Re: naturalism (was: RE: SUO: Monolithic ontologies)
This is a nice article. In light of the present discussion the
following quote from it is interesting:
- Naturalism would not, however, rule out the
transmigration of souls if our best scientific theories were to require
the truth of this doctrine.
Note that this version of naturalism, unlike the one that Ian
presented, does not make any a priori ontological assumptions.
Mike
At 08:16 AM 7/2/2003 -0700, Jay Halcomb wrote:
See also:
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mathphil-indis/
Indispensability Arguments in the Philosophy of Mathematics
Jay
----- Original Message -----
From: "Mike Pool" <mpool@iet.com>
To: "Ian Niles" <iniles@teknowledge.com>; "'Chris
Angus'"
<chris.angus@btinternet.com>; "Ian Niles"
<iniles@teknowledge.com>; "'West,
Matthew R SITI-ITPSIE'" <matthew.west@shell.com>
Cc: <standard-upper-ontology@ieee.org>
Sent: Wednesday, July 02, 2003 05:56
Subject: naturalism (was: RE: SUO: Monolithic ontologies)
>
> Ian,
>
> I may have missed something here in this discussion of naturalism,
it's
hard to keep up with all the SUO mail. However, I find it
puzzling that
you claim that the SUMO is firmly rooted in metaphysical naturalism
defined
as the belief "that the natural world, the world of physical
processes and
objects, is all that there is" while the SUMO partitions
&%Entity into the
classes &%Physical and &%Abstract".
>
> The comment on &%Abstract is intriguing. "Instances of
Abstract can be
said to exist in the same sense as mathematical objects such as sets
and
relations, but they cannot exist at a particular place and time without
some
physical encoding or embodiment." This is a little murky
to me, I'd like
to better understand what it means for an abstract entity to be
physically
encoded or embodied, but it does seem to suggest, if &%Abstract
has any
instances, that there are things that exist outside of space and
time. The
partitioning of &%Entity into &%Abstract and the class
&%Physical also
suggests that there are entities that are neither physical objects
nor
processes. After all, &%Object and &%Process are subclasses
of &%Physical.
>
> Of course, there are versions of mathematical platonism that claim
to be
consistent with naturalism (Quine argued that abstract mathematical
entities
were required by our best scientific theories and therefore granted
them
ontological status in a naturalistic framework but used a broader
definition
of naturalism than you are invoking) and there are
naturalists/nominalists
who go to great lengths to deny the existence of abstract entities,
like
sets, numbers, (e.g., Hartry Field) and others who deny that
mathematical
entities like sets are actually abstract (I think this is the line
that
Penelope Maddy pushed.) However, I am
unfamiliar with versions of
naturalism that simultaneously posit mathematical entities as abstract
and
define naturalism as the view that physical processes and objects are
all
that exist. Could you say a bit more here about the nature of
the
naturalism in which the SUMO is firmly rooted and the notion of
abstract
entity that appears in the SUMO? !
> Again, please forgive if you've already addressed this
and I've missed
it.
>
> best,
>
> Mike Pool
>
> At 12:18 PM 7/1/2003 -0700, Ian Niles wrote:
>
> >Chris,
> >
> > I didn't say that the
hypothesized naturalists wouldn't agree
about
> >what is "natural". I just assumed that they
would disagree about many
other
> >things. As I've said before, my notion of a supernatural
object is
anything
> >that is regarded as existing outside of space/time, e.g.
immaterial
souls,
> >Platonic forms, etc.
> >
> >-Ian
> >
> >> -----Original Message-----
> >> From: Chris Angus
[mailto:chris.angus@btinternet.com]
> >> Sent: Tuesday, July 01, 2003 11:56 AM
> >> To: Ian Niles; 'West, Matthew R SITI-ITPSIE'
> >> Cc: standard-upper-ontology@ieee.org
> >> Subject: RE: SUO: Monolithic ontologies (was ontology as
science)
> >>
> >>
> >> Ian
> >>
> >> If you cannot agree about what constitutes 'natural' how
can
> >> you agree on
> >> what is 'supernatural'. This seems to be a very shaky
line
> >> of reasoning.
> >>
> >> Regards
> >> Chris Angus
> >>
> >> > > MW: It seems then that we need to identify what
you wrap up into
> >> > > naturalism. I suspect if you put 10 naturalists
in a room
> >> for a week
> >> > > they would not all agree about everything.
> >>
> >> > IN: I'm absolutely certain they wouldn't agree
about
> >> everything, but that
> >> > doesn't matter. As long as they agree that there
is,
> >> currently at least,
> >> no
> >> > good reason to posit supernatural entities, that would
be
> >> enough, I think.
> >> > By supernatural entities, I mean thinks like
immaterial
> >> Cartesian souls,
> >> > Platonic forms, Leibnitzian monads, Berkeleyan ideas,
and
> >> all the rest of
> >> > the stuff which was assumed to exist outside of
space/time
> >> purely on the
> >> > basis of a priori theorizing.
> >> >
> >>
>
>
>