RE: Problem with section 5.1.3.2.5 Vote Secrecy
Gregg, that is the approach of the Open Voting Consortium (although
because it prints a paper ballot, it is technically a computerized
ballot printer. and not a DRE). An advantage of the OVC system is
that it maintains an electronic audit trail as well as cryptographic
marks to help prevent ballot stuffing and including the same ballot
more than once in the tally. The OVC approach is also accessible
because the paper ballot can be "spoken" through the Ballot
Verification Station to a visually or reading impaired voter.
Best regards,
Arthur
At 10:20 PM -0500 9/15/04, Gregg Vanderheiden wrote:
>There is also a 4th case - yes?
>DRE is used to create a paper ballot that is then the official ballot and
>must be turned in to be counted. (like any other paper ballot)
>
>
>Gregg
>
> -- ------------------------------
>Gregg C Vanderheiden Ph.D.
>Professor - Ind. Engr. & BioMed Engr.
>Director - Trace R & D Center
>University of Wisconsin-Madison
>
>
>-----Original Message-----
>From: owner-stds-1583-stg3@listserv.ieee.org
>[mailto:owner-stds-1583-stg3@listserv.ieee.org] On Behalf Of David Aragon
>Sent: Wednesday, September 15, 2004 3:29 PM
>To: Josephine.Scott@COMPUWARE.COM; stds-1583-stg3@IEEE.ORG;
>stds-1583-tg1@IEEE.ORG
>Cc: dave@idiom.com
>Subject: RE: Problem with section 5.1.3.2.5 Vote Secrecy
>
>Josie said:
>
>> I believe (the author may correct me) that the "under glass"
>> method was a nod toward the problem of making the verification
>> record accessible as well.
>
>I believe the impetus for this (Mercuri method) architecture was,
>originally, to prevent the voter carrying off the paper proof of
>how they voted. (Or, for that matter, altering or defacing it so
>that even if it started out as a true copy of the electronic record,
>it creates a discrepancy when it goes into the box.)
>
>If the electronic record is the official record, this is quite an
>important concern, because taking the paper "receipt" could allow
>selling it, and altering it would foul up an audit or recount.
>
>How the paper and electronic records are used is a policy matter,
>and we need evaluative criteria for the equipment that make sense
>across various policies. It seems to me that at least the following
>would prevent selling the paper:
>
>(1) The paper is the official record and is always counted.
> (But that's policy and we cannot specify it.)
>
>(2) In a DRE where the electronic record is official and the paper
> is an audit trail, prevent the voter from removing or altering
> the paper record (except to spoil both).
>
>(3) In an optical-scan system, the electronic record is made from
> the paper and again, the voter cannot take or alter the paper
> after the electronic record is created (except to spoil both).
>
>Method (1) is a paper ballot. Method (2) can be Mercuri Method for
>a DRE, and is evidently required by the current standards language.
>I think the standards language should also permit (3).
>
>Regards,
>Dave.
--
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Arthur M. Keller, Visiting Associate Professor, Computer Science Dept.
University of California, Baskin School of Engineering, Room 153B,
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