SUO: RE: RE: RE: Re: Architecture of an intelligent ontology development algorithm
Tom Johnston wrote:
>
<snip/>
> TJ: I meant "relatively stable", of course, "stable" in the
> sense that Quine
> thought arithmetic to be. That sense being that, if we were
> ever faced with
> a serious empirical counter-example to the laws of
> arithmetic, (something in
> the strange world of quantum physics, perhaps), we would find
> some other way
> to accommodate that example than by revising the laws of
> arithmetic. Even
> more likely, we would be unable to even describe the
> phenomenon in a way
> that brings the laws of arithmetic into question. So I think
> an upper level
> ontology is more like logic and arithmetic -- something near
> the core of
> Quine's conceptual sphere -- than like "our own goals". Why
> do you think an
> upper level ontology is as subjective, ideosyncratic and
> mutable as personal
> goals are?
I may have exagerated a tiny bit - they might be more stable
than goals, but I certainly don't think they are as stable
as I think arithmetic is stable.
> Here's why I think this particular issue is important. If an
> upper level
> ontology can be or become as relatively stable as I have
> suggested, then it
> can have legislative force, contra (apparently) to what John
> has suggested.
> In other words, just as we do not think about revising
> arithmetic when we
> encounter anomalies in counting-things kinds of activities,
> we can reach the
> point where we do not think about revising an upper level
> ontology when we
> encounter anomalies in classifying-things kinds of
> activities. Of course,
> this isn't an absolete "not"; it's a Quinean "not".
The situation you're describing above is unlikely, in my
opinion, except in very small subdomains, such as linear
system math, first order logic, and other foundational
areas. Most of the focus of ontology developers is on
the human computer interaction level, where we use English
with other people and still don't do a good job of conveying
our ideas to each other.
Consider a system that designs a car. Every year the car
design changes, partially to provide a novel style, partly
to accomodate changing technologies, and partly to make
the car safer, easier to build, cheaper, higher quality,
and all the other design goals that engineers have in mind
to build a car.
So if I want a system that interacts with car purchasers
over the web and builds the car to meet their requirements,
it has to understand their needs. It can't just say that
the law now requires tire pressure and temperature sensors
in every tire, it has to explain the reasons behind the
new law (accidents in SUVs from tire failures pissed off
the legislators), what you can do about it (write your
legislator), and so on.
The car world changes every year, just like our culture
changes every year. It seems very gradual when we're not
intensely affected by a change, but when you reflect on
how different cars are now than when you started driving,
you may come up with hundreds of changes in the technology
that would have had to be implemented in the car program.
<snip/>
> So I claim that an upper level ontology can be as highly
> stable as the laws
> of arithmetic, but in the only way that such stability can ever be
> achieved -- by us. We can MAKE it stable, by accommodating
> any purportedly
> conflicting evidence by re-interpreting that evidence, i.e. by making
> adjustments in our ontological schemes somewhere ELSE.
<snip/>
> What do you think? First, do you think there is a real
> difference here, as I
> think there is? Secondly, if you differ with my conclusions,
> as you appear
> to do, where do you think I've gone wrong?
>
> Tom
We appear to disagree because we're using different intuitions
about different applications of the ontological machinery.
You seem to be concentrating on the foundational sciences,
which are probably more stable than most things, but I feel
the major value of "spiritual machines", as the book title
went, is to communicate in an absorbing and humane way with
people who have the usual idiosyncracies, personality issues,
painful memories, and other human limitations. I'm not as
concerned about the educational use (learning math, science,
logic, ...) as these more social and economic issues.
JMHO,
Rich