SUO: *Date 12 Feb 2002
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DW = David Whitten
IN = Ian Niles
JA = Jon Awbrey
JS = John Sowa
SF = Scott Farrar
Item 1. Standards, Practical & Otherwise
JS: I completely agree with the following excerpt from your recent note:
JA: Nobody here, nor any small coalition among us,
nor indeed any single group that I can think of
anywhere in the world today, knows enough, working
alone, to build anything that might deserve the name
of a standard ontology.
JS: One little qualification: following the phrase "working alone",
I would add "or together".
JS: I would also add that the task of building anything that would qualify
as an official standard ontology could only be done *after* science
is finished -- i.e., all the major discoveries that can be made
have been made.
JS: Given that disclaimer, I still believe that there is a lot of useful
work that can be done today. But that work can only be done *after*
everyone on the project acknowledges the limitations stated in the
excerpt I quoted above.
Yes, I can go with the drift of that.
I just realized that I have probably always thought of the
word "standard" in the very same breath and vexillary complex
with words and phrases like "banner", "guidon", "toe the line",
"yard marker", and so on, and at first I thought that maybe it was
just an accident of personal history that these words were first or
most strikingly impressed on me in sixth grade marching band or some
other mickey mouse outfit, but then I looked in a dictionary and lo:
| standard.
|
| ME, from MF "estandard" = "rallying point", of Gmc origin,
| akin to OE "standan" = "to stand" and OE "ord" = "point".
| 1. a conspicuous object (as a banner) formerly carried at
| the top of a pole and used to mark a rallying point,
| especially in battle or to serve as an emblem.
Of course, many other meanings tend to rally 'round that one.
So I guess I never dreamt that the role of a standard was to be
that final flag of theory at the summit of our inquiry but more
like a providential constellation to steer by in the mean times.
Item 2. Linguistic Concepts
Generic comment. You'll find that the SUMO Theory Of Things
is very short on the sorts of knowledge that can be gathered
from basic references, elementary textbooks, and most other
"standard" sources. We can assemble a bibliography in time,
but here's a standard old classic on formal language theory:
| Denning, P.J., Dennis, J.B., Qualitz, J.E.,
|'Machines, Languages, and Computation',
| Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1978.
I have also cobbled together a 2-page precis of the basic ideas:
http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03490.html
http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03525.html
SF: Below are some comments regarding the status of some
linguistic concepts within the ontology:
SF: In my discussion with Ian, several issues surfaced:
First there is the status of the concept &%Language.
We suggest expanding its status somewhat:
SF: In addition to including &%Language as a subclass of &%LinguisticExpression,
we think &%Language should include a set-theoretic notion. Many linguists
argue that a language is a potentially infinite set of what SUMO calls
&%LinguisticExpressions. Therefore Ian suggested that SUMO add,
IN: (disjoint Language FiniteSet)
No, a formal language can be a finite set.
Its finitary aspect is that it be "finitely generated",
typically by a finite set of rules in a formal grammar.
Aside. SUMO's concept of "disjoint" is also ill-defined,
since it classifies the empty set as disjoint from itself.
DW: I certainly would understand why you would want to do this, however,
if you have a finite vocabulary, and a grammar that cannot realize
an infinite number of linguistic expressions, it would be false.
I would like to caution you to be careful not to overload the
SUMO term with more than one English word-sense. I believe
Jon Awbrey is correct that there are many ways words can be
used, and SUMO needs to have a way to represent them, but
I am of the opinion that modern reasoning systems don't
deal with ambiguity well at all, and we would do well
to keep our definitions and terms usable by machines
and systems currently available.
SF: Yes, I agree that we are talking about more than one concept here.
Now the question is just how many? The notion of language as an
unbounded set is pervasive within the ling. community. But, as
much as possible, we're trying to remain theory neutral, at least
while we're constructing our lingustics sub-ontology.
SF: Also, if we construe language as a set of &%LinguisticExpressions,
then is it correct to say (subclass Language LinguisticExpression)?
I think that if we adopt the set-theoretic notion of &%Language,
then we need some way of disallowing Language as a member of
the set that is itself &%Language. Perhaps this touches on
Russell's Paradox?
Formal langauges are defined one at a time, and the definition of
a "linguistic expression", say, a word or a sentence, then becomes
relative to the language in question. To try and write something
like "(subclass Language LinguisticExpression)" is pretty useless,
even apart from its clashes with the natural grammar of English.
DW: What are the elements of the class &%Language ?
SF: I think we should allow any &%LinguisticExpression to be an element.
&%Words, &%Phrases, &%Morphemes, etc.
DW: Is &%Language the mode or method of expressing a concept
in a Linguistic fashion? (meaning 1)
DW: Or contrari-wise, is &%Language the set of utterances, each of which
is the Linguistic formulation of a particular concept? (meaning 2)
DW: I would hope that you aren't advocating that the term &%Language
should be used for both of these, as they are distinct, seperable,
and from the SUO perspective, do not support the same inferences
and conclusions.
SF: No, I'm not advocating this. They are definitely distinct concepts.
SF: Second, &%Language should be linked ontologically to the concepts
of &%SocialInteraction and/or &%Communication. Let me express my
ideas in English:
"Language is a means for communication."
"And/or "Language is used for social interaction."
Languages may be linked to other contexts of application,
and it is important to do so. But sometimes you have to
consider their abstract aspects, or else be overwhelmed
by complexities before you can even get started.
DW: This is close to the meaning (1) above. Again, let me caution
you that simply because English uses the same word, you should
not assume it is the same concept. As a doctoral student, I'm
sure this has been drilled into your consciousness multiple times,
so I suppose my caution is actually being expressed to remind the
other folks on the mailing list who haven't thought as deeply about
this very focused area of existence as you have.
SF: Third, I suggest that we give some thought to specifying the
various forms of &%Language and &%LinguisticExpressions:
perhaps a 'form' slot with the
SF: possible values, 'written,' 'spoken,' or 'signed.'
DW: Perhaps Adam can clarify, but the idea of 'slots' isn't a KIF concept,
and the word has been used in so many ways in knowledge representation,
that I am afraid I must anticipate Jon Awbrey and say this Third point
is so fraught with ambiguity, that I have no idea how to crystalize it.
perhaps you should look into extra predicates that make the distinctions
you are interested in? or perhaps differing subclasses ?
SF: Right. I'm new to the SUO-KIF format. Specialized predicates take
the place of 'slots', I think. Does this accord w. your thinking?
Can you give me an example of how we might specify this?
SF: Fourth, I suggest the following subclasses of &%Language:
(subclass HumanLanguage Language)
(documentation Human Language "This is the subclass of &%Language
used and interpreted by a &%Human. Instances include all extinct
and extant humanlanguages"
)
(instance Spanish HumanLanguage)
Generic question. How much information have you
really conveyed to anybody by writing such things?
DW: Spanish as the name of a particular mode of expression
is an instance of HumanLanguage. (sub-meaning 1)
DW: Spanish as the set of utterances understandable by a Spanish language
speaker is a subclass of HumanLanguage. (sub-meaning 2)
DW: Since sub-meaning 1 and sub-meaning 2 are not the same, which do you mean?
SF: I think sub-meaning 2 is most appropriate.
SF: (subclass ArtificialLanguage Language)
(documentation ArtificialLanguage "This is the subclass of &%Language
designed by humans but intended for and interpreted by a &%Machine.
This class is disjoint from the subclass of languages that are
constructed to be used by humans, eg. Esperanto.")
DW: I would have used the term ConstructedLanguage or ArtificialLanguage
for Esperanto. Since you are bringing interpretation and intent into
your documentation, don't be surprised if Jon picks up this ball and
runs with it. I'll let him try to take it in for a touchdown.
fumble, fumble, ..., I blames the muddiness of the field, Coach ...
DW: I probably would include some idea of a FormalLanguage as
a superclass too, since there are many things in common there.
I would advise hanging on to the "standard" accounts of a formal language.
If you really want to lateral your thinking about syntax and advance on
down the field of semeiosis, then my advice would be -- send in Peirce!
Jon Awbrey
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