RE: SUO: Monolithic ontologies (was ontology as science)
Dear Ian,
This looks like progress. See responses and further
questions below.
I've also tidied the thread up a bit with some <snip>s.
Matthew West
Principal Consultant
Shell Information Technology International Limited
Shell Centre, London SE1 7NA, United Kingdom
Tel: +44 20 7934 4490 Other Tel: +44 7796 336538
Email: matthew.west@shell.com
Internet: http://www.shell.com
<snip>
> > > > > > > > -----Original Message-----
> > > > > > > > From: Ian Niles [mailto:iniles@teknowledge.com]
> > > > > > > > Sent: 23 June 2003 18:58
> > > > > > > > To: 'John F. Sowa'; Erik Larson; Fowler, Julian; Jon
> > > > > > > Awbrey; Burkett,
> > > > > > > > Bill; standard-upper-ontology@ieee.org
> > > > > > > > Subject: RE: SUO: Monolithic ontologies (was ontology
> > > > > as science)
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > John,
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > I hope you don't mind if I jump in here. It's
> > > > > true, as the
> > > > > > > > quotation from the WonderWeb paper asserts, that the
> > > > > > > > developers of the SUMO
> > > > > > > > did not assume a "specific theoretical approach" in
> > > creating
> > > > > > > > and refining
> > > > > > > > the ontology. However, this does not imply, as
> > you seem to
> > > > > > > > believe, that
> > > > > > > > there is no metaphysical perspective which has
> guided the
> > > > > > > > development of the
> > > > > > > > ontology. In fact, the SUMO is firmly rooted in
> > > metaphysical
> > > > > > > > naturalism,
> > > > > > > > viz. the belief that the natural world, the world
> > > of physical
> > > > > > > > processes and
> > > > > > > > objects, is all that there is. Since naturalism is
> > > > > > > > compatible with many
> > > > > > > > theoretical orientations, it is possible to be both
> > > > > > > > metaphysically grounded
> > > > > > > > and ontologically eclectic.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > MW: Looking this up in the OED suggests that this is
> > > > mostly about
> > > > > > > excluding spiritual and supernatural matters. Is
> > that what you
> > > > > > > mean?
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Right, excluding everything that cannot be regarded as a
> > > > > > description of a
> > > > > > physical object or process (at some level of abstraction).
> > > > > >
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > MW: This leaves quite a lot open (well almost
> > > > everything in fact).
> > > > > > > In particular 3D/4D.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > I did address this controversy in my message. Since the
> > > > > > consensus of this
> > > > > > list has been, I think, that the two representations are
> > > > > > intertranslatable,
> > > > > > let's just pick one and use a mapping in cases where the
> > > > > other is more
> > > > > > convenient.
> > > > >
> > > > > MW: Then you also need the other one to map to...
> > > > > >
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > MW: Where do you stand on possible and modal matters?
> > > > Do you admit
> > > > > > > the Starship Enterprise or Sherlock Holmes as things
> > > > one can talk
> > > > > > > about (I can't find these in nature). And how about
> > > things like
> > > > > > > stock options? Abstract objects are not part of the
> > > > natural world,
> > > > > > > but I assume you do not wish to exclude those do you?
> > > > > >
> > > > > > I agree that we can meaningfully talk about fictional
> > > > objects, stock
> > > > > > options, and abstract objects. However, I don't think the
> > > > > > meaning of these
> > > > > > things is conferred by a Platonic form or some other such
> > > > > > nonsense. I'd
> > > > > > prefer a Wittgensteinian approach that cashed out their
> > > > > > content in terms of
> > > > > > their function in the language game of which they're a part.
> > > > >
> > > > > MW: I thought you were disdaining metaphysics - and then
> > > > you name drop
> > > > > like this!
> > > >
> > > > Name-dropping? This is just Intro to Philosophy stuff.
> > >
> > > MW: I thought your position was to refute the value of philosophy.
>
> I don't have any objection to applying philosophy where it is
> needed. I
> just don't see the value of taking up once again unresolved
> debates on the
> *true* nature of reality, given that our goal is to construct
> an engineering
> artifact in a severely limited time frame.
MW: Well I wasn't trying to suggest that one had to consider ALL of
past philosophical work, only that there is some that is actually
useful and/or at least should not just be ignored with a great
sweep of the hand.
>
> > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > MW: So what does/would Sherlock Holmes and the Starship
> > Enterprise
> > > > > refer to? What language game are they a part of?
> > > >
> > > > They are both part of the language game of
> > > > creating/discussing fictional
> > > > texts.
> > >
> > > MW: I don't have a linguistics background and don't see
> anything as
> > > a language game, so would appreciate a brief statement on what you
> > > mean by language game.
>
> "Language game" is a notion from the later Wittgenstein (the
> Wittgenstein of
> the "Philosophical Investigations" rather than the Wittgenstein of the
> "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus"). Wittgenstein used this
> expression to
> encapsulate his idea that language cannot be divorced from the
> socio-cultural practices in which language is embedded. One
> of his examples
> is the notion of "6 O'Clock on the Sun". We don't really
> know what this
> means, because our scheme of temporal coordinates is relative
> to being on
> Earth and marking time by the Sun's rotation around the Earth.
MW: Gee, doesn't sound much like a socio-cultural practice to me.
I think that most mathematicians would say that if you give coordinates
for a point without having specified the coordinate system, then you
haven't conveyed very much.
MW: On the other hand I would agree that there are all sorts of things
that do exist by convention - such as most national borders. As a
4 dimensionalist I am quite happy about these. You can have any 4D chunk
or collection of chunks you want in this or any possible world.
MW: Do you make a big thing about distinguishing "natural" objects from
these socio-cultural objects in SUMO?
>
> > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > MW: In what sense is a stock option involved in a
> language game?
> > > >
> > > > Well, a stock option is a socio-cultural artifact. It's an
> > > > agreement by one
> > > > party, a publicly owned corporation, to sell a set number
> > > of shares to
> > > > another party, usually an employee of the corporation.
> > >
> > > MW: I can see some statements about what stock options (in
> > > your opinion)
> > > ARE but no relationship to a language game.
>
> Well, in this case the stock option is a right, which derives
> its substance
> from the language game of conferring rights.
MW: Well it seems to me that if I substitute "socio-cultural
convention" for "language game" this makes reasonable sense.
> Often, when we put our
> philosophy caps on, according to Wittgenstein, we imagine
> that rights are
> some sort of funny object in Platonic heaven that magically
> connects with
> our activities and endows them with their value. However,
> again according
> to Wittgenstein, we need only attend to how words like
> "right" are actually
> used in the language to see that we do not need to posit
> these and other
> wierd entities.
MW: Well it looks like I can draw the conclusion that the later
Wittgenstein (or at least some of his work) is a part of your
metaphysical foundation - as well as naturalism.
MW: I must confess that I am not familiar (as you must have
gathered) with the later Wittgenstein, so could you explain
what you do do with "rights" if you don't "posit" them.
>
> > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > As I've said before, I think that the
> whole purpose of
> > > > > > > > a standard
> > > > > > > > upper ontology is defeated if one assumes
> anything beyond
> > > > > > > > naturalism. For
> > > > > > > > one thing, the add-ons
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > MW: Could you give some examples of what you mean by
> > > "add-ons"?
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Well, there are metaphysical positions that are
> > > incompatible with
> > > > > > naturalism, e.g. Platonic realism or dualism. However, I
> > > > > > don't think these
> > > > > > alternatives or the others like them would promote
> any of the
> > > > > > applications
> > > > > > mentioned in the SUO Scope and Purpose statment.
> > > > Furthermore, as I
> > > > > > mentioned below, these other metaphysics would tend to
> > > > > alienate large
> > > > > > classes of academic users.
> > > > >
> > > > > MW: Well I would not include them either unless there were a
> > > > > significant
> > > > > group that was prepared to work on their inclusion. This is
> > > > not simply
> > > > > an academic exercise, and in general I find that the best
> > > > indicator of
> > > > > what is valuable is the willingness of people and
> > organisations to
> > > > > commit resources to the development of artifacts -
> > including SUMO.
> > > >
> > > > Well, by that measure, SUMO is a success. There are dozens
> > > > of organizations
> > > > that are actively using SUMO. Just google SUMO ontology or
> > > > ontologies.
> > >
> > > MW: I would hesitate to use the word success, I think you have to
> > > gain more acceptance here to claim that. However, that you have
> > > serious effort behind your initiative means that (IMHO) it should
> > > be taken seriously (I did vote for SUMO in the recent vote).
> > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > > You and John have been arguing, I take it, that the SUMO is
> > > > > > lacking because
> > > > > > it was built upon a sufficiently robust metaphysical
> > > foundation.
> > > > >
> > > > > MW: The underlying issue is that without a clear foundation,
> > > > > the ontology tends to be ambiguous, because different people
> > > > > can overlay
> > > > > different assumptions and interpretations on the same
> > constructs.
> > > >
> > > > I don't think this is the issue. I would tend to
> regard any extra
> > > > metaphysical assumptions beyond naturalism as just so
> > much hot air.
> > > > However, see below for my response to your specific examples.
> > >
> > > MW: It seems then that we need to identify what you wrap up into
> > > naturalism. I suspect if you put 10 naturalists in a room
> for a week
> > > they would not all agree about everything.
>
> I'm absolutely certain they wouldn't agree about everything, but that
> doesn't matter. As long as they agree that there is,
> currently at least, no
> good reason to posit supernatural entities, that would be
> enough, I think.
> By supernatural entities, I mean thinks like immaterial
> Cartesian souls,
> Platonic forms, Leibnitzian monads, Berkeleyan ideas, and all
> the rest of
> the stuff which was assumed to exist outside of space/time
> purely on the
> basis of a priori theorizing.
MW: Well I'm happy to go along with that (as long as I understood
you correctly). Although I suspect I have realist tendencies (the
universe is independent of our existence and so are universals
such as sets).
>
> > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > > I've
> > > > > > responded that we did assume a metaphysical perspective in
> > > > > > constructing the
> > > > > > ontology, viz. naturalism, and I argued that this
> perspective
> > > > > > was enough. I
> > > > > > don't think anything else is needed. If you think
> something
> > > > > > additional or
> > > > > > different is needed, please let me know what that is.
> > > > >
> > > > > MW: How you deal with change is the biggest one. I
> notice Chris
> > > > > is already pursuing this.
> > > > >
> > > > > MW: Beyond that I can only suggest that you read Ted Sider's
> > > > > book Four Dimensionalism. A large part of which is
> > actually about
> > > > > some different flavours of 3 dimensionalism that are possible.
> > > > > He is setting them up to knock them down, but he does
> enumerate
> > > > > a number of 3D positions that have been taken in the
> literature.
> > > > > Your's may be one of them, or none of them, (it can't
> be all of
> > > > > them) but it would be useful to say which up front.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > will always alienate those who are
> > > > > > > > ontologically
> > > > > > > > committed to the negation of the add-ons, and, to
> > > the extent
> > > > > > > > that people
> > > > > > > > refuse to use the ontology, it will not serve its
> > intended
> > > > > > > function of
> > > > > > > > semantic middleware. For another thing, the add-ons
> > > > > are, I claim,
> > > > > > > > unnecessary. Although they may arouse deep
> > passions among
> > > > > > > > philosophers, we
> > > > > > > > have yet to find one that is needed to facilitate
> > semantic
> > > > > > > > interoperability.
> > > > > > > > The closest we've come is in the 3D/4D dispute,
> but, even
> > > > > > > > there, I think the
> > > > > > > > consensus was that you could simply pick one
> > representation
> > > > > > > > and then provide
> > > > > > > > a mapping to the other.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > MW: It is not as simple as that. They have different
> > > expressive
> > > > > > > capabilities.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > I hate to risk resurrecting this whole debate, but I think
> > > > > > the conclusion
> > > > > > was that the two schemes or representation are
> > > intertranslatable.
> > > > >
> > > > > MW: From which I understand that it was at least your
> > conclusion.
> > > > > Mine was that we need both because they (potentially at
> > > least) have
> > > > > different areas of application.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > This is exactly what we have done
> > > > > > > > with the SUMO.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > MW: So which one did you pick? What flavour does it have?
> > > > > >
> > > > > > It's 3D.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > In any case, perhaps rather than citing chapter
> > > > > and verse from
> > > > > > > > Pierce, you could cite an example where a metaphysical
> > > > > > > assumption more
> > > > > > > > robust than that of naturalism is needed to facilitate
> > > > > one of the
> > > > > > > > applications mentioned in the SUO Scope and Purpose
> > > statement.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > MW: Naturalism is hardly a complete metaphysical
> > > > foundation. It is
> > > > > > > just one of the things you need.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > So what else do you need? Really, Matthew, you and John
> > > > > > ought to be able to
> > > > > > give me one example. That's all I'm asking for.
> > > > >
> > > > > MW: I've mentioned one above
> > > > >
> > > > > - how you deal with change.
> > > >
> > > > In the SUMO, change is always represented as a
> 'Process' from one
> > > > 'Attribute' or 'Relation' to another. For example, 'Melting'
> > > > (http://ontology.teknowledge.com:8080/rsigma/SKB.jsp?req=SC&na
> > > > me=Melting&skb
> > > > =SUMO) is a change of state from 'Solid' to 'Liquid', and
> > > > 'Translocation'
> > > > (http://ontology.teknowledge.com:8080/rsigma/SKB.jsp?req=SC&na
> > > > me=Translocati
> > > > on&skb=SUMO) is a change from one location to another.
> > >
> > > MW: This is only half the story. How do you deal with change
> > > with respect to the objects changed by the activities?
>
> I'm not sure what you're asking here. I've said that change
> in the SUMO is
> assumed to be a temporal progression from one state or
> relation to another
> state or relation. What is it that you still find unclear about this?
MW: How do you identify these states? When do you show it as a state of
an object or a relation to another object?
>
> > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > But how about:
> > > > >
> > > > > - what it means to be an individual (process or physical
> > > > > object - or both?).
> > > >
> > > > In the SUMO, to be an instance of 'Process' or 'Object'
> > is to have a
> > > > location in space/time.
> > >
> > > MW: This is close to a 4D statement. Now by location, do you mean
> > > something that is extended in space and time, or space
> but not time,
> > > or just a point location?
>
> I mean space and time.
MW: So you are at least eternalist rather than presentist. If objects
can be extended in time as well as space, can I talk about temporal
parts of them as well as spatial parts of them? (the implication from
above is "yes" - but I'd just like to confirm that). If yes, Do you
consider these temporal parts as independent objects with their own
identity? This is really a question as to whether they can participate
in relationships and be otherwise referenced.
>
> > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > - What sorts of things physical quantities are (pressures,
> > > > > temperatures etc)
> > > >
> > > > I don't see that the ontology has to take a stand on what
> > pressures,
> > > > temperatures, and other physical quantities *really* are.
> > > > All we need to do
> > > > is to offer a formalization which allows different people and
> > > > different
> > > > systems to say all they need to say to communicate with one
> > > > another and
> > > > perform certain standard inferences.
> > >
> > > MW: The view you take determines what aparatus you need, and the
> > > complexity involved in achieving this.
> > >
> > > MW: However, lets try a simpler question. Does the membership of
> > > classes change?
>
> I guess what you're asking is the following: Is it possible for a
> particular entity to be an instance of a class at one time
> and not to be an
> instance of that class at another time? I would say that it is indeed
> possible. As I understand it, Chris Welty and Nicola Guarino
> would say that
> it is not possible. Of course, they do this at the price of
> assuming some
> form of essentialism, which most people would find objectionable.
MW: Well at least some people would apparantly - but I suspect that for
all positions you can take there are some people who find it
objectionable.
MW: Interestingly in EPISTLE we find we do not need classes with
changing membership, and otherwise your position is getting very close
to ours - so we should look at the reasons for this more closely.
MW: Because we classify states of things, those states never change their
membership of a class. However, you might be interested in the subclass
of those that are members of the class "now". And there are a number of
these classes that apply, but the membership of none of them changes.
You need to stand outside time to see things in this way, but being able
to reduce classes to sets has some very big advantages.
MW: Do you consider properties such as "the degree of hotness sometimes
described as 20C" to be classes? If not what are they?
>
> > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > Your responses to these things will give some insight into
> > > > > your metaphysics.
> > > >
> > > > I think I'm still a naturalist simpliciter.
> > >
> > > MW: I'm sure you know what you mean by that. But I would like to
> > > as well. As well as the headline statements, there are all sorts
> > > of nasty details as the choices are made about how to do things.
>
> OK, I hope I've clarified things somewhat. Let me know if I haven't.
MW: Yes, we are certainly making progress.
>
> > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > -Ian
> > > > > > > >
<snip>