Re: [P1363:] 1363.3: Using generalized schemes / choice of pairings
On Wed, July 2, 2008 4:06, Nigel Smart said:
>> * Is it too early in the use of IBE to start standardizing
>> different pairings, and should we focus on a single
>> interoperable specification?
>>
>
> The exact opposite. It is so early you don't want to exclude something.
>
> For example currently Ate/sextic twists are best at "proper" security
> levels (i.e. equivalent to 128-bit AES/256-bit ECC/3000-bit RSA)
> as opposed to "academic" security levels (80-bit Block cipher, 160-bit ECC,
> 1024-bit RSA). It might be that someone finds a really really good way of
> making supersingular curves work at these levels, so you dont want to
> exclude them (you will still die on bandwidth for ss-curves, but maybe in
> some apps you dont care about that).
I agree entirely -- except for the "academic" epithet of 80-bit security.
There are very disparate scenarios in practice where the existence of a single
spec would hinder interoperability rather than promoting it.
For instance, we can think of sensors nodes on the one hand (where imposing
the 128-bit level would actually preclude the use of pairings), versus server
clusters on the other (where security below the 128-bit level may easily
prevent the deployment of many critical applications); a single spec would
render these two platforms isolated from one another if pairings are involved.
As Nigel says, it's too early to exclude something you may well need.
Paulo Barreto.
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