FW: Problem with section 5.1.3.2.5 Vote Secrecy
Dear All,
I passed on all messages in my company and this is one of the reactions.
Jacques Hulshof
N.V. Nederlandsche Apparatenfabriek "Nedap"
+ 31 (0) 544 471 162 (Phone); + 31 (0) 544 463 475 (Fax)
+ 31 (0) 6 53718821 (Mobile); jacques.hulshof@nedap.com
Parallelweg 2, NL-7141 DC Groenlo
or P.O. Box 6, NL-7140 AA Groenlo, The Netherlands
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-----Original Message-----
From: Rudy Wolbers
Sent: donderdag 16 september 2004 9:46
To: Jacques Hulshof
Subject: RE: Problem with section 5.1.3.2.5 Vote Secrecy
Hello Jacques,
After reading a lot of e-mails about whether ballot printing is part of
this annex to the standard I am wondering what all the fuss is about.
The annex is about the voter verifiable paper audit trail. This is meant
to allow the voter to verify that his or her vote is at least stored in
a way that can't be changed by electronics and software, despite the
fact that this is severely tested and approved for its purpose.
It should therefore always be in combination with electronic storage of
votes. Systems that already have a paper ballot that the voter can read
(and perhaps even handle) in their main process don't require this voter
verifiable paper audit trail in that sense.
It seems everyone wants to make sure that his or her solution fits into
the definition of a VVPAT, even when their system doesn't require it
because the matter of trust is already solved in the way their system
operates. The VVPAT is an option, but might not necessarily be required
for those systems that solve voter trust in other, perhaps even better,
ways. The annex is, as I see it, to describe what requirements it should
fulfill in the case it is required as add-on.
Regards,
Rudy Wolbers
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-----Original Message-----
From: Jacques Hulshof
Sent: donderdag 16 september 2004 9:08
To: Rudy Wolbers; Hans van Wijk
Subject: FW: Problem with section 5.1.3.2.5 Vote Secrecy
Jacques Hulshof
N.V. Nederlandsche Apparatenfabriek "Nedap"
+ 31 (0) 544 471 162 (Phone); + 31 (0) 544 463 475 (Fax)
+ 31 (0) 6 53718821 (Mobile); jacques.hulshof@nedap.com
Parallelweg 2, NL-7141 DC Groenlo
or P.O. Box 6, NL-7140 AA Groenlo, The Netherlands
-----Original Message-----
From: Arthur Keller [mailto:ark@SOE.UCSC.EDU]
Sent: donderdag 16 september 2004 8:57
To: AlKolwicz@QWEST.NET
Cc: 'David Aragon'; gv@TRACE.WISC.EDU; Josephine.Scott@COMPUWARE.COM;
stds-1583-stg3@IEEE.ORG; stds-1583-tg1@IEEE.ORG
Subject: RE: Problem with section 5.1.3.2.5 Vote Secrecy
The Vogue AutoMark, as far as I know, does not maintain an electronic
audit trial. So there is only the paper ballot itself.
The OVC system prints a paper ballot *and* maintains a permanent
electronic audit trial.
Best regards,
Arthur
At 10:09 PM -0600 9/15/04, alkolwicz wrote:
>Does a vote marking machine, such as the Vogue AutoMark, fit within
this
>definition?
>
>Al Kolwicz
>CAMBER
>
>-----Original Message-----
>From: owner-stds-1583-stg3@listserv.ieee.org
>[mailto:owner-stds-1583-stg3@listserv.ieee.org] On Behalf Of David
Aragon
>Sent: Wednesday, September 15, 2004 8:52 PM
>To: dave@IDIOM.COM; gv@TRACE.WISC.EDU; Josephine.Scott@COMPUWARE.COM;
>stds-1583-stg3@IEEE.ORG; stds-1583-tg1@IEEE.ORG
>Subject: RE: Problem with section 5.1.3.2.5 Vote Secrecy
>
>Yes, I agree that Greg's example is within the range that the
>Standard should make sense for. If a machine has two outputs,
>one paper and one electronic, then policy could range anywhere
>from "only the electronic one counts" to "only the paper one
>counts" -- but whichever ones are present, the Security section
>is trying to say they have to be either stored like ballots or
>erased.
>
>Dave
--
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Arthur M. Keller, Visiting Associate Professor, Computer Science Dept.
University of California, Baskin School of Engineering, Room 153B,
1156 High Street, Santa Cruz, CA 95066-1077
tel +1(831)459-1485, fax +1(831)459-4829, www.soe.ucsc.edu/~ark