RE: SUO: what the hell was C S P talking about?
John,
Thanks very much for the concise, yet detailed discussion that you've given.
Another CSP definition of "sign" is:
"A sign, or representamen, is something which stands to somebody for
something in some respect or capacity. It addresses somebody, that is,
creates in the mind of that person an equivalent sign, or perhaps a more
developed sign. That sign which it creates I call the interpretant of the
first sign. The sign stands for something, its object. It stands for that
object, not in all respects, but in reference to a sort of idea, which I
have sometimes called the ground of the representamen." (CSP, CP 2:228)
This definition makes it clear that we are talking about an agent
("somebody") using signs to represent things.
If I understand correctly, one simple interpretation / example of this
definition might be:
A sign ("representamen") that is a text string, like "Yojo".
What the sign "stands for", i.e. a physical cat.
An agent ("somebody") for whom the text string "Yojo" stands for a physical
cat.
The "interpretant" created in the mind of the agent, which also stands for a
physical cat. This "interpretant" is an internal "conceptual structure",
which the agent uses to represent the physical cat in its "mind".
If I understand the "ground of the representamen" idea correctly, then
"Yojo" stands for a physical cat not in all respects, but in reference a
particular idea, e.g. a specific, individual physical cat viewed as a pet.
More specifically, "Yojo" might stand for an individual cat in reference to
its (individual catlike) personality, behavior, history, etc. Thus when we
say "Yojo" we may not be referring to a specific physical cat just as a
physical entity.
Phil Jackson
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"When we learn that white cats with blue eyes are deaf and have peculiar
habits, such as that of following their masters like dogs, we no sooner see
a white cat than we want to know what colored eyes she has. This may be
called association by relational contiguity. That is to say not only have
the two ideas frequently been experienced together, but their union has
often been accompanied in experience with a third idea of an interesting
kind. Another kind of association which is very important is that which
makes an idea interesting. I propose to term it association by interest. An
idea occurs to us in such a way that it would, other things being equal, be
very dim. For example, it may result from a fortuitous putting together of
two other ideas both of which are sunk deep in the subconscious mind. But if
the new idea happens to be interesting, it will promptly become vivid. Why
is this? Clearly it is because the objective self-consciousness, or the idea
which a man has of himself, consists in large measure of what may be roughly
described as a composite of ideas of his aims and purposes, including all
problems which exercise him. Now the separate components of this composite
may for the most part be dim; but the total idea is perhaps the most vivid
in consciousness at all times. Now an interesting idea is one which has an
analogy, or resemblance in form, to this composite of the man's aims. It is,
therefore, drawn into vividness by the vividness of that composite."
-- CSP, CP7:499
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> -----Original Message-----
> From: owner-standard-upper-ontology@ieee.org
> [mailto:owner-standard-upper-ontology@ieee.org]On Behalf Of John F. Sowa
> Sent: Wednesday, May 02, 2001 11:13 PM
> Cc: standard-upper-ontology@ieee.org
> Subject: Re: SUO: what the hell was C S P talking about?
>
>
>
> Pat,
>
> One important point to remember is that P. said that anything and
> everything could be considered a sign, including neural excitations
> in the brain. What keeps that observation from being trivial is his
> taxonomy of various kinds of signs.
>
> Examples:
>
> 1. Qualisign: A simple sensory quality, such as red or hot.
>
> 2. Sinsign: An existing thing, which is a sign of itself, such
> as a dog, a tree, or a person named "George W. Bush".
>
> 3. Legisign: A convention or habit, such as a rubber cone on the
> street causes motorists to turn away.
>
> 4. Icon: An image that resembles the thing it is a sign of,
> such as a picture, drawing, etc.
>
> 5. Index: Something that indicates its referent by some causal
> connection, such as smoke means fire, a pointing weathervane
> indicates the direction of the wind.
>
> 6. Symbol: Something that indicates its referent by convention,
> such as a stop light or insignia on a uniform.
>
> 7. Rheme: A formal symbol that indicates a specific type of entity,
> such as the word "telephone", which indicates a telephone.
>
> 8. Dicent Sign: A formal symbol that states a proposition, such as
> a sentence in English or a formula in mathematics.
>
> 9. Argument: A sequence of dicent signs that expresses a lawlike
> relationship (such as a proof in logic).
>
> Some comments:
>
> | A sign is something,
> | 'A', which brings something, 'B', its 'interpretant'
> | sign, determined or created by it, into the same
> | sort of correspondence (or a lower implied sort)
> | with something, 'C', its 'object', as that in
> | which itself stands to 'C'.
>
> A, B, and C are different kinds of signs. For example #1 above,
> the sign A would be some retinal stimulation, B would be some
> neural excitation, which may be called a "percept", and C would
> be another neural excitation, which may be called a "concept".
>
> For example #2, A might be my cat Yojo, B would be my concept of Yojo,
> and C would be the name "Yojo".
>
> For example #9, A would be the symbols in a logic book, B would be
> some concept of the symbols, and C would be the interpretation as
> a logical argument in whatever kind of "thinking" occurs when a
> logician reads a proof.
>
> > 2. Leaving 1. aside for now, it has a second circularity, in that the
> > 'correspondence' that A brings about between B and C is the same as
> > that which holds between A and C. However since we are told nothing
> > about the relationship betwen either B and C or between A and C,
> > there seems to be no place to start in trying to apply this, er,
> > definition. It doesnt constrain the meaning of the terms it uses in
> > any way.
>
> P. wrote many pages about the relationships, how one sign brings
> about another, etc. That definition is a summary of many, many
> pages of explanation.
>
> > 3. The definition refers to A bringing about something. The only way
> > I can make sense of this would seem to involve A being an agent of
> > some kind, or at least something that can cause a process or event.
>
> The agent is the entity (human, animal, robotic, or whatever) that
> interprets A as a sign of C by means of some internal representation B.
>
> > To "bring about" anything at all, something would seem to need to
> > *happen*; some change must be taking place; something becoming true
> > that was formerly false.
>
> That process of interpretation takes place inside of the "agent",
> which in P's examples could be a bee or even a protozoan (they weren't
> too clear about bacteria in those days, but he would have considered
> them as suitable "agents" for at least the very simple kinds of signs
> in examples #1 and maybe #2). Perhaps bacteria could have "habits",
> as in example #3, but those would probably be inherited rather than
> learned -- an example of species-level learning rather than
> individual learning.
>
> John Sowa
>