SUO: RE: RE: Continuants and Occurrents in 4D
John,
I think we may be disagreeing on something fundamental.
It seems to me that world views can be called incompatible if they disagree
on something fundamental - something which influences the whole ontology -
even if the differences can be encapsulated in a few 'predicates'.
The process you describe:
If you want to merge the ontologies, then you fiddle around
with the definitions. In the worst case (which usually turns
out to be the most common case), you end up with the union of
all the definitions, and each predicate has a suffix to indicate
which original it came from.
Resolution: If you have a predicate P with two different
definitions, you have an inconsistency. But if you have P1
with one definition and P2 with another definition, there is
no inconsistency. To minimize duplication, what standards
organizations usually do is to rename P1 to be P, to keep
P2 available for backwards compatibility, but to say that P2
is "deprecated" -- i.e., not recommended for future development.
Seems to me, at one level - a practical set of rules for developing a single
ontology.
But at another level, it seems to me forcing a single world view.
Take the standard example - my desk. It is a physical object and under the
E(ndurantist) view this is one thing, under the P(erdurantist) view it is
another. Do I have two predicates or two definitions? I would tend to say
two predicates. If we had to choose, then which is P1 and which P2 - i.e.
which do we demote to 'not recommended for future development'. And when we
have made the choice, have we not demoted all world views that incorporate
P2.
It would seem to be impractical (your worst case) to keep both predicates,
as this would, for starters, mean that there would be two versions of every
type of physical object property.
I agree with you that it makes pragmatic sense to choose one for a working
ontology. But I thought you were arguing for being able to somehow maintain
a number of ontologies. Or even more difficult, a lattice of related
ontologies, so that we did not need to make the choice.
On a related point, I agree with your 'Checking Account' example. My
experience is that at this level analysis reveals some way to incorporate
the two perspectives on the checking account into a synthesized richer
notion. My experience and, I think, a common philosophical claim, is that
there are some fundamental (top level) notions where this is not practical.
What I was trying to understand was how to deal with this - other than
choose an option.
Regards
Chris
-----Original Message-----
From: owner-standard-upper-ontology@ieee.org
[mailto:owner-standard-upper-ontology@ieee.org]On Behalf Of John F. Sowa
Sent: 07 March 2001 16:19
To: standard-upper-ontology@ieee.org
Subject: SUO: RE: Continuants and Occurrents in 4D
Chris,
There is a big difference between saying that an entire
world view is incompatible with another and saying that
one particular definition of one of the predicates is
difficult and perhaps impossible to translate to the other.
>The point is not that people (and Pat) have complained that 'Endurantist'
>and 'Perdurantist' views cannot be translated. It is that one view cannot
be
>expressed in the language of the other. So, for example, in your preferred
>Perdurantist Whiteheadean view (a general preference I share) it seems
>difficult (impossible) to describe the standard Endurantist view - where
>continuants are wholly present at each point in time at which they exist.
>However, I thought your position was that you preferred a general
collection
>of theories in which Whiteheadean Perdurantism would co-exist peacefully
>(and consistently) with Endurantism.
This objection merely amounts to saying that Peter Simons'
definition (which I think is a good one) is difficult to
translate. So then I suggested a different definition, which
is meaningful in both a 3-D and a 4-D coordinate system,
and which has a very large overlap with Simons' definition.
Difficulties like this occur all the time at every level of
the ontology. When banks merge, they discover that they have
different definitions of "checking account". But that doesn't
mean that their entire world views are incompatible.
If you want to merge the ontologies, then you fiddle around
with the definitions. In the worst case (which usually turns
out to be the most common case), you end up with the union of
all the definitions, and each predicate has a suffix to indicate
which original it came from.
Resolution: If you have a predicate P with two different
definitions, you have an inconsistency. But if you have P1
with one definition and P2 with another definition, there is
no inconsistency. To minimize duplication, what standards
organizations usually do is to rename P1 to be P, to keep
P2 available for backwards compatibility, but to say that P2
is "deprecated" -- i.e., not recommended for future development.
John Sowa