RE: wrong key behaviour
>>the difference [between LRW and EME] is the level of granularity.
With 4KB LBA's the difference in granularity is 256 fold, not a trivial
amount. I call 16-byte granularity very weak against traffic analysis,
4KB granularity somewhat weak. There are other alternatives, too, which
are much better in this regard. I do not insist on reviving EME,
especially because of the royalty issue. It can be prohibitively
expensive at a volume of 100 million disk drives a year, we don't know
the licensing conditions, so why should we spend our time on
standardizing something we would never use?
Laszlo
> -------- Original Message --------
> Subject: Re: wrong key behaviour
> From: james hughes <Jim.P.Hughes@Sun.COM>
> Date: Thu, December 22, 2005 8:00 pm
> To: laszlo@HARS.US
> Cc: james hughes <Jim.P.Hughes@Sun.COM>, stds-p1619@IEEE.ORG
>
> On Dec 22, 2005, at 7:32 PM, laszlo@HARS.US wrote:
>
> >>> a "wrong key behavior" can be beyond the scope
> > The issue is rather: can the raw, encrypted data be read from the
> > drive?
> > Maybe, the standard could just say in the introduction that LRW is
> > weak
> > against traffic analysis,
>
> We know that LRW is vulnerable to a per 16 byte block code book
> attack (active and passive). EME is vulnerable to a per sector code
> book attack (again passive and active). So the difference is the
> level of granularity.
>
> If you want EME or EME-like algorithm, make the proposal and we will
> consider it on the P1619a round.
>
> Thanks
>
> jim