RE: [Fwd: RE: MTBF for voting machines] part 2
"Random" (-looking) errors are PRECISELY the tool an adversary would deploy
in precincts favoring the opponent: the election outcome can be "steered" if
counts can be selectively "blurred" or "fuzzed" towards the mean in regions
favoring the opponent, and/or "sharpened" or "hyped" in regions favoring the
benefactor. These kinds of errors or fraud may slip beneath the radar,
since, on a tally by tally basis, they look "normal".
--
Pete Klammer, P.E. / ACM(1970), IEEE(SA,P1583), ICCP(CCP), NSPE(PE)
3200 Routt Street / Wheat Ridge, Colorado 80033-5452
(303)233-9485 / Fax:(303)274-6182 / Mailto:PKlammer@ACM.org
"Either Be Good, or Else Be Careful, but Do Have Fun! "
> -----Original Message-----
> From: owner-stds-1583-disc@LISTSERV.IEEE.ORG
> [mailto:owner-stds-1583-disc@LISTSERV.IEEE.ORG] On Behalf Of
> David Aragon
> Sent: Friday, February 25, 2005 1:14 PM
> To: notable@MINDSPRING.COM; SAVIOCvs@AOL.COM;
> sklein@CPCUG.ORG; stds-1583-disc@IEEE.ORG
> Subject: Re: [Fwd: RE: MTBF for voting machines] part 2
>
> Rebecca says:
>
> > Actually, even the so-called "random" failures can introduce skew.
>
> Definitely, especially if we create a model and call "random" anything
> the model doesn't cover. The consent decree in Common Cause v. Jones
> didn't depend on the Votomatic errors having any systematic bias.
> They could. But even if they didn't, their error rate would have
> a systematic civil rights impact and a systematic effect on the total
> vote count.
>
> Dave.
>