RE: SUO: Monolithic ontologies (was ontology as science)
Iam, (Matthew,)
If I may ask a question.
> > MW: In what sense is a stock option involved in a language game?
>
> Well, a stock option is a socio-cultural artifact. It's an
> agreement by one
> party, a publicly owned corporation, to sell a set number of shares to
> another party, usually an employee of the corporation.
You say "a set number of shares" (or for simplicity, we can say a single
share). How would this be expressed in SUMO? In the same way as an actual
single share (or set of shares) that is sold or held by someone?
The issue is that at the stage when the stock option contract is made, it is
not known whether it will be exercised (i.e. whether it is actual or
possible).
The surface form of the language (game?) suggests no difference between the
actual and possible.
However, financial systems typically value (traded) stock options - if they
are 'in the money' - by assuming that they are execised on valuation date. A
series of valuations on different dates will involve a series of (possible)
exercisings. Do these valuations involve exactly the same (identical) share?
If not, how do we explain the valuation?
There are various ways of dealing with this - I wonder which SUMO has
adopted? Or, indeed whether SUMO has a policy on this matter. In my view, a
SUO would need a policy on this.
For those (sad?) people who follow all the SUO mails, this is related to a
point I raised in a discussion with Pat Cassidy ealier (extract below). ...
And to Matthew's original question "Where do you stand on possible and modal
matters?".
Sat 14/06/2003 10:00 - "I came across this point recently in Prior's Papers
on time and tense, 2003] p.87 and noted it down - " 'The (merely) possible',
as Pierce said, 'is
necessarily general', and 'it is only actuality, the force of existence,
which bursts the fluidity of the general and produces a discrete unit. [Note
9: C.S. Pierce, Collected Papers, 4, 172. Cf my Time and Modality, p.114.]"
"
Regards,
Chris
-----Original Message-----
From: owner-standard-upper-ontology@majordomo.ieee.org
[mailto:owner-standard-upper-ontology@majordomo.ieee.org]On Behalf Of
West, Matthew R SITI-ITPSIE
Sent: 26 June 2003 13:19
To: Ian Niles
Cc: standard-upper-ontology@ieee.org
Subject: RE: SUO: Monolithic ontologies (was ontology as science)
Dear Ian,
See comments below.
Matthew West
Principal Consultant
Shell Information Technology International Limited
Shell Centre, London SE1 7NA, United Kingdom
Tel: +44 20 7934 4490 Other Tel: +44 7796 336538
Email: matthew.west@shell.com
Internet: http://www.shell.com
<snip>
> > > > > -----Original Message-----
> > > > > From: Ian Niles [mailto:iniles@teknowledge.com]
> > > > > Sent: 23 June 2003 18:58
> > > > > To: 'John F. Sowa'; Erik Larson; Fowler, Julian; Jon
> > > > Awbrey; Burkett,
> > > > > Bill; standard-upper-ontology@ieee.org
> > > > > Subject: RE: SUO: Monolithic ontologies (was ontology
> > as science)
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > John,
> > > > >
> > > > > I hope you don't mind if I jump in here. It's
> > true, as the
> > > > > quotation from the WonderWeb paper asserts, that the
> > > > > developers of the SUMO
> > > > > did not assume a "specific theoretical approach" in creating
> > > > > and refining
> > > > > the ontology. However, this does not imply, as you seem to
> > > > > believe, that
> > > > > there is no metaphysical perspective which has guided the
> > > > > development of the
> > > > > ontology. In fact, the SUMO is firmly rooted in metaphysical
> > > > > naturalism,
> > > > > viz. the belief that the natural world, the world of physical
> > > > > processes and
> > > > > objects, is all that there is. Since naturalism is
> > > > > compatible with many
> > > > > theoretical orientations, it is possible to be both
> > > > > metaphysically grounded
> > > > > and ontologically eclectic.
> > > >
> > > > MW: Looking this up in the OED suggests that this is
> mostly about
> > > > excluding spiritual and supernatural matters. Is that what you
> > > > mean?
> > >
> > > Right, excluding everything that cannot be regarded as a
> > > description of a
> > > physical object or process (at some level of abstraction).
> > >
> > > >
> > > > MW: This leaves quite a lot open (well almost
> everything in fact).
> > > > In particular 3D/4D.
> > >
> > > I did address this controversy in my message. Since the
> > > consensus of this
> > > list has been, I think, that the two representations are
> > > intertranslatable,
> > > let's just pick one and use a mapping in cases where the
> > other is more
> > > convenient.
> >
> > MW: Then you also need the other one to map to...
> > >
> > > >
> > > > MW: Where do you stand on possible and modal matters?
> Do you admit
> > > > the Starship Enterprise or Sherlock Holmes as things
> one can talk
> > > > about (I can't find these in nature). And how about things like
> > > > stock options? Abstract objects are not part of the
> natural world,
> > > > but I assume you do not wish to exclude those do you?
> > >
> > > I agree that we can meaningfully talk about fictional
> objects, stock
> > > options, and abstract objects. However, I don't think the
> > > meaning of these
> > > things is conferred by a Platonic form or some other such
> > > nonsense. I'd
> > > prefer a Wittgensteinian approach that cashed out their
> > > content in terms of
> > > their function in the language game of which they're a part.
> >
> > MW: I thought you were disdaining metaphysics - and then
> you name drop
> > like this!
>
> Name-dropping? This is just Intro to Philosophy stuff.
MW: I thought your position was to refute the value of philosophy.
>
> >
> > MW: So what does/would Sherlock Holmes and the Starship Enterprise
> > refer to? What language game are they a part of?
>
> They are both part of the language game of
> creating/discussing fictional
> texts.
MW: I don't have a linguistics background and don't see anything as
a language game, so would appreciate a brief statement on what you
mean by language game.
>
> >
> > MW: In what sense is a stock option involved in a language game?
>
> Well, a stock option is a socio-cultural artifact. It's an
> agreement by one
> party, a publicly owned corporation, to sell a set number of shares to
> another party, usually an employee of the corporation.
MW: I can see some statements about what stock options (in your opinion)
ARE but no relationship to a language game.
>
> > >
> > > > >
> > > > > As I've said before, I think that the whole purpose of
> > > > > a standard
> > > > > upper ontology is defeated if one assumes anything beyond
> > > > > naturalism. For
> > > > > one thing, the add-ons
> > > >
> > > > MW: Could you give some examples of what you mean by "add-ons"?
> > >
> > > Well, there are metaphysical positions that are incompatible with
> > > naturalism, e.g. Platonic realism or dualism. However, I
> > > don't think these
> > > alternatives or the others like them would promote any of the
> > > applications
> > > mentioned in the SUO Scope and Purpose statment.
> Furthermore, as I
> > > mentioned below, these other metaphysics would tend to
> > alienate large
> > > classes of academic users.
> >
> > MW: Well I would not include them either unless there were a
> > significant
> > group that was prepared to work on their inclusion. This is
> not simply
> > an academic exercise, and in general I find that the best
> indicator of
> > what is valuable is the willingness of people and organisations to
> > commit resources to the development of artifacts - including SUMO.
>
> Well, by that measure, SUMO is a success. There are dozens
> of organizations
> that are actively using SUMO. Just google SUMO ontology or
> ontologies.
MW: I would hesitate to use the word success, I think you have to
gain more acceptance here to claim that. However, that you have
serious effort behind your initiative means that (IMHO) it should
be taken seriously (I did vote for SUMO in the recent vote).
>
> > >
> > > You and John have been arguing, I take it, that the SUMO is
> > > lacking because
> > > it was built upon a sufficiently robust metaphysical foundation.
> >
> > MW: The underlying issue is that without a clear foundation,
> > the ontology tends to be ambiguous, because different people
> > can overlay
> > different assumptions and interpretations on the same constructs.
>
> I don't think this is the issue. I would tend to regard any extra
> metaphysical assumptions beyond naturalism as just so much hot air.
> However, see below for my response to your specific examples.
MW: It seems then that we need to identify what you wrap up into
naturalism. I suspect if you put 10 naturalists in a room for a week
they would not all agree about everything.
>
> >
> > > I've
> > > responded that we did assume a metaphysical perspective in
> > > constructing the
> > > ontology, viz. naturalism, and I argued that this perspective
> > > was enough. I
> > > don't think anything else is needed. If you think something
> > > additional or
> > > different is needed, please let me know what that is.
> >
> > MW: How you deal with change is the biggest one. I notice Chris
> > is already pursuing this.
> >
> > MW: Beyond that I can only suggest that you read Ted Sider's
> > book Four Dimensionalism. A large part of which is actually about
> > some different flavours of 3 dimensionalism that are possible.
> > He is setting them up to knock them down, but he does enumerate
> > a number of 3D positions that have been taken in the literature.
> > Your's may be one of them, or none of them, (it can't be all of
> > them) but it would be useful to say which up front.
> > >
> > > >
> > > > > will always alienate those who are
> > > > > ontologically
> > > > > committed to the negation of the add-ons, and, to the extent
> > > > > that people
> > > > > refuse to use the ontology, it will not serve its intended
> > > > function of
> > > > > semantic middleware. For another thing, the add-ons
> > are, I claim,
> > > > > unnecessary. Although they may arouse deep passions among
> > > > > philosophers, we
> > > > > have yet to find one that is needed to facilitate semantic
> > > > > interoperability.
> > > > > The closest we've come is in the 3D/4D dispute, but, even
> > > > > there, I think the
> > > > > consensus was that you could simply pick one representation
> > > > > and then provide
> > > > > a mapping to the other.
> > > >
> > > > MW: It is not as simple as that. They have different expressive
> > > > capabilities.
> > >
> > > I hate to risk resurrecting this whole debate, but I think
> > > the conclusion
> > > was that the two schemes or representation are intertranslatable.
> >
> > MW: From which I understand that it was at least your conclusion.
> > Mine was that we need both because they (potentially at least) have
> > different areas of application.
> > >
> > > >
> > > > > This is exactly what we have done
> > > > > with the SUMO.
> > > >
> > > > MW: So which one did you pick? What flavour does it have?
> > >
> > > It's 3D.
> > >
> > > > >
> > > > > In any case, perhaps rather than citing chapter
> > and verse from
> > > > > Pierce, you could cite an example where a metaphysical
> > > > assumption more
> > > > > robust than that of naturalism is needed to facilitate
> > one of the
> > > > > applications mentioned in the SUO Scope and Purpose statement.
> > > >
> > > > MW: Naturalism is hardly a complete metaphysical
> foundation. It is
> > > > just one of the things you need.
> > >
> > > So what else do you need? Really, Matthew, you and John
> > > ought to be able to
> > > give me one example. That's all I'm asking for.
> >
> > MW: I've mentioned one above
> >
> > - how you deal with change.
>
> In the SUMO, change is always represented as a 'Process' from one
> 'Attribute' or 'Relation' to another. For example, 'Melting'
> (http://ontology.teknowledge.com:8080/rsigma/SKB.jsp?req=SC&na
> me=Melting&skb
> =SUMO) is a change of state from 'Solid' to 'Liquid', and
> 'Translocation'
> (http://ontology.teknowledge.com:8080/rsigma/SKB.jsp?req=SC&na
> me=Translocati
> on&skb=SUMO) is a change from one location to another.
MW: This is only half the story. How do you deal with change
with respect to the objects changed by the activities?
>
> >
> > But how about:
> >
> > - what it means to be an individual (process or physical
> > object - or both?).
>
> In the SUMO, to be an instance of 'Process' or 'Object' is to have a
> location in space/time.
MW: This is close to a 4D statement. Now by location, do you mean
something that is extended in space and time, or space but not time,
or just a point location?
>
> >
> > - What sorts of things physical quantities are (pressures,
> > temperatures etc)
>
> I don't see that the ontology has to take a stand on what pressures,
> temperatures, and other physical quantities *really* are.
> All we need to do
> is to offer a formalization which allows different people and
> different
> systems to say all they need to say to communicate with one
> another and
> perform certain standard inferences.
MW: The view you take determines what aparatus you need, and the
complexity involved in achieving this.
MW: However, lets try a simpler question. Does the membership of
classes change?
>
> >
> > Your responses to these things will give some insight into
> > your metaphysics.
>
> I think I'm still a naturalist simpliciter.
MW: I'm sure you know what you mean by that. But I would like to
as well. As well as the headline statements, there are all sorts
of nasty details as the choices are made about how to do things.
>
> > >
> > > > >
> > > > > -Ian
> > > > >
> > > > > > -----Original Message-----
> > > > > > From: John F. Sowa [mailto:sowa@bestweb.net]
> > > > > > Sent: Saturday, June 21, 2003 2:31 AM
> > > > > > To: Erik Larson; John F. Sowa; Fowler, Julian; Jon
> > > > Awbrey; Burkett,
> > > > > > Bill; standard-upper-ontology@ieee.org
> > > > > > Subject: Re: SUO: Monolithic ontologies (was ontology
> > > as science)
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Erik,
> > > > > >
> > > > > > I mentioned SUMO as an example of a monolithic ontology
> > > > > > because Adam has been insisting for a long time that there
> > > > > > is no need to support options, modules, or microtheories.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > He agreed to vote for motion #2, but he remains unconvinced
> > > > > > about the need for any kind of modularity that goes beyond
> > > > > > the simple decomposition of SUMO into 11 modules,
> all of which
> > > > > > are assumed (but not yet proven) to be consistent with one
> > > > > > another.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > The definition of a monolithic ontology is one that is (or
> > > > > > can be) stated as a single consistent theory with no room
> > > > > > for incompatible options. That is what SUMO is today, but
> > > > > > it's definitely not what Cyc is. I don't know about DOLCE.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > > John, you're not singling out SUMO as a
> > "monolithic" ontology
> > > > > > > are you? Many would agree that it's significantly less
> > > > > > > monolithic then its competitors, specifically
> becuase it was
> > > > > > > designed with communities of users in mind. For
> instance...
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Those quotations from Guarino and OpenCyc state principles,
> > > > > > which don't say anything about modularity. I believe it is
> > > > > > a mistake not to emphasize modularity and options.
> But I know
> > > > > > that Cyc does have about 6000 microtheories, and I hope that
> > > > > > mechanism (or something like it) eventualy makes
> its way into
> > > > > > OpenCyc and whatever is proposed by the SUO Working Group.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > >SUMO:
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > >Because of its characteristic merging of different
> > upper level
> > > > > > > ontologies, SUMO is actually not influenced by a specific
> > > > > > > theoretical approach, rather it tends to take from various
> > > > > > > ontological proposals those general categories which seem
> > > > > > > to be largely shared by the computer science community.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > I doubt that Guarino or the Cyclers would question the value
> > > > > > of borrowing ideas and axioms from many different sources.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > But when people say that they have "not been influenced by
> > > > > > a specific theoretical approach" that merely means that they
> > > > > > have not fully analyzed their assumptions. That is
> not a good
> > > > > > sign -- it implies that that they have not done their
> > homework.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > > Given your interest in avoiding biases in the construction
> > > > > > > of an SUO, it seems you ought to be receptive to the SUMO
> > > > > > > approach. Are you?
> > > > > >
> > > > > > I'll reply with a quotation from my favorite philsopher,
> > > > > > C. S. Peirce:
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Find a scientific man who proposes to get along
> without any
> > > > > > metaphysics... and you have found one whose doctrines are
> > > > > > thoroughly vitiated by the crude and uncriticized
> > metaphysics
> > > > > > with which they are packed. We must
> philosophize, said the
> > > > > > great naturalist Aristotle -- if only to avoid
> > > philosophizing.
> > > > > > Every man of us has a metaphysics, and has to
> have one; and
> > > > > > it will influence his life greatly. Far better,
> then, that
> > > > > > that metaphysics should be criticized and not be allowed
> > > > > > to run loose.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Peirce said this about Ernst Mach and the positivists, but
> > > > > > he would have been even more vehemently opposed to
> the logical
> > > > > > positivists of the 1920s and 30s. It also applies
> to anybody
> > > > > > who claims no influence from "a specific theoretical
> > approach."
> > > > > >
> > > > > > John
> > > > > >
> > > > >
> > > >
> > >
> >
>