Re: [ieee] RE: Hand Recounts of votes recorded on DREs
A miscalibrated touch screen can make it impossible to vote for a
candidate whose button is on the edge of the screen.
Best regards,
Arthur
At 5:11 PM -0500 12/12/04, Brit Williams wrote:
>A poorly calibrated touchscreen is not a serious problem. Unless
>the voter is completely spaced out she will notice that the wrong
>name is lit. If the voter is experienced with touchscreen voting
>they will simply touch the name again to turn it off and vote for
>the correct candidate. An inexperienced voter will call the poll
>worker immediately. If the calibration problem persists, the voter
>will notify a poll worker. The poll worker will move the voter to
>another machine and, if necessary, recalibrate the voting station.
>I say 'if necessary' because in Georgia we only work on a voting
>station in the precinct if it is absolutely necessary. We train our
>poll workers to simply remove the machine from the line and then
>accumulate the votes from it after the polls close.
>
>Brit
>----- Original Message ----- From: "Arthur Keller" <ark@SOE.UCSC.EDU>
>To: "Andrew Berg" <andrewb@votehere.com>
>Cc: <stds-1583-stg3@IEEE.ORG>; <stds-1583-disc@IEEE.ORG>;
><stds-1583-tg1@IEEE.ORG>; <stds-1583-tg2@IEEE.ORG>
>Sent: Friday, December 10, 2004 12:49 PM
>Subject: Re: [ieee] RE: Hand Recounts of votes recorded on DREs
>
>>Paper trails do partially address touchscreen calibration issues.
>>Having an independent voter-verified copy of the vote would help
>>voters detect when the wrong candidate was selected by touchscreen
>>miscalibration. Of course, the review screen also helps with this
>>problem.
>>
>>Miscalibrations of touchscreens are very serious, since they can mean
>>voting for the wrong candidate, or even being unable to vote for some
>>at all.
>>
>>Best regards,
>>Arthur
>>
>>At 7:30 AM -0800 12/10/04, Andrew Berg wrote:
>>>Just so that I'm clear on what you're trying to say:
>>>
>>>Are you claiming that machines tested to a 15000 hour MTBF would
>>>_not_ need a paper trail?
>>>
>>>Also, are you intentionally conflating touchscreen calibration
>>>issues (which a paper trail does not adequately address) with data
>>>retention reliability issues (which a paper trail might be of some
>>>benefit)? I'm no expert on reliability, but my years in system
>>>design have taught me to keep seperate issues seperate.
>>>
>>>-andrew
>>>
>>>On 09 Dec 2004 19:05:15 -0500, Stanley A. Klein <sklein@cpcug.org> wrote:
>>>
>>>>Requiring recalibration is a machine failure. It is a loss of function
>>>>lasting more than 10 seconds.
>>>>
>>>>The 163 hours allows as low as a 90.7% reliability during election day
>>>>and a 72% reliability during combined election day and pre-election
>>>>setup.
>>>>
>>>>If the systems were 99.9% reliable (i.e., a 15000 hour MTBF instead of
>>>>the ludicrously inadequate 163 hours) then you would have a failure
>>>>budget of .001 within which you would allocate all failures including
>>>>requirements for recalibration during election day.
>>>>
>>>>Touch screens should be designed that can operate with much lower than
>>>>.001 probability of needing recalibration during election day and less
>>>>than .002 probability of needing recalibration during system setup. You
>>>>need to be much lower because there are other failure modes besides
>>>>requiring recalibration. If you can't do that, then touch screen
>>>>technology should not be permitted in voting systems.
>>>>
>>>>The 163 hour MTBF is so inadequate that between 50% and 80% of precincts
>>>>will experience some kind of machine failure, visible or invisible,
>>>>during election day. This is borne out by empirical observation during
>>>>the recent election. Equipment built to that shoddy a standard needs
>>>>the backup of a paper trail.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>Stan Klein
>>>>
>>>
>>>-andrew
>>>
>>>--
>>>andrewb@votehere.com
>>
>>
>>--
>>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>Arthur M. Keller, Visiting Associate Professor, Computer Science Dept.
>>University of California, Baskin School of Engineering, Room 153B,
>>1156 High Street, Santa Cruz, CA 95066-1077
>>tel +1(831)459-1485, fax +1(831)459-4829, www.soe.ucsc.edu/~ark
--
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Arthur M. Keller, Visiting Associate Professor, Computer Science Dept.
University of California, Baskin School of Engineering, Room 153B,
1156 High Street, Santa Cruz, CA 95066-1077
tel +1(831)459-1485, fax +1(831)459-4829, www.soe.ucsc.edu/~ark