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SUO: RE: RE: Metaphysical choices - position. mereology and constitution




Chris,

	I'm not sure what you mean by "temporal part", but it sounds like
what you mean is "spatio-temporal part", i.e. the relation that exists
between two space-time worms when one contains the other.  Since the SUMO is
a 3-D ontology, it makes a categorial distinction between objects and
processes, and so 'Objects' and 'Processes' each have their own mereological
relation, viz. 'part' for 'Objects' and 'subProcess' for 'Processes'.  Thus,
to say that Queen Elizabeth is part of the English Monarchy, we could write
(part QueenElizabeth EnglishMonarch), since both 'QueenElizabeth' and
'EnglishMonarch' would be 'Agents' and 'Agent' is a subclass of 'Object'.
Perhaps your point all along has just been that we should make the predicate
'occupiesPosition' a 'subrelation' of 'part'?  Is that it?

-Ian

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Chris Partridge [mailto:mail@ChrisPartridge.net]
> Sent: Wednesday, June 12, 2002 12:07 PM
> To: Ian Niles; standard-upper-ontology@ieee.org
> Cc: Adam Pease
> Subject: RE: RE: Metaphysical choices - position. mereology and
> constitution
> 
> 
> Ian,
> 
> We are going around in circles.
> 
> CP> You wrote: 'I do think I addressed your issue about the
> > number of events.' I
> > am a bit lost here.
> > Maybe it would be clearer if you tell me whether you think:
> > 1) There is one event/process
> > 2) There are two events/processes
> > 3) There are different interpretations that result in 1) and 2)
> > 4) Something else.
> 
> IN>As I wrote above, my response is that there may be a 
> single event even if
> there is more than one agent.  Your argument that the case is 
> problematic
> rests on the premise that an event can have no more than one 
> agent.  One who
> did not accept this premise would not conclude that, if 
> Elizabeth Windsor
> and Queen Elizabeth (or the English Monarch or whatever) are 
> two different
> agents, there are necessarily two events.
> 
> [NB: I am not basing my position on any argument about the 
> number of agents
> an event must necessarily have. I would be intrigued to know 
> where I have
> made such an argument. The core of my argument is that within 
> SUMO one can
> argue either way - that there are one or two.]
> 
> I think it would have helped if you had answered the question 
> I asked. What
> I can infer from the 'may' in your sentence above is that you 
> are going for
> option 3) 'There are different interpretations that result in 
> 1) and 2)'.
> 
> If that is the case, then I presume that the answer to the 
> question below is
> that you agree - the SUMO does not tell us.
> > > It seems to me that as it stands the SUMO does not reduce
> > > this particular
> > > ambiguity.
> > > Do you agree?
> 
> Then the rest of my argument follows naturally.
> 
> --------------------------------------------------------------
> --------------
> --------------------------------------
> 
> As for temporal part:
> IN>As I stated in my first message to the list today, one can 
> express in
> SUMO
> that Queen Elizabeth is a temporal part of the English 
> Monarch as follows:
> (temporalPart (WhenFn QueenElizabeth) (WhenFn 
> EnglishMonarch)).  If this
> does not capture what you mean by temporal part, please 
> explain exactly how
> your notion deviates from the SUMO concept.
> 
> Expanding on what I said in my first reply:
> The SUMO gloss on temporal part and time position is:
> (documentation temporalPart "(&%temporalPart ?POS1 ?POS2) means that
> &%TimePosition ?POS1 is part of &%TimePosition ?POS2.")
> (documentation TimePosition "Any &%TimePoint or 
> &%TimeInterval along the
> universal timeline from &%NegativeInfinity to &%PositiveInfinity.")
> (documentation TimeInterval "An interval of time. Note that a 
> &%TimeInterval
> has both an extent and a location on the universal timeline. 
> Note too that a
> &%TimeInterval has no gaps, i.e. this class contains only convex time
> intervals.")
> 
> So (temporalPart (WhenFn QueenElizabeth) (WhenFn 
> EnglishMonarch)) means that
> the time interval in which Queen Elizabeth exists is a part 
> of the time
> interval that English Monarch exists.
> 
> However then it is also true that (temporalPart (WhenFn 
> JohnLennon) (WhenFn
> QueenElizabeth)) - as the time interval in which JohnLennon 
> existed is a
> part of the time interval that Queen Elizabeth will exist. 
> Similarly the pet
> hamster I had as a child is a temporal part of both Queen 
> Elizabeth and John
> Lennon. And so on for any number of silly examples. Which is 
> certainly not
> the way anyone I know thinks of temporal parts - but I am 
> willing to stand
> corrected.
> 
> As I said in my first reply 'It does not
> > > seem to make any
> > > commitment about spatial positions or co-location. In fact,
> > I had some
> > > trouble finding anything to do with (temporary) co-location -
> > > but it may
> > > reflect my skills with the browser.'.
> 
> I also assume that you accept my earlier comments regarding 
> the fact that
> the SUMO has no type for Queen Elizabeth as she is not an 
> Agent - but a
> position-occupying temporal part of one.
> 
> Chris
> 
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Ian Niles [mailto:iniles@teknowledge.com]
> Sent: 12 June 2002 21:05
> To: 'mail@ChrisPartridge.net'; standard-upper-ontology@ieee.org
> Cc: Adam Pease
> Subject: RE: RE: Metaphysical choices - position. mereology 
> and constitution
> 
> Chris,
> 
>         Replies below.
> 
> -Ian
> 
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Chris Partridge [mailto:chris_partridge@csi.com]
> > Sent: Wednesday, June 12, 2002 10:43 AM
> > To: Ian Niles; standard-upper-ontology@ieee.org
> > Cc: Adam Pease
> > Subject: RE: RE: Metaphysical choices - position. mereology and
> > constitution
> >
> >
> > Ian,
> >
> > I thought I had answered your question about events. But
> > anyway an event can
> > have any number of agents or none. It all depends upon the
> > event. I do not
> > however see how this point is relevant to anything that I said.
> > Notice in the case of eating the cake there is 
> (deliberately) no agent
> > specified. Maybe it would be better to thing of it in SUMO 
> terms as a
> > Process - as Event does not seem to appear in the SUMO.
> 
> Um, well, I thought in your original message that you were 
> arguing that in
> the "Queen Elizabeth" example there are one or two events, 
> depending on
> whether Elizabeth Windsor and Queen Elizabeth (or the English 
> Monarch or
> whatever) are two different agents or the same agent.  My 
> response was that,
> even if there are two agents in this case, there may be a 
> single event,
> since some events have more than one agent.  In other words, 
> I tried to show
> that two ontologies could possibly agree on the number of 
> events in the
> world, even if they differed about the number of agents in 
> your example.
> 
> >
> > I also notice that you have not answered my questions - which
> > I copy again.
> 
> I staked a bold claim on this issue in a previous message.  I 
> am on the
> record as asserting that clarity is better than ambiguity.
> 
> > > I presume that you agree a regimentation that reduces
> > > ambiguity is sensible.
> > > It seems to me that as it stands the SUMO does not reduce
> > > this particular
> > > ambiguity.
> > > Do you agree?
> >
> >
> > > It seems to me that if the SUMO could be amended so that it
> > > is no longer
> > > ambiguous in this area, it would be a 'good thing'. Do you agree?
> >
> >
> > > If the issue were (as it is) a specific example of a more
> > > general issue,
> > > then it seems to me that it would be a better thing to work
> > > at this higher
> > > level. Do you agree?
> >
> > You wrote: 'I do think I addressed your issue about the
> > number of events.' I
> > am a bit lost here.
> > Maybe it would be clearer if you tell me whether you think:
> > 1) There is one event/process
> > 2) There are two events/processes
> > 3) There are different interpretations that result in 1) and 2)
> > 4) Something else.
> 
> As I wrote above, my response is that there may be a single 
> event even if
> there is more than one agent.  Your argument that the case is 
> problematic
> rests on the premise that an event can have no more than one 
> agent.  One who
> did not accept this premise would not conclude that, if 
> Elizabeth Windsor
> and Queen Elizabeth (or the English Monarch or whatever) are 
> two different
> agents, there are necessarily two events.
> 
> >
> > Am I to presume that my analysis of your attempt to describe
> > temporal parts
> > is correct - that is, that the SUMO does not currently have
> > the resources to
> > describe them? And hence does not have the resources to
> > characterise things
> > like Queen Elizabeth?
> 
> As I stated in my first message to the list today, one can 
> express in SUMO
> that Queen Elizabeth is a temporal part of the English 
> Monarch as follows:
> (temporalPart (WhenFn QueenElizabeth) (WhenFn 
> EnglishMonarch)).  If this
> does not capture what you mean by temporal part, please 
> explain exactly how
> your notion deviates from the SUMO concept.
> 
> >
> > Chris
> >
> >
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: owner-standard-upper-ontology@majordomo.ieee.org
> > [mailto:owner-standard-upper-ontology@majordomo.ieee.org]On
> > Behalf Of Ian
> > Niles
> > Sent: 12 June 2002 19:35
> > To: 'Chris Partridge'; standard-upper-ontology@ieee.org
> > Cc: Adam Pease
> > Subject: SUO: RE: Metaphysical choices - position. mereology and
> > constitution
> >
> >
> >
> > Chris,
> >
> >         I don't think I follow you here.  As I mentioned in
> > my last message,
> > I do think I addressed your issue about the number of 
> events.  If you
> > believe, as you must if you disagree with my argument, that an event
> > necessarily has a single agent, please let me know why you
> > believe this.  As
> > for the rest of your message, I'm afraid I just don't
> > understand how it's
> > relevant to the issues we've been discussing.  This may of
> > course be my own
> > fault, so perhaps someone else could help out by jumping in here and
> > explaining what in the Queen Elizabeth example cannot be adquately
> > represented in the SUMO.
> >
> > -Ian
> >
> > > -----Original Message-----
> > > From: Chris Partridge [mailto:mail@ChrisPartridge.net]
> > > Sent: Wednesday, June 12, 2002 9:10 AM
> > > To: Ian Niles; standard-upper-ontology@ieee.org
> > > Cc: Adam Pease
> > > Subject: RE: Metaphysical choices - position. mereology and
> > > constitution
> > >
> > >
> > > Ian,
> > >
> > > It seems to me that you have missed the thread of my
> > > argument. So I will try
> > > an restate it.
> > >
> > > Assuming that Position is an Agent and not a role of an Agent
> > > then there are
> > > at least two possible ways of dealing with an event such the
> > > 'eating the
> > > cake' in the example - which are distinguished by the number
> > > of events that
> > > the ontology admits existing.
> > >
> > > I originally wrote to Adam:
> > > > > Bill Burkett made a point to you some time ago that it was
> > > > > difficult to
> > > > > ensure against misinterpretation of an ontology. And I think
> > > > > it was agreed
> > > > > that reducing the risk of misinterpretation was 'a good
> > > thing'. I am
> > > > > guessing (and I will rely on your and Ian's knowledge of it)
> > > > > but I believe
> > > > > that the SUMO, as it stands, allows for some situations to be
> > > > > ontologised in
> > > > > a number of ways, that all conform with the SUMO. And that
> > > > > regimentation of
> > > > > the top level can eliminate this 'ambiguity'..
> > >
> > > I presume that you agree a regimentation that reduces
> > > ambiguity is sensible.
> > > It seems to me that as it stands the SUMO does not reduce
> > > this particular
> > > ambiguity.
> > > Do you agree?
> > >
> > > It seems to me that if the SUMO could be amended so that it
> > > is no longer
> > > ambiguous in this area, it would be a 'good thing'. Do you agree?
> > >
> > > If the issue were (as it is) a specific example of a more
> > > general issue,
> > > then it seems to me that it would be a better thing to work
> > > at this higher
> > > level. Do you agree?
> > >
> > >
> > > In your reply to me about occupying a position - I think you
> > > misunderstand
> > > the issue. As I said earlier, Queen Elizabeth is NOT a
> > > position. We English,
> > > at least, do not expect Prince Charles to be appointed to the
> > > position of
> > > Queen Elizabeth but to the position of English Monarch. I
> > presume you
> > > Americans did not expect George Bush to be appointed to (or
> > > start to occupy)
> > > the position of President Clinton. And so on ... As such,
> > > your answer misses
> > > the point. I suspect my original assertion is correct. I also
> > > not that the
> > > issue.
> > >
> > > Furthermore, as I understand your argument, you are
> > suggesting that a
> > > temporal part is a time interval - or a mapping from an
> > > object to a time
> > > interval. So a spatial part is a space interval or a mapping
> > > from an object
> > > to a space interval?
> > >
> > > You wrote: '(temporalPart (WhenFn QueenElizabeth) (WhenFn
> > > EnglishMonarch)).
> > > ' From what I can tell this just means TimePosition of Queen
> > > Elizabeth is
> > > part of the TimePosition of the EnglishMonarch. It does not
> > > seem to make any
> > > commitment about spatial positions or co-location. In fact,
> > I had some
> > > trouble finding anything to do with (temporary) co-location -
> > > but it may
> > > reflect my skills with the browser.
> > >
> > > Regards,
> > > Chris
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > -----Original Message-----
> > > From: Ian Niles [mailto:iniles@teknowledge.com]
> > > Sent: 12 June 2002 18:48
> > > To: 'mail@ChrisPartridge.net'; standard-upper-ontology@ieee.org
> > > Cc: Adam Pease
> > > Subject: RE: Metaphysical choices - position. mereology and
> > > constitution
> > >
> > > Chris,
> > >
> > >         The SUMO predicate that relates an agent with the
> > > position occupied
> > > by the agent is, naturally enough, 'occupiesPosition'.
> > > Furthermore, it is
> > > possible to say in the SUMO that one position is a temporal
> > > stage of another
> > > position, e.g. that "Queen Elizabeth" is a temporal stage of
> > > the overarching
> > > position of "English Monarch".  In the SUMO, we use the
> > > function 'WhenFn' to
> > > map any instance of 'Physical' (encompassing both 'Objects'
> > > and 'Processes')
> > > to the 'TimeInterval' corresponding to the time frame when
> > > the instance of
> > > 'Physical' exists.  Thus, since 'Position' is a subclass of
> > > 'Agent' and
> > > 'Agent' is a subclass of 'Object', one can just write
> > > (temporalPart (WhenFn
> > > QueenElizabeth) (WhenFn EnglishMonarch)).  Furthermore, 
> again since
> > > 'Position' inherits from 'Object', one can assert that the agent
> > > 'QueenElizabeth' is a part of the overarching agent/position
> > > 'EnglishMonarch' as follows:  (part QueenElizabeth 
> EnglishMonarch).
> > >
> > >         I think that this resolves the problem that you
> > > allude to at the end
> > > of your most recent message.  Note that the problem you
> > > raised in your first
> > > message on this topic, as I understood it, was that there
> > > would be different
> > > numbers of events, depending on how one chose to treat the
> > > entites "Queen
> > > Elizabeth" (or "English Monarch") and "Elizabeth Windsor".
> > However, I
> > > argued in my response to that message: (i.) that the fact
> > > that an event has
> > > two or more agents does not necessarily imply that there is
> > > more than one
> > > event and (ii.) that a perfectly adequate ontology may not
> > > determine the
> > > precise number of objects in the world.  If you still have an
> > > issue with
> > > what I've said here or in my other messages, please let me
> > > know exactly what
> > > claim or line of reasoning you are challenging.
> > >
> > > -Ian
> > >
> > > > -----Original Message-----
> > > > From: Chris Partridge [mailto:chris_partridge@csi.com]
> > > > Sent: Wednesday, June 12, 2002 1:05 AM
> > > > To: iniles@teknowledge.com; standard-upper-ontology@ieee.org
> > > > Cc: Adam Pease
> > > > Subject: RE: Metaphysical choices - position. mereology and
> > > > constitution
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > Ian,
> > > > BTW: the example as originally constituted with Queen
> > > > Elizabeth still works.
> > > > You wrote: 'In fact, this
> > > > situation seems perfectly parallel to the classic problem
> > > > about identity,
> > > > viz. morning star and evening star.  Just as it had to be
> > > > established by
> > > > empirical investigation that both of these "stars" are in
> > > > fact the planet
> > > > Venus, we might have to do some work to determine whether
> > > the Queen of
> > > > England and Elizabeth Windsor are the same person.'
> > > > Our current meagre empirical resources are enough to tell
> > > us they are
> > > > different. Before Elizabeth Windsor was crowned she was not
> > > > Queen Elizabeth
> > > > (or the Queen of England). This uses the test suggested
> > > > centuries ago by
> > > > John Locke - that if two things have different beginnings (or
> > > > endings) they
> > > > cannot be the same thing. The original text for those 
> interested.
> > > > An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book II, Chapter
> > > > xxvii, 1 - XXVII -
> > > > Of identity and diversity - "... When we see any thing to be
> > > > in any place in
> > > > any instant of time, we are sure, (be it what it will) that
> > > > it is that very
> > > > thing, and not another, which at that same time exists in
> > > > another place, how
> > > > like and indistinguishable soever it may be in all other
> > > > respects: ... For
> > > > we never finding, nor conceiving it possible, that two things
> > > > of the same
> > > > kind should exist in the same place at the same time, we
> > > > rightly conclude,
> > > > that whatever exists any where at any time, excludes all of
> > > > the same kind,
> > > > and is there it self alone. When therefore we demand, whether
> > > > any thing be
> > > > the same or no, it refers always to something that existed
> > > > such a time in
> > > > such a place, which 'twas certain, at that instant, was the
> > > > same with it
> > > > self and no other: From whence it follows that one thing
> > > > cannot have two
> > > > beginnings of Existence, nor two things one beginning, it
> > > > being impossible
> > > > for two things of the same kind, to be or exist in the same
> > > > instant, in the
> > > > very same place; or one and the same thing in different
> > places. That
> > > > therefore that had one beginning is the same thing, and that
> > > > which had a
> > > > different beginning in time and place from that, in not the
> > > > same but divers.
> > > > That which has made the Difficulty from this Relation, has
> > > > been the little
> > > > care and attention used in having precise Notions of the
> > > > things to which it
> > > > is attributed."
> > > > The problem is that the current SUMO has no concept for the
> > > > occupation of a
> > > > position - which is what Queen Elizabeth is. It is a temporal
> > > > stage in the
> > > > English Monarch. Neither does in seem to have the notion of
> > > > temporal stages
> > > > (except for time intervals). So the problem with the original
> > > > example is not
> > > > expressible in SUMO.
> > > > Regards,
> > > > Chris
> > > > ______________________________________________________________
> > > > ______________
> > > > _______________
> > > > Ian,
> > > >
> > > > I suspect that you have misunderstood the example - and may
> > > > well be partly
> > > > my fault.
> > > > I wrote in haste 'Queen Elizabeth'. The position is of course
> > > > the 'English
> > > > Monarch', or some such name. We can clearly see this is not
> > > > the same as the
> > > > person 'Elizabeth Windsor' - even with our meagre empirical
> > > > resources. That
> > > > was the point of the original change. With this clarified,
> > > > you might wish to
> > > > revise your comments. E.g. I do not notice any going over
> > > > this point in the
> > > > message whose link you gave.
> > > >
> > > > Re: part - I now notice that the browser sort UC 'P's before
> > > > lc 'p's - is
> > > > this what was intended?
> > > >
> > > > Re: constitution - this is the relation between the spatially
> > > > co-located
> > > > statue and clay - where these are deemed not to overlap,
> > > > because (e.g.)
> > > > different sortals cannot share parts.
> > > >
> > > > Chris
> > > > -----Original Message-----
> > > > From: iniles@teknowledge.com [mailto:iniles@teknowledge.com]
> > > > Sent: 11 June 2002 20:53
> > > > To: 'Chris Partridge'; standard-upper-ontology@ieee.org
> > > > Cc: Adam Pease
> > > > Subject: RE: Metaphysical choices - position. mereology and
> > > > constitution
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > Chris,
> > > >
> > > >         See my comments below.
> > > >
> > > > -Ian
> > > >
> > > > > -----Original Message-----
> > > > > From: Chris Partridge [mailto:chris_partridge@csi.com]
> > > > > Sent: Tuesday, June 11, 2002 9:04 AM
> > > > > To: standard-upper-ontology@ieee.org
> > > > > Cc: apease@ks.teknowledge.com
> > > > > Subject: SUO: Metaphysical choices - position. mereology and
> > > > > constitution
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > Adam,
> > > > >
> > > > > I have changed the name of the thread - as it seems to have
> > > > > moved on and
> > > > > this forms a natural break.
> > > > >
> > > > > I originally made the comment to illustrate some points I
> > > > > have been making
> > > > > for some time. In no particular order:
> > > > > 1) There are some metaphysical questions that can usefully
> > > > > inform the design
> > > > > of an ontology (this is in response to Ian's angels on a pin
> > > > > head comment).
> > > > > That is not to say that some metaphysical questions may be as
> > > > > irrelevant as
> > > > > angels to building SUO type ontologies.
> > > > > 2) The fact that useful discussion can take place without it
> > > > > being framed in
> > > > > terms of axioms - though it will typically need to be cashed
> > > > > out in the end
> > > > > in some kind of formalisation (such as axioms).
> > > > > 3) That there is some useful top level regimentation that
> > > > > still needs to be
> > > > > done to the SUMO.
> > > > >
> > > > > It seems to me that unless I explain the underlying issue
> > > > > here, pointing at
> > > > > inconsistencies or multiple interpretations of particular
> > > > > axioms will appear
> > > > > a bit ad hoc. So I will start by trying to sketch quickly the
> > > > > issue - which
> > > > > will be familiar to some people.
> > > > >
> > > > > Bill Burkett made a point to you some time ago that it was
> > > > > difficult to
> > > > > ensure against misinterpretation of an ontology. And I think
> > > > > it was agreed
> > > > > that reducing the risk of misinterpretation was 'a good
> > > thing'. I am
> > > > > guessing (and I will rely on your and Ian's knowledge of it)
> > > > > but I believe
> > > > > that the SUMO, as it stands, allows for some situations to be
> > > > > ontologised in
> > > > > a number of ways, that all conform with the SUMO. And that
> > > > > regimentation of
> > > > > the top level can eliminate this 'ambiguity'.
> > > >
> > > > If what you mean by "regimentation" is that one ought to make
> > > > explicit,
> > > > whenever possible, the principles and distinctions that are
> > > > guiding the
> > > > development of the ontology, then I agree with you.  Of
> > > > course, you're not
> > > > going to find too many people who will challenge the claim
> > > > that clarity
> > > > tends to eliminate ambiguity.
> > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > To see the issue that arises as a result of the original
> > > > > change made to
> > > > > position, consider the following topical, but trivial,
> > > > > example. The Queen
> > > > > (of England) at her Jubilee Party eats a cake. We are happy
> > > > > to say that it
> > > > > is true that there is a cake eating event and that Queen
> > > > > Elizabeth eats a
> > > > > cake and that Elizabeth Windsor eats a cake. Can we focus on
> > > > > this 'cake
> > > > > eating event'
> > > > >
> > > > > Under the original SUMO scheme - let's call it the O-C
> > > > scheme - Queen
> > > > > Elizabeth is a position that is a role of Elizabeth Windsor.
> > > > > So there is a
> > > > > single 'cake eating' event.
> > > > >
> > > > > Under the new SUMO scheme Queen Elizabeth is a Position
> > that is a
> > > > > CognitiveAgent and Elizabeth Windsor is a Human that is a
> > > > > CognitiveAgent. I
> > > > > presume also that SUMO somewhere has an 'occupies' relation
> > > > > that relates the
> > > > > two cognitive agents (is the occupiesPosition?).
> > > > >
> > > > > My question is whether it is possible within this second
> > > > > scheme to determine
> > > > > whether there is one or two cake eating events - and if so
> > > > > how? And whether
> > > > > this is what we want to do a conscious policy?
> > > >
> > > > Actually, even if there are two cognitive agents here, viz.
> > > > the Queen and
> > > > Elizabeth Windsor, it does not necessarily follow that
> > there are two
> > > > distinct events.  There are many events that have more than
> > > > one agent, and
> > > > it may be that the particular event of cake-eating that you
> > > > cite here is one
> > > > of these.  However, I doubt that this will appease you.
> > > > You'll still be
> > > > worried about how many agents there are in this example.  My
> > > > response is
> > > > that I just don't know how many agents there are here.  In
> > > fact, this
> > > > situation seems perfectly parallel to the classic problem
> > > > about identity,
> > > > viz. morning star and evening star.  Just as it had to be
> > > > established by
> > > > empirical investigation that both of these "stars" are in
> > > > fact the planet
> > > > Venus, we might have to do some work to determine whether
> > > the Queen of
> > > > England and Elizabeth Windsor are the same person.  In any
> > > > case, I don't
> > > > think this is a matter to be settled a priori by one's
> > > > preferred ontology.
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > Could you tell us what is your (and maybe Ian's) intuition is
> > > > > (maybe based
> > > > > upon SUMO)? And how is this backed up in SUMO?
> > > >
> > > > Note that we've been over this ground before.  I tried to give a
> > > > comprehensive summary of the revised SUMO view on these
> > > > matters in an old
> > > > message to the SUO list:  
> http://suo.ieee.org/email/msg06357.html.
> > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > There are quite a lot of intertwined issues. But keeping
> > > > > things simple. Some
> > > > > people will say that there are two completely distinct
> > > > > CognitiveAgents and
> > > > > that the occupies relation that links them is a kind of
> > > > > constitution. Under
> > > > > this strategy one typically ends up with two events. Others
> > > > > will say that
> > > > > the occupies relation is one of sharing temporal parts and so
> > > > > is similar to
> > > > > a temporalised (improper) part of relation. Under this
> > > strategy one
> > > > > typically ends up with one event. It seems to me that would
> > > > > be useful to
> > > > > formalise the preferred strategy to ensure that conforming
> > > > > ontologies end up
> > > > > with the same number of objects.
> > > >
> > > > You seem to be assuming here that an ontology should
> > > > legislate the precise
> > > > number of objects in the world.  Otherwise, how would 
> "conforming"
> > > > ontologies always agree about the number of objects in the
> > > > world?  If you
> > > > are making this assumption, it strikes me as utterly wrong.
> > > > There are many
> > > > things that we in our current state of ignorance don't know
> > > > about the world,
> > > > and the ontology, I think, should leave room for settling
> > > > these matters as
> > > > the facts stack up.  To go back to the morning star/evening
> > > > star example, do
> > > > you suppose an ontology constructed before these two things
> > > > were known to be
> > > > the same thing, should have taken a stand about whether they
> > > > were the same
> > > > thing?  If it didn't take such a stand, how could it satisfy
> > > > your criterion
> > > > that "conforming ontologies end up with the same number
> > of objects".
> > > >
> > > > >(NB I could not find
> > > > > 'constitution' or
> > > > > 'part of' using the browser - probably my fault).
> > > >
> > > > I'm not sure what you mean by "constitution".  As for 'part
> > > > of', look under
> > > > 'part'.
> > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > The metaphysical choice I referred to in my original mail
> > > > > turns on whether
> > > > > one uses part of (mereology) or constitution to link
> > > > > co-located objects such
> > > > > as the position and its occupier (or our old friends the
> > > > > statue and the
> > > > > clay).
> > > > >
> > > > > I hope you can now see the underlying issue. As a matter of
> > > > > process, it
> > > > > seems to me proper to clarify what the issues are, in rough
> > > > > way, and the
> > > > > strategies for resolving them - refining our intuitions
> > > > > before diving into
> > > > > formalising them.
> > > >
> > > > Well, my worry is that we'll spend an enormous amount of
> > > > intellectual work
> > > > getting clear about a small range of cases, which may feature
> > > > prominently in
> > > > one's favorite metaphysics textbook but which don't have many
> > > > real world
> > > > ramifications.  I think one has only to consider the 2,500
> > > > year history of
> > > > philosophy to give this worry some substance.
> > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > Regards,
> > > > > Chris
> > > > >
> > > > > -----Original Message-----
> > > > > From: apease@ks.teknowledge.com
> > [mailto:apease@ks.teknowledge.com]
> > > > > Sent: 11 June 2002 00:43
> > > > > To: Chris Partridge; standard-upper-ontology@ieee.org
> > > > > Subject: RE: SUO: RE: Copyright issues
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > Chris,
> > > > >
> > > > > At 03:56 PM 6/6/2002 +0200, Chris Partridge wrote:
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > [snip]
> > > > >
> > > > > > >I don't know where Cyc stands on this issue, but in the
> > > > > SUMO 'Position'
> > > > > is
> > > > > >a
> > > > > > >subclass of 'CognitiveAgent', so that the identity of a
> > > > > position can be
> > > > > > >"tracked".
> > > > > > >CP2> But did you also amend the relevant bits of the
> > > > > mereology axioms to
> > > > > > >cater for what you have introduced? And so on....
> > > > > >
> > > > > >AP>What are the axioms in the mereology that would you
> > > > like amended?
> > > > > >
> > > > > >The change that was made was from 'Position' being a role of
> > > > > a person, to
> > > > > >being CognitiveAgent. It seems to me that making this shift
> > > > > raises obvious
> > > > > >mereological questions - and also questions about
> > > > > metaphysical choices
> > > > > >(hence me offering it as an example to Ian). I presume from
> > > > > your question,
> > > > > >that it does not do this for you. Am I right?
> > > > >
> > > > > Could you explain further what you see as the mereological
> > > > > choices, and how
> > > > > they might be made with respect to the existing content of
> > > > > SUMO?  We're not
> > > > > aware of any impacts from the change that currently need to
> > > > > be addressed,
> > > > > but would welcome detail to the contrary.
> > > > >
> > > > > Adam
> > > > >
> > > > > >Chris
> > > > >
> > > > > Adam Pease
> > > > > Teknowledge
> > > > > (650) 424-0500 x571
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > >
> > >
> >
> >
> 
>