_i || e_{ID'_i}, \sigma_{e'_i})$ has already generated in the answering for secret key query, then \mathcal{C} rejects the query. Otherwise \mathcal{C} verifies $(ID'_i || e_{ID'_i}, \sigma_{e'_i})$ by running Verify with vk_σ and works as following;
 - 1 If it is valid then \mathcal{C} runs KeyGen_{PRO} with the input $e_{ID'_i}$, and returns the resulting re-encryption key $rk_{ID_i \rightarrow ID'}$.
 - 2 Otherwise \mathcal{C} rejects the query.

Review of Security Model of IBPRE(4/6)

Definition

- **Re-encryption queries.** Suppose that \mathcal{A} queries \mathcal{C} about $(sk_{ID'_i}, C_{ID_i}, ID_i \rightarrow ID'_i)$. If $sk_{ID'}$ has never issued to \mathcal{A} then \mathcal{C} rejects the query. Otherwise, \mathcal{C} runs Check with the input(params, C_{ID_i}, ID_i).
 - 1 If Check outputs 0 then \mathcal{C} rejects the query.
 - 2 Otherwise, \mathcal{C} generates $e_{ID'_i}$ by running EGen with $sk_{ID'_i}$ as input. \mathcal{C} generates $rk_{ID_i \rightarrow ID'_i}$ by running KeyGen_{PRO} with the input $e_{ID'_i}$. \mathcal{C} re-encrypts C_{ID_i} into $C_{ID'_i}$ by running ReEnc with the input $rk_{ID_i \rightarrow ID'_i}$. \mathcal{C} returns $C_{ID'_i}$ to \mathcal{A}

Review of Security Model of IBPRE(5/6)

Definition

- **Challenge.** After some queries, \mathcal{A} selects two equal length plaintexts $M_0, M_1 \in \mathcal{M}$ and a target identity ID^* which no secret key for ID^* has issued, and sends them to \mathcal{C} . Given (M_0, M_1, ID^*) , \mathcal{C} selects $d \leftarrow_R \{0, 1\}$ and computes $C_{ID^*} = Enc_{IBE}(ID^*, \text{params}, M_d)$. \mathcal{C} returns C_{ID^*} to \mathcal{A} .
- **Phase 2.** \mathcal{A} continues to issue queries as in Phase 1, and \mathcal{C} responds as before except the following case.
 - 1 If \mathcal{A} makes the secret key query at the point ID^* , then \mathcal{C} rejects.
 - 2 If \mathcal{A} makes the re-encryption query such that $ID_i = ID^*$, then \mathcal{C} rejects.
- **Guess.** Finally, \mathcal{A} outputs a guess $d' \in \{0, 1\}$.

Review of Security Model of IBPRE(6/6)

Definition

The adversary \mathcal{A} wins if $d' = d$. An identity-based proxy re-encryption system is secure in the sense of IND-ID-CPA if $|\Pr[d' = d] - 1/2|$ is negligible.

Review of M2 PRE(1/4)

The underlying IBE scheme (BB_1 -IBE scheme):

- 1 **Setup_{IBE}(k)**. Given a security parameter k , select a random generator $g \in G$ and random elements $g_2, h \in \mathbb{G}$. Pick a random $\alpha \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$. Set $g_1 = g^\alpha$, $\text{mk} = g_2^\alpha$, and $\text{params} = (g, g_1, g_2, h)$. Let mk be the master-secret key and let params be the public parameters.
- 2 **KeyGen_{IBE}(mk, params, ID)**. Given $\text{mk} = g_2^\alpha$ and ID with params , the PKG pick a random $u \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$. Set $sk_{ID} = (d_0, d_1) = (g_2^\alpha (g_1^{ID} h)^u, g^u)$.

Review of M2 PRE(2/4)

- 1 $\text{Enc}_{IBE}(ID, \text{params}, M)$. To encrypt a message $M \in G_1$ under the public key $ID \in Z_p^*$, pick a random $r \in Z_p^*$ and compute $C_{ID} = (g^r, (g_1^{ID}h)^r, \text{Me}(g_1, g_2)^r)$.
- 2 $\text{Dec}_{IBE}(sk_{ID}, \text{params}, C_{ID})$. Given ciphertext $C_{ID} = (C_1, C_2, C_3)$ and the secret key $sk_{ID} = (d_0, d_1)$ with params , compute $M = \frac{C_3 e(d_1, C_2)}{e(d_0, C_1)}$.

Review of M2 PRE(3/4)

The delegation scheme:

- 1 $\text{EGen}(sk_{ID}, \text{params})$. Given $sk_{ID} = (d_0, d_1) = (g_2^\alpha (g_1^{ID} h)^u, g^u)$ for ID with params , set $e_{ID} = d_1 = g^u$.
- 2 $\text{KeyGen}_{PKG}(mk, \text{params})$. Given $mk = \alpha$ with params , set $sk_R = \alpha$.
- 3 $\text{KeyGen}_{PRO}(sk_R, e_{ID'}, \text{params}, ID, ID')$. Given $sk_R = \alpha, e_{ID'} = g^{u'}$ with params , set $rk_{ID \rightarrow ID'} = (ID \rightarrow ID', g^{u'\alpha})$.
- 4 $\text{Check}(\text{params}, C_{ID}, ID)$. Given the delegator's identity ID and $C_{ID} = (C_1, C_2, C_3)$ with params , compute $v_0 = e(C_1, g_1^{ID} h)$ and $v_1 = e(C_2, g)$. If $v_0 = v_1$ then output 1. Otherwise output 0.

Review of M2 PRE(4/4)

- 1 $\text{ReEnc}(rk_{ID \rightarrow ID'}, \text{params}, C_{ID}, ID')$. Given identities ID, ID' , $rk_{ID \rightarrow ID'} = (ID \rightarrow ID', g^{u'\alpha})$, $C_{ID} = (C_1, C_2, C_3)$ with params , the proxy re-encrypt the ciphertext C_{ID} into $C_{ID'}$ as following. First it runs “Check”, if output 0, then return “Reject”. Else it computes $C_{ID'} = (C'_1, C'_2, C'_3) = (C_1, C_2, C_3 e(C_1^{ID' - ID}, g^{u'\alpha}))$.

Attack I(1/2)

Suppose adversary \mathcal{A} 's target identity is ID^* , he attacks as following:

- ① First \mathcal{A} makes secret key query on a randomly chosen identity ID . For $ID \neq ID^*$, Challenger \mathcal{C} returns $sk_{ID} = (d_0, d_1) = (g_2^\alpha (g_1^{ID} h)^u, g^u)$.
- ② Next \mathcal{A} makes Type-1 re-encryption key queries on $\widetilde{ID} \rightarrow ID$ where \widetilde{ID} is a randomly chosen identity. For $\widetilde{ID} \neq ID^*$, Challenger \mathcal{C} returns $rk_{\widetilde{ID} \rightarrow ID} = (rk_1, rk_2) = (\widetilde{ID} \rightarrow ID, g^{u\alpha})$.
- ③ When \mathcal{A} receives a ciphertext $C^* = (C_1^*, C_2^*, C_3^*)$ for ID^* with params, he re-encrypts this ciphertext to the ciphertext for ID as following. $C_{ID} = (C_1, C_2, C_3) = (C_1^*, C_2^*, C_3^* e(C_1^{*ID-ID^*}, g^{u\alpha}))$ where $g^{u\alpha} = rk_2$. We can verify this ciphertext is a valid ciphertext for ID .
- ④ \mathcal{A} can decrypt the ciphertext C_{ID} by the secret key sk_{ID} for the following.

Attack I(2/2)

$$\begin{aligned}\frac{C_3 e(d_1, C_2)}{e(d_0, C_1)} &= \frac{C_3 e(g^{r(ID-ID^*)}, g^{u\alpha}) e(g^u, (g_1^{ID^*} h)^r)}{e(g_2^\alpha (g_1^{ID} h)^u, g^r)} \\ &= \frac{M^* \cdot e(g_1, g_2)^r e((g_1^{ID} h)^r, g^u)}{e(g_1, g_2)^r e((g_1^{ID} h)^r, g^u)} \\ &= M^*\end{aligned}$$

Remark 1

Remark

The first attack shows that the proxy can re-encrypt any IBE user's ciphertext to be the delegatee's ciphertext, which beyond the ability supposed to give proxy, that is, just re-encrypting the delegator's ciphertext to be the delegatee's ciphertext.

Attack II

Suppose adversary \mathcal{A} 's target identity is ID^* , he attacks as following:

- 1 First \mathcal{A} makes **secret key query** on a randomly chosen identity ID . For $ID \neq ID^*$, Challenger \mathcal{C} returns $sk_{ID} = (g_2^\alpha (g_1^{ID} h)^u, g^u)$ where u is randomly chosen from Z_q^* .
- 2 Next \mathcal{A} makes **Type-1 re-encryption key queries** on $\widetilde{ID} \rightarrow ID$ where \widetilde{ID} is a randomly chosen identity. For $\widetilde{ID} \neq ID^*$, Challenger \mathcal{C} returns $rk_{\widetilde{ID} \rightarrow ID} = (rk_1, rk_2) = (\widetilde{ID} \rightarrow ID, g^{u\alpha})$.
- 3 Now \mathcal{A} can compute valid private keys for ID^* .

$$\frac{g_2^\alpha (g_1^{ID} h)^u}{g^{u\alpha ID}} \cdot g^{u\alpha ID^*} = g_2^\alpha (g_1^{ID^*} h)^u$$

and we can see $(g_2^\alpha (g_1^{ID^*} h)^u, g^u)$ is a valid private key for ID^* .

Remark 2

Remark

The second attack implies that, if the proxy colludes with any delegatee, the proxy and this delegatee can derive any other IBE user's secret key.

Important Notes

- Actually, these two Attacks use the same method to attack the scheme, **so Attack II implies Attack I.**
- Although our attacks follow the “Proxy and Delegatee collusion attack” paradigm, **but we remark that our attacks are different with “Proxy and Delegatee collusion attack” in bidirectional PRE such as R. Canetti and S. Hohenberger’s CCA2 secure PRE in CCS’07. In that paper, the authors excluding “Proxy and authorized Delegatee collusion attack” in their security model.**
- Actually, our attack can be seen as a **“Proxy and any Delegatee collusion attack”** instead of a **“Proxy and authorized Delegatee collusion attack”**.

Conclusions

We give two attacks to M2 PRE. The reason why their scheme is not secure is that **their re-encryption key is of the form $g^{u/\alpha}$ where α is the master – key**. This re-encryption key can give the adversary more power than just doing re-encryption from the delegator to the delegatee.

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