RE: Problem with section 5.1.3.2.5 Vote Secrecy
At 8:51 PM -0700 9/15/04, David Aragon wrote:
>Yes, I agree that Greg's example is within the range that the
>Standard should make sense for. If a machine has two outputs,
>one paper and one electronic, then policy could range anywhere
>from "only the electronic one counts" to "only the paper one
>counts" -- but whichever ones are present, the Security section
>is trying to say they have to be either stored like ballots or
>erased.
Why can't the electronic version be maintained as an audit trail to
be reconciled against the paper version? It seems reasonable so long
as there is no information maintained about the order in which the
paper ballots were printed.
Best regards,
Arthur
--
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Arthur M. Keller, Visiting Associate Professor, Computer Science Dept.
University of California, Baskin School of Engineering, Room 153B,
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tel +1(831)459-1485, fax +1(831)459-4829, www.soe.ucsc.edu/~ark