SUO: Re: ontology as science
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Fowler, Julian wrote:
>
> Bill et al,
>
> Two points ...
>
> 1. I'm not sure that I fully understand the "ontology is/is not a science" discussions.
> To be considered as a science, the discipline of ontology would have to be involved in
> proposing theories that can both explain past observations and make predictions as to
> future observations. I don't see either of these as being what ontology does (but
> see point 2).
Julian,
I initially read Bill as making a type of argument that is stock among
behavior-focused, nominal, reductive, or Ockhamite thinkers against
the validity of cognitive constructs, or "intermediate variables"
as the phrase used to go, and I found myself almost getting into
a type of debate that I already promised myself I would not
waste yet another decade on. And then there is a precedent
in Peirce of saying that metaphysics, ontology included,
with a whole lot of reconstruction and rehabilitation,
could be made an honest science. Also sprach Kant.
But then I woke up with a shock, and realized that I was dreaming
of what Ontology could be, and not what it is by present evidence.
Peirce's, and Kant's, ..., and Sowa's, and Kent's visions often
have that effect on me -- "I want to believe!" as Mulder cries,
but it's time to turn off the Xmlfiles and get back to work.
> 2. I do see an important relationship between ontology and science,
> in that the former provides a mechanism for formalizing much of the
> latter (and, in doing so, providing a useful mechanism for determining
> inconsistencies within scientific theories, using inferencing to construct
> experimental conditions under which the predictions of theories can be tested, etc.).
To follow-up also on Boyan's question, it is clear that science
has a bearing on "critical ontology", and maybe even should have
or will eventually have an impact on "popular or folk ontology" --
it is clear that just in last century or two we have seen our
most fundamental notions of space, time, matter, motion, ...,
and not a few notions in the social sciences, and yes, even
the foundations of mathematics, undergo radical revision and
reconstruction due to the rigors of practical experimentation
and critical reflection.
But the second part of what you said above, the very idea that
ontology provides a mechanism for formalizing much of science,
that, now, is talking about what it might be, not what it has
been in the past, and not what it is on present evidence.
Ontology, as it is done, has not impacted science.
The momentum has all been in the other direction,
and then, it's been an up-hill, even Sisyphean
effort against extreme and extremist inertia,
resistance, and downright viscous friction.
> On this basis I see ontology in the same category
> as mathematics and logic, i.e., as a discpline
> in its own right and as a tool that supports
> scientific endevours.
We Well Wish (WWW).
> John S's point about the use of ontology in the study of meaning
> may then imply an overloading of the term "ontology" itself (or,
> rather, the coincidence of the term's original meaning within
> philosophy and its acquired meaning within computer science*/AI
> domains) -- i.e., that theories of meaning and variant of meaning
> arising from scientific study and research ("ontology") can be
> formally stated as an "ontology". In the first case the
> "is ontology science?" question is meaningful (and my
> answer would be "yes"), in the second it is not.
>From the perspective of a pragmatic thinker, the connection between
meaning and metaphysics is well drawn, since Peirce's critique of
"metaphysics that would be a science" approached that particular
labor of Hercules by asking what it takes for a word or concept --
in classical tradition he regarded a concept as a mental symbol --
physical or metaphysical or whatever, to have any meaning at all.
And his answer to that was the Pragmatic Maxim, which we can get
a first approximation to by recognizing that it is really just the
familiar requirement of being able to operationalize our concepts in
terms of observable consequences, conceivable data, and practical effects.
The higher orders of approximation kick into play when one comes to examine
the difference between "operationalize as" or "represent as", and "reduce to",
but that can be put off till later, at least, so long as one understands that
there is a significant difference that is yet to be analyzed in the remainder.
> regards
> Julian
>
> * maybe my position on this is related to the fact that some 20+ years ago
> I indulged in several lengthy arguments with my Masters degree supervisor,
> on the subject of whether computer "science" is in fact a science.
I am going to add your name to the list of people I want to believe.
Consider it fair warning.
Jon Awbrey
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> -----Original Message-----
> From: Burkett, Bill
> Sent: 2003-06-19 22:37
> To: Matt Halstead; standard-upper-ontology@ieee.org
> Subject: RE: ontology as science (was: Re: SUO: Re: (ELP's summary of
> MRW's standards experience))
>
> Hi, Matt --
>
> I really like what you've proposed here -- it resonates very well with my own perspective of the problem. The key feature of your suggestion is "using *my* knowledge of some concept" (emphasis added). I think that the effectiveness/usefullness of ontology has to start with this individualistic "test" and then proceed to the statistical evaluation of the mapping to a more general "community" ontology and thereby "test" the community ontology against the individual ontologies. But the individual "test" is still subjective (I don't think it can ever be "formal"), hence my support of original claim that "ontology is not a science".
>
> Bill
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Matt Halstead [mailto:matt.halstead@auckland.ac.nz]
> Sent: Thu 6/19/2003 1:43 PM
> To: Burkett, Bill; sowa@bestweb.net; standard-upper-ontology@ieee.org
> Cc:
> Subject: Re: ontology as science
> (was: Re: SUO: Re: (ELP's summary of MRW's standards experience))
>
>
>
> I would suggest another interpretation of the science of #2 and #3 - I think
> there are at least two levels of objective tests for these.
>
> 1. "using my knowledge of some concept, does an ontology classify to the
> correct concept I expect" (the most obvious failure would be it not
> containing some property restriction that you thought was necessary and
> sufficient.)
>
> 2. "what can we hypothesize about what someone(or everyone if you combine
> ontologies) says about some concept" - I guess this should be broken into
> single ontologies and shared(combined) ontologies.
>
> In #1 we could perhaps test formally against our own ontology, in #2 it
> would seem like a few different methods. For single ontologies we can test
> for logical consistency, for shared ontologies, we could build statistical
> like hypotheses about what people say about something, or, if a shared
> ontology is logically consistent, that #1 kinds of test pass or fail, or,
> that all people, each with their own mini-ontologies surrounding a concept,
> agree or disagree with the shared ontology for that particular concept.
>
> In the end, an ontology is simply a model, just like other models. Various
> representations give us different tools to help test the knowledge says what
> we think it does.
>
> While the interpretation of labels for concepts can be subjective, ontology
> gives you a formal and unambiguous way to represent that interpretation, so
> that indeed we can ask questions of this interpretation, and get the same
> answer - no matter the person or the time a question is asked.
>
> Matt
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