SUO: Re: Partial, Multiple, Vague Objects?
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West, Matthew wrote:
>
> Dear Jon,
>
> Not quite sure how you get to vagueness from the points below,
> but never mind.
Matthew,
I just mentioned the battles over "partial-definedness" and "vagueness" of objects
as a topic from the AI, CS_1, and CS_2 literatures that cyclicly goes through the
very same dynamics as that about almost any other "intens/tional" quality, for
example, the case of multiple entities haunting the same volume of spacetime,
like some folks are imagining here.
> One of the chapters in Sider's 4 dimensionalism is on arguments
> from vagueness. The point of view he was supporting was that
> with an apparently vauge object like a nose or a mountain,
> the reality is that there are lots of definite objects
> (take you pick as to where the nose ends) and the
> vagueness comes in that the sign represents all
> of them.
>
> I think that's what you were saying below.
Yes, whether we are talking about multiple, overlapping,
partial, transubstantial, or vague objects, its okay to
talk in that loose fashion so long as we understand the
figure of speech involved, but when it comes time to
think about what's really going on, then its better
to realize that charts and graphs and maps overlap,
not objects.
Fortunately, the basic conceptual framework for dealing with this very type
of situation was already worked out by Riemann in the 1850's and has enjoyed
one or two significant applications in the intervening years. Now, due to
the domains of application where this problem of "intercoordination" first
became most acute, the basic ideas are presently buried in the accumulated
years of notational dust, so it may take some creative and reconstructive
archeo-logical work to excavate their conceptual foundations and to adapt
them to our present concerns, but it will be a heck of a lot easier to do
that than it would be to try and recreate the last 150 years worth of
progress from scratch.
Plus, as an extra-added incensive,
you get 10 or 15 years worth of my
own work on the problem for free.
Jon Awbrey
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> Matthew West
> Principal Consultant
> Shell Information Technology International Limited
> Shell Centre, London SE1 7NA, United Kingdom
>
> Tel: +44 20 7934 4490 Other Tel: +44 7796 336538
> Email: matthew.west@shell.com
> Internet: http://www.shell.com
>
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Jon Awbrey [mailto:jawbrey@oakland.edu]
> > Sent: 21 June 2003 01:52
> > To: West, Matthew R SITI-ITPSIE
> > Cc: sowa@bestweb.net; Eric Peterson; Mike Pool;
> > apease@ks.teknowledge.com; clegg@cyc.com; John DeOliveira; Patrick
> > Cassidy; standard-upper-ontology@ieee.org
> > Subject: Re: Partial, Multiple, Vague Objects?
> >
> >
> > o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
> >
> > John, Matthew, Patrick, et al.
> >
> > Let me suggest that this is another one of those issues that arises
> > from a failure to distinguish maps and territories -- that what we
> > really have is two different descriptions, possibly of one thing.
> > The AI, Cog Sci, and Philosophy literatures periodically go thru
> > this very same cycle about "partial objects" or "vague objects",
> > and when the dust clears most clear-headed folks recognize that
> > it's the descriptions, information, and signs that are partial
> > and vague, and not the objects. To call the objects partial,
> > multiple, or vague just because the signs that we mediately
> > have of them are is yet another case of the reified syntax
> > fallacy, that is, of confusing properties of signs with
> > properties of their objects.
> >
> > Jon Awbrey
> >
> > o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
> >
> > West, Matthew R SITI-ITPSIE wrote:
> > >
> > > Dear John,
> > >
> > > Just a couple of points.
> > >
> > > 1. What I like about Nicola's work is that his foundations
> > are explicit
> > > so you can get to say whether you like them or not. I am
> > agnostic about
> > > different 3D ontologies because I think they are infererior for the
> > > kinds of purposes I have in mind. However, like you I think it is
> > > important to accomodate both 3D and 4D views.
> > >
> > > 2. I looked at the bit in Nicola's paper about coincident
> > objects. He
> > > gives the example of the lump of clay and the vase it
> > constitutes. In
> > > fact a 4D analysis would also see these as two things,
> > because the temporal
> > > extents are different, even though at some stages of the
> > lump of clay
> > > they are coincident. The vase is in effect a temporal part
> > of the piece
> > > of clay. One of the things I particularly like about the 4D
> > approach is
> > > how it deals with the issues of apparently coincident objects.
> > >
> > > Matthew West
> > > Principal Consultant
> > > Shell Information Technology International Limited
> > > Shell Centre, London SE1 7NA, United Kingdom
> > >
> > > Tel: +44 20 7934 4490 Other Tel: +44 7796 336538
> > > Email: matthew.west@shell.com
> > > Internet: http://www.shell.com
> > >
> > > > -----Original Message-----
> > > > From: John F. Sowa [mailto:sowa@bestweb.net]
> > > > Sent: 20 June 2003 00:32
> > > > To: West, Matthew R SITI-ITPSIE; sowa@bestweb.net; Eric
> > Peterson; Mike
> > > > Pool; apease@ks.teknowledge.com; clegg@cyc.com; John
> > > > DeOliveira; Patrick
> > > > Cassidy; standard-upper-ontology@ieee.org
> > > > Subject: RE: SUO: ELP's summary of MRW's standards experience
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > Dear Matthew,
> > > >
> > > > I agree that having well-defined rules is important, but
> > > > those rules also have implications, which can create
> > > > inconsistencies, as we have noticed.
> > > >
> > > > JS>You have to be very careful with Nicola's DOLCE. One of his
> > > > >fundamental assumptions is totally inconsistent with Matthew's
> > > > >principle "if two things have the same spatiotemporal extent,
> > > > >they are identical."
> > > >
> > > > MW> I have no problem mapping to and from multiple
> > coincident objects
> > > > >as long as I know what the rules are and they are consistently
> > > > >applied. That the rules do not coincide with many
> > peoples intuitions
> > > > >is a different issue.
> > > >
> > > > Intuitions lead to statements that embody them. They can be
> > > > stated in formal languages or in natural languages, but sooner
> > > > or later, they generate inconsistencies with other intuitions.
> > > >
> > > > Although I am in favor of well-defined methodologies, I have
> > > > serious doubts about the desirability of Nicola's identity
> > > > rules. They solve a problem that exists only in Nicola's
> > > > conceptual model, not in mine or in others that I believe
> > > > are both more widely used and more suitable as a foundation
> > > > for ontology.
> > > >
> > > > However, I would be willing to allow Nicola's model to
> > > > coexist as an option, but not one that I would recommend.
> > > >
> > > > John
> >
> > o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
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