Re: SUO: Re: IFF Comments Requested
Pat,
Some of your comments strike me.
Sure that they are right if one be referring to the old classical work done
in problem solving and psychological area.
But most of current work on problem solving consider only success or
failure of experts' strategies. They do not consider the strategies of
novices, notably at the the begining of the solving process for two
reasons: one is that they do not know how to do; the second reason is
that it is too much difficult and that it needs too much work. It is not
that this kind of research would not interest them. If the work to know how
to do was easier they will do.
The other argument that you took and that I can't agree with concens the
adequation of a modern approach of language to a cognitive approach. It is
currently admitted now that the working of language is complicated. And I
know that you know. So the last rampart to a complexification of the
cognitive approach remain in the refusal of an approach such as IFF which
seems to me ready - even if it would surely evolve as my own data would do
- to import the complex language approach to cognitive level.
The emergence of global objects from interactions between elements
constitute steps in the acquisition of concepts. And it is able to be
articulated with a neural and distribued approach.
The passage between linguistic and cognitive level stands in the fact that
syntax can be signifying. Do you think you could ignore anymore cognitive
linguistics such as Talmy's and Langagker's ones ?
The most important thing stands in the fact that the meaningful syntax
opened the way to the elaboration of cognitive observables which are able
to give account of inobservable concepts.
I do not yet know if IFF is able to work for every problem I have already
list. But I am sure I can start with.
I am not able to juge your criticisms about topos theory. In fact I know
topos theory only through some linguistic french works. And I confess that
I never understood something in it. But when I read Robert's document I
understood very well what he wrote about topos. It is only a clear
mathematical concept which could surely be interpreted in many different
ways as almost mathematical notions.
With Robert's approach, I am able to clarify most of my psychological data.
The main difficulty I have stands in the fact I am not familiar with
notations and I am doing mistakes.
Beyond the very nice approach of name spaces, I found very interesting to
give a separation between objects and metalevel. Both levels can be matched
but not with isomorphisms.
Josiane Caron-Pargue
At 17:52 04/10/01 -0500, vous avez écrit:
>>ATTN SUO Voting Members,
>>
>>-----Original Message-----
>>From: Jim Farrugia [mailto:jim@spatial.maine.edu]
>>Sent: Thursday, October 04, 2001 2:46 PM
>>To: standard-upper-ontology@ieee.org
>>Cc: Jim Farrugia
>>Subject: SUO: IFF Comments Requested
>>
>>
>>ATTN SUO WG,
>>
>>It is now time for active SUO members to do a thorough review of
>>IFF.
>>Please submit your comments by October 18, 2001, replying to this
>>subject line ("IFF Comments Requested"), so that we can easily gather all
>>comments. (At some point later, we may suggest other subject lines to
>>group together related comments.)
>
>OK, I have a few.
>
>First, I fail to see the utility of the emphasis placed on category
>theory. This is not motivated anywhere, but it badly needs to be
>motivated if you expect anyone to take it seriously enough to even read
>the sources to find out what you are talking about.
>
>Second, I do not understand what the intended role of the KIF axioms is to
>the rest of the proposal; there seems to be no connection between the
>contents of the KIF structural ontology and topos theory. In particular, I
>simply cannot make sense of the 'categorical property'. What new-KIF are
>you talking about, that is entirely category-theoretic?
>
>Third, the comment: "This foundational approach should answer Solomon
>Feferman's qualms about logical and psychological priority" seems to me to
>be particularly unfortunate, since it manifestly does *not* answer them.
>Now, I would be inclined to suggest that proper classes, small sets, etc
>etc, and all the other post-Russellian FOM concerns that suffuse topos
>metatheory in fact have virtually no relevance to an upper ontology in any
>case, and are best simply put aside as irrelevant (or only marginally
>relevant); but since you apparently do not want to take this easy way out
>of the kitchen, you had better be ready to take some heat.
>
>Fourth, you seem to have been misled by a pun on the word "class". As used
>in KIF and throughout the DL logic literature (and indeed the OOP and
>database communities), this does NOT mean 'proper class' in the sense used
>in topos theory. In fact, KIFclasses constitute a(n extremely small)
>sub-collection of the sets; every KIFclass (extension) is a set, but not
>all sets are KIFclasses. (A trivial consequence of the completeness
>theorem.) Proper classes, in the topos sense, are not even in the domain
>of discourse. So to interpret KIF:Class as meaning conglomerates in the
>Adamek, Herrlich & Strecker sense is just plain silly. (BTW, what a
>*terrible* choice as a guiding text. This is like watching someone commit
>ritual suicide. Do you seriously expect a sizeable number of IEEE members
>to read such a book? You could at least have cited a slightly readable
>intro, such as 'categories for the working mathematician'.)
>
>Fifth, in spite of the reference to McLarty, there is something highly
>suspicious in claiming to give a first-order axiomatization of any part of
>topos theory, in view of the fact that first-order logic satisfies the
>compactness and completeness theorems with respect to a model theory based
>on sets. Evidently, one doesn't need the proper classes in order to
>explain topos, then, right? In fact, that entire conglomerate diagram can
>all just be dismissed as fantasy, if those really are first-order logic
>axioms. (Or did you have some kind of nonstandard models in mind, perhaps?
>So what model theory are you assuming for your first-order axioms, maybe
>you could tell us?) This is really a very hot kitchen, and I am going to
>hold your hands over the fire until you squeal.
>
>Sixth. Let me back off from having FOM fun with y'all and get to the main
>point. The purpose of ontologies is to represent facts about worlds, not
>to play elegant games in the foundations of mathematics. Matthew West
>wants to describe oil flowing along pipelines, that kind of thing. Now,
>what connection, even of the most remote kind, can you suggest there is
>going to be between ANY such activity of describing the real world, and
>ANY of this mathematical gamesmanship of topos theory? So far, I can't see any.
>
>Pat Hayes
>
>PS. There already is a semantics for DAML+OIL, by the way. You can find it
>on the DAML+OIL website. Peter Patel-Schneider, the author, is currently
>revising it to bring it into line with the model theory for RDF(S).
>
>
>
>
>
>--
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