

Key Management for Link Layer Security

Kwangjo Kim*, **Hyunrok Lee***,
Taehwan Yoo**, **Jeesook Eun****

Information and Communications University (ICU) *

Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute (ETRI) **

Content


- **802.11i overview**
- **Proposed Key management**
- **Authentication**
- **Mobility**
- **Ensuring mobility**

- **Confirmed Standard - 2004.6.24**
- **Data Security (Key Management/Crypto Algorithm)**
 - IEEE 802.1aa
 - Accept 802.11i Key Descriptor
 - Define Key exchange state machine
 - IEEE 802.11i
 - RSN (Robust Security Network)
 - Access control based on 802.1X
 - Dynamic Key Exchange and Management
 - New Crypto Algorithm
 - TKIP – For backward compatibility (WEP)
 - CCMP – AES-CCM mode


■ User Authentication

- IEEE 802.1X
 - Port-Based Network Access Control
 - Before authentication: uncontrolled port
 - After authentication: controlled port open
- IEEE 802.1aa
 - Extra document for 802.1X
 - After authentication and Key exchange: controlled port open
- EAP (Extensible Authentication Protocol)
 - Various authentication mechanism will be acceptable
 - EAP-MD5, EAP-TLS, EAP-TTLS
- AAA (Authentication, Authorization and Accounting) Server
 - RADIUS (Remote Authentication Dial In User Service) Server
 - RFC 2865
 - Diameter Server
 - RFC 3588


IEEE 802.11i - Authentication





IEEE 802.11i - Authentication & Key Exchange





802.11i - Pairwise Key Hierarchy




Master Key (MK)




Pairwise Master Key (PMK) = $\text{TLS-PRF}(\text{MK}, \text{"client EAP encryption"} \mid \text{clientHello.random} \mid \text{serverHello.random})$




Pairwise Transient Key (PTK) = $\text{EAPoL-PRF}(\text{PMK}, \text{AP Nonce} \mid \text{STA Nonce} \mid \text{AP MAC Addr} \mid \text{STA MAC Addr})$



Key Confirmation Key (KCK)-PTK bits 0-127



Key Encryption Key (KEK)-PTK bits 128-255



Temporal Key -PTK bits 256- n – can have cipher suite specific structure

802.11i – Key Management



STA



AP



AS

Step1: Use RADIUS to push PMK from AS to AP



Step2: Use PMK and 4-way Handshake to derive, bind, and verify PTK



Step 3: Use Group Key Handshake to send GTK from AP to STA



Proposed Key Management


- **DISCOVERY**
- **Key Hierarchy**
- **Key Exchange with verification**

DISCOVERY



- **Cannot avoid this process!!**
- **Following factors should be configured before operation.**
 - Is there any valid MACsec module?
 - Where is Cryptography function?
 - Tx only? Rx only? Both possible?
 - What is Cryptography algorithm?
 - GCM-AES-128,CCM-AES-128,OCB-AES-128,RSA?
 - What is Key distribution algorithm?
 - Diffie-Hellman?
 - And so on...

Key Hierarchy



- SP : Supplicant
- AUTH : Authenticator




Master Key (MK) – Pre-configured Key (Symmetric Key)




Pairwise Master Key (PMK)
=PRF(MK|SP_Hello.random|AUTH_Hello.random)




Pairwise Transient Key (PTK)
=PRF(PMK, AUTH Nonce|SP Nonce|AUTH MAC Addr|SP MAC Addr)



Key Confirmation
Key (KCK)-PTK
bits 0-127



Key Encryption
Key (KEK)-PTK
bits 128-255




Temporal Key -PTK bits 256- n –
can have cipher suite specific structure

Authentication


- SP : Supplicant
- AUTH : Authenticator

- 802.1x is so bulky for Layer 2 Authentication
- Using Pairwise Mater Key (PMK)
 - Make it Simple

Authentication using PMK



Key Exchange with verification



- SP : Supplicant
- AUTH : Authenticator


Mobility

■ Glossary

- In the networks, the ability of a terminal, while in motion, to access telecommunication services from different locations, and the capability of the network to identify and locate that terminal.

■ Considerations

- Wireless Supplicant always needs mobility
- Wired Supplicant
 - Frequency
 - Bridge to Bridge
 - Over the local area



■ Requirements

- Require a system whose role works like Authentication Server (AS)
- Guarantee communication channel with Layer 2 protocol


■ Possible Models

- Back-end [1]
 - Relay role between Supplicant (SP) and AS
 - Watch the response from AS to SP → set controlled port
 - Whether SP includes Authenticator Address information or not
 - The key distribution protocol for making AS know SP's
- Authenticator (AUTH) + AS [2]
 - Subject of authentication : AUTH
 - Protocol for finding the authentication information of SP
 - Broadcast
 - Query with Destination MAC Address
- Assumptions
 - globally unique MAC address
 - AS (or AUTH) maintains master key information table between SP address and AUTH address
 - Pre-established secure channel among AS (or AUTH)


Ensuring Mobility

(2/2)

[1]



[2]



◆ Further works

➔ Key Management to support mobility

Thank you for your attention
Q&A

