Re: SUO: RE: Continuants and Occurrents in 4D
"John F. Sowa" <sowa@bestweb.net>:
>Matthew West wrote:
>
> >I also notice a theme developing here, that a 3D viewpoint can be seen as a
>
> >view on a 4D viewpoint. I mention this because it accords with my own
> >expectation. I will be interested to see if it is justified.
>
>To a large extent, I would agree with that. And by the way,
>there is nothing especially new about the 4-D point of view.
>It was discussed by the medieval Scholastics, including
>St. Thomas Acquinas, who used a 4-D description in discussing
>how God's foreknowledge could be consistent with human free
>will.
>
>His basic point was that God sees everything from a 4-D
>point of view, but mere mortals can't see ahead. God's view
>doesn't prevent mere mortals from making choices from their
>particular point of view.
>
>And I don't believe that there is any inconsistency between
>these points of view. They are just different ways of
>describing the same universe.
They are different and *inconsistent* ways. Let me put the
inconsistency in a nutshell for you.
P says that properties are timeless.
E says that a continuant is the same thing at one time as at another.
Both agree that there is change in the universe: shit happens, in the
immortal phrase.
E would describe change by saying that some thing X that E calls a
continuant has property Q at one time but not-Q at another time.
Now, to P, E seems to be saying that one thing, X - the *same thing*
at one time as at another, recall - both has and does not have the
property Q, which is a blatant contradiction. That isn't what E
means, of course: what E means is that X has Q at time T1 and not-Q
at time T2; but that is incoherent to P, since in P's world
properties don't obtain 'at' times. After some discussion, P might
figure out that what E seems to mean is that Q is true of the
T1-slice of X and false of the T2-slice of X; and indeed that is how
to translate E's vocabulary into P's ontology, so all seems rosy. (P
may well say to himself: that guy is confused, since obviously X at
one time isnt *identical* to X at another time, or it would have the
same properties: any fool can see that.) But if that idea is put to
E, he will reject it vehemently (I've tried it, and they do); he will
say that this is a basic mistake, and even use words like 'fallacy',
since it is of the very essence of a continuant like X, it seems to
E, that one does *not* distinguish its temporal 'parts'; continuants
don't have temporal parts (episodes), by their very nature; so to
even think about the T-slice of X is a fundamental error, in E's
world. So P's translation of E's ontology, although perfectly fine to
P, would be rejected by E, and be classified as a syntax error by any
respectable E-aligned ontology..
So they agree - everyone agrees - that change happens; but E's
conclusion is that properties must change, because things don't; and
P's conclusion is that things must be different at different times,
because properties don't change.
Both of them find the other's world-view unusable. To E, P's universe
seems to be a kind of Heraclitian limbo where all is flux and there
are no real things at all; to P, E's classifications seem arbitrary
and unnecessary, and moreover the only way he can make sense of them
is apparently blasphemous to E.
>Perhaps some predicates that are easy to define in one view
>don't map into the other view. That may be an inconvenience,
>but it is certainly not an inconsistency.
It is likely to produce an inconsistency if you just try to merge the
two views, rather than keeping them separated and translating between
them with some care, and even some diplomacy.
Pat
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