SUO: RE: RE: RE: RE: Re: Architecture of an intelligent ontology development algorithm
Tom Johnston wrote:
> Richard:
>
> Yes, I think we're close to concluding that it's a matter of differing
> intuitions. But it was an informative journey (for me, at
> least) getting to
> that point.
>
> Perhaps the intuitions differ on what "upper" means. As an
> example of what I
> mean by "upper":
>
> Stuff
> Things
> Count-type things
> Mass-type things
> Events
> Relationships
> Types of Things.
> Types of Events.
> Types of Relationships.
>
> recursion all around here. OK, quite a naive ontology, but it
> will do as an
> example.
>
> I don't think that ontology would be forced to change by any
> changes you
> describe in your car example.
>
> Tom
Things, events, relationships, and so on seem to me to be
the bottom levels, or near there, while novel concepts defined
on top of these kinds of objects are the higher level ones.
I base this kind of thing on the definition of a "generalization"
of a component - A is more general than B if A has fewer
properties than B, and if every property A has is also a
property of B. So B has every property of A and then at least
one more, making B a specialization of A.
Take a database table with Name and ID as attributes. Another
table having Name, ID and Phone Number would be a specialization
of the first, and would have to be placed lower on the lattice.
JMHO,
Rich
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Richard Cooper [mailto:rich@valutech.com]
> Sent: Thursday, August 28, 2003 12:27 PM
> To: Tom Johnston; Jon Awbrey; SUO
> Subject: RE: RE: RE: Re: Architecture of an intelligent ontology
> development algorithm
>
>
> Tom Johnston wrote:
> >
> <snip/>
> > TJ: I meant "relatively stable", of course, "stable" in the
> > sense that Quine
> > thought arithmetic to be. That sense being that, if we were
> > ever faced with
> > a serious empirical counter-example to the laws of
> > arithmetic, (something in
> > the strange world of quantum physics, perhaps), we would find
> > some other way
> > to accommodate that example than by revising the laws of
> > arithmetic. Even
> > more likely, we would be unable to even describe the
> > phenomenon in a way
> > that brings the laws of arithmetic into question. So I think
> > an upper level
> > ontology is more like logic and arithmetic -- something near
> > the core of
> > Quine's conceptual sphere -- than like "our own goals". Why
> > do you think an
> > upper level ontology is as subjective, ideosyncratic and
> > mutable as personal
> > goals are?
>
> I may have exagerated a tiny bit - they might be more stable
> than goals, but I certainly don't think they are as stable
> as I think arithmetic is stable.
>
>
> > Here's why I think this particular issue is important. If an
> > upper level
> > ontology can be or become as relatively stable as I have
> > suggested, then it
> > can have legislative force, contra (apparently) to what John
> > has suggested.
> > In other words, just as we do not think about revising
> > arithmetic when we
> > encounter anomalies in counting-things kinds of activities,
> > we can reach the
> > point where we do not think about revising an upper level
> > ontology when we
> > encounter anomalies in classifying-things kinds of
> > activities. Of course,
> > this isn't an absolete "not"; it's a Quinean "not".
>
> The situation you're describing above is unlikely, in my
> opinion, except in very small subdomains, such as linear
> system math, first order logic, and other foundational
> areas. Most of the focus of ontology developers is on
> the human computer interaction level, where we use English
> with other people and still don't do a good job of conveying
> our ideas to each other.
>
> Consider a system that designs a car. Every year the car
> design changes, partially to provide a novel style, partly
> to accomodate changing technologies, and partly to make
> the car safer, easier to build, cheaper, higher quality,
> and all the other design goals that engineers have in mind
> to build a car.
>
> So if I want a system that interacts with car purchasers
> over the web and builds the car to meet their requirements,
> it has to understand their needs. It can't just say that
> the law now requires tire pressure and temperature sensors
> in every tire, it has to explain the reasons behind the
> new law (accidents in SUVs from tire failures pissed off
> the legislators), what you can do about it (write your
> legislator), and so on.
>
> The car world changes every year, just like our culture
> changes every year. It seems very gradual when we're not
> intensely affected by a change, but when you reflect on
> how different cars are now than when you started driving,
> you may come up with hundreds of changes in the technology
> that would have had to be implemented in the car program.
>
> <snip/>
>
> > So I claim that an upper level ontology can be as highly
> > stable as the laws
> > of arithmetic, but in the only way that such stability can ever be
> > achieved -- by us. We can MAKE it stable, by accommodating
> > any purportedly
> > conflicting evidence by re-interpreting that evidence, i.e.
> by making
> > adjustments in our ontological schemes somewhere ELSE.
>
> <snip/>
>
> > What do you think? First, do you think there is a real
> > difference here, as I
> > think there is? Secondly, if you differ with my conclusions,
> > as you appear
> > to do, where do you think I've gone wrong?
> >
> > Tom
>
> We appear to disagree because we're using different intuitions
> about different applications of the ontological machinery.
> You seem to be concentrating on the foundational sciences,
> which are probably more stable than most things, but I feel
> the major value of "spiritual machines", as the book title
> went, is to communicate in an absorbing and humane way with
> people who have the usual idiosyncracies, personality issues,
> painful memories, and other human limitations. I'm not as
> concerned about the educational use (learning math, science,
> logic, ...) as these more social and economic issues.
>
> JMHO,
> Rich
>
>
>
>
> t=
>