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SUO: RE: Partial, Multiple, Vague Objects?




Dear Jon,

Not quite sure how you get to vagueness from the points below,
but never mind.

One of the chapters in Sider's 4 dimensionalism is on arguments
from vagueness. The point of view he was supporting was that
with an apparently vauge object like a nose or a mountain, the
reality is that there are lots of definite objects (take you pick
as to where the nose ends) and the vaguess comes in that the
sign represents all of them.

I think that's what you were saying below.


Matthew West
Principal Consultant
Shell Information Technology International Limited
Shell Centre, London SE1 7NA, United Kingdom

Tel: +44 20 7934 4490 Other Tel: +44 7796 336538
Email: matthew.west@shell.com
Internet: http://www.shell.com


> -----Original Message-----
> From: Jon Awbrey [mailto:jawbrey@oakland.edu]
> Sent: 21 June 2003 01:52
> To: West, Matthew R SITI-ITPSIE
> Cc: sowa@bestweb.net; Eric Peterson; Mike Pool;
> apease@ks.teknowledge.com; clegg@cyc.com; John DeOliveira; Patrick
> Cassidy; standard-upper-ontology@ieee.org
> Subject: Re: Partial, Multiple, Vague Objects?
> 
> 
> o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
> 
> John, Matthew, Patrick, et al.
> 
> Let me suggest that this is another one of those issues that arises
> from a failure to distinguish maps and territories -- that what we
> really have is two different descriptions, possibly of one thing.
> The AI, Cog Sci, and Philosophy literatures periodically go thru
> this very same cycle about "partial objects" or "vague objects",
> and when the dust clears most clear-headed folks recognize that
> it's the descriptions, information, and signs that are partial
> and vague, and not the objects.  To call the objects partial,
> multiple, or vague just because the signs that we mediately
> have of them are is yet another case of the reified syntax
> fallacy, that is, of confusing properties of signs with
> properties of their objects.
> 
> Jon Awbrey
> 
> o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
> 
> West, Matthew R SITI-ITPSIE wrote:
> > 
> > Dear John,
> > 
> > Just a couple of points.
> > 
> > 1. What I like about Nicola's work is that his foundations 
> are explicit
> > so you can get to say whether you like them or not. I am 
> agnostic about
> > different 3D ontologies because I think they are infererior for the
> > kinds of purposes I have in mind. However, like you I think it is
> > important to accomodate both 3D and 4D views.
> > 
> > 2. I looked at the bit in Nicola's paper about coincident 
> objects. He
> > gives the example of the lump of clay and the vase it 
> constitutes. In
> > fact a 4D analysis would also see these as two things, 
> because the temporal
> > extents are different, even though at some stages of the 
> lump of clay
> > they are coincident. The vase is in effect a temporal part 
> of the piece
> > of clay. One of the things I particularly like about the 4D 
> approach is
> > how it deals with the issues of apparently coincident objects.
> > 
> > Matthew West
> > Principal Consultant
> > Shell Information Technology International Limited
> > Shell Centre, London SE1 7NA, United Kingdom
> > 
> > Tel: +44 20 7934 4490 Other Tel: +44 7796 336538
> > Email: matthew.west@shell.com
> > Internet: http://www.shell.com
> > 
> > > -----Original Message-----
> > > From: John F. Sowa [mailto:sowa@bestweb.net]
> > > Sent: 20 June 2003 00:32
> > > To: West, Matthew R SITI-ITPSIE; sowa@bestweb.net; Eric 
> Peterson; Mike
> > > Pool; apease@ks.teknowledge.com; clegg@cyc.com; John
> > > DeOliveira; Patrick
> > > Cassidy; standard-upper-ontology@ieee.org
> > > Subject: RE: SUO: ELP's summary of MRW's standards experience
> > >
> > >
> > > Dear Matthew,
> > >
> > > I agree that having well-defined rules is important, but
> > > those rules also have implications, which can create
> > > inconsistencies, as we have noticed.
> > >
> > > JS>You have to be very careful with Nicola's DOLCE.  One of his
> > > >fundamental assumptions is totally inconsistent with Matthew's
> > > >principle "if two things have the same spatiotemporal extent,
> > > >they are identical."
> > >
> > > MW> I have no problem mapping to and from multiple 
> coincident objects
> > > >as long as I know what the rules are and they are consistently
> > > >applied. That the rules do not coincide with many 
> peoples intuitions
> > > >is a different issue.
> > >
> > > Intuitions lead to statements that embody them.  They can be
> > > stated in formal languages or in natural languages, but sooner
> > > or later, they generate inconsistencies with other intuitions.
> > >
> > > Although I am in favor of well-defined methodologies, I have
> > > serious doubts about the desirability of Nicola's identity
> > > rules.  They solve a problem that exists only in Nicola's
> > > conceptual model, not in mine or in others that I believe
> > > are both more widely used and more suitable as a foundation
> > > for ontology.
> > >
> > > However, I would be willing to allow Nicola's model to
> > > coexist as an option, but not one that I would recommend.
> > >
> > > John
> 
> o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
> 
>