Re: SUO: Re: One Stone Fits All
Jon,
To a very large extent, I agree.
JA> .... Since it's terribly unlikely that any of us are
> anywhere near grokking the "essence" of anything -- I do not deny that
> essences exist, indeed, I think it is very likely that some do, it's
> just that most of the historically nominated candidates have so far
> turned out to be historical accidents -- I think that it is far
> more useful in the meantime, awaiting the end of inquiry, to
> speak of our descriptions of things and how they change
> from time to time, and how they change in appearance
> from point of view to point of view.
This, by the way, leads to one of my major criticisms of DOLCE.
They use an unqualified modal operator to mark what they claim is
"essential" to some type. As I have pointed out many times, every
claim of necessity rests on some implicit "law" that makes something
necessary or essential. Instead of an unqualified "essence marker",
we should require a explicit statement of some law (or axiom) that
states the principle for whatever essence is being assumed. For
more on that subject, see my paper "Laws, Facts, and Contexts":
http://www.jfsowa.com/pubs/laws.htm
TJ>Quine's demolition of the analytic/synthetic dichotomy does for
concepts what Witt's
>>>family resemblances does for things. It blurs the sharp distinctions. In particular,
>>>it blurs the dichotomy between a statement being true by definition (analytic a priori,
>>>in Kantian terms) and being true by empirical matter of fact (synthetic a posteriori,
>>>in Kantian terms).
>
JA> Can you explain to me in your own words
> how you think that Quine demolished the
> analytic/synthetic dichotomy?
Good question. In any case, I would throw the words "analytic" and
"synthetic" into the same dustbin as "universals" and "particulars".
As a replacement, I would recommend the approach in the laws.htm paper.
JA> The dichotomy between dichotomies and continua is a false dichotomy.
> In mathematics, continua are constructed by way of limit processes,
> like Cauchy sequences, from dichotomies, like Dedekind cuts, and
> continuous functions are constructed via "step" functions.
> One of the most spectacular elaborations of this way
> of doing things is Conway's and Knuth's concept of
> "surreal numebers", which stuff vastly more points
> in a line that even the real numbers contain,
> all constructed by means of certain types
> of dichotomies. And incidentally, akin
> to a particular type of "game theory".
I agree.
JA> Not all of it, but a large share of these ideas from Witt. and Whit.
> amount to little more than popularizations of ideas that have long
> been stock in trade in topology, algeberaic and point set flavors.
I believe that Witt. and Whit. have more to offer, but in any case
I agree that philosophers have a lot to learn from mathematicians
and physicists.
Peirce, Whitehead, and Wittgenstein are three "outsiders" who applied
their training in mathematics, physics, and engineering to revolutionize
philosophy. In return, the 20th century analytic philosophers did their
best to ignore them. I believe it's now time to bring them back with
a vengence. See my paper on "Signs, Processes, and Language Games":
http://www.jfsowa.com/pubs/signproc.htm
John Sowa