----- Original Message -----
Sent: Saturday, December 06, 2003 3:07
PM
Subject: Paper stock and possible voting
error with optical scanners
Stephen, Herb, Brit, et al.,
During the November elections Al Kolwicz and I
were contacted by a candidate in a Denver school board race. She was concerned
about the excessive number of undervotes in her race, ~30% compared to 5-7% in
the other races.
While a larger undervote in a school board race
isn't unusual in school board races, an investigation turned up some factors
that affect the P1583 standards.
This was a mail election using paper ballots and
the ballots were read using a Sequoia optical scanner system using a DOS
operating system (DOS OS is the only Sequoia scanner system certified by
Colorado at present). The Denver election officials were quite cooperative and
allowed us to inspect the actual ballots used, which are generated and printed
by Sequoia in California.
The problems with respect to the standards come
in because the paper stock used to print the ballots on was rather more
translucent than I expected for an optical scanner. Also, the ballot was
printed on two sides. So the first issue is that I don't recall seeing any
standards that specify how opaque the paper stock must be for paper
ballots.
Secondly, the Sequoia scanner read the ballot as
a mark between a greater than and less than symbol, i.e., >
< is the blank the voter sees, and they indicate their vote by a line
between the symbols >-< for their candidate of
choice. While we were not able to test the problem for the usual
reasons, a potential error arises with translucent paper stock because on the
reverse side of the ballot there was a solid line aligned with the candidate
we were helping. So looking at a light with a blank ballot in hand one saw
------>-<--------
We are unable to determine whether this
caused the candidate to receive additional votes, or whether undervotes
resulted if the voter voted for some other candidate. An undervote might
result if the voter marked some other candidate, particularly if the voter
drew a very light line between the symbols for their candidate. The scanner
might then read both the mark on the front of the ballot and the one on the
back of the ballot. As overvotes are automatically rejected, the election
tabulation might show many fewer votes in this race than were actually
cast.
In either case the voting equipment
standards need to include a test of optical scanners for such malfunctions and
specify ballot opacity. As best I can find the draft standards don't consider
these issues at present.
Chuck Corry
--
Charles E. Corry, Ph.D., F.G.S.A.
President, Equal
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