SUO: Re: Unanimous Consent
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Jay, Matthew, Pierre, SUO WG,
Many people, present writer included, have observed that the criteria
appropriate to different kinds of ontology applications and projects,
all of them nonetheless falling under the rather large tent of our
scope and purpose document, may be radically different.
In particular, I have pointed to the differences in working methodology
and goals of research oriented ontologies and, for the lack of a better
name, so-called commonsense ontologies.
Jon Awbrey
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Jay Halcomb wrote:
>
> Pierre said:
>
> "Never the less, it seems to me that this group would be better off
> if proposed material was judged on criteria similar to those by which
> the final product shall be evaluated, rather than dependent upon
> pleasant email exchanges."
>
> Pierre, I agree with this view, which was the essential point of my last
> e-mail -- getting more specific about such criteria for working documents.
>
> Jay
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: "Pierre Grenon" <pierre.grenon@ifomis.uni-leipzig.de>
> To: "West, Matthew R SITI-ITPSIE" <matthew.west@shell.com>
> Cc: <standard-upper-ontology@ieee.org>
> Sent: Friday, August 29, 2003 08:07
> Subject: RE: SUO: Unanimous consent
>
> >
> > A few clarifications.
> >
> > > > PG: I was refering to the second kind of maturity. Not the
> > > > maturity of the
> > > > project's findings (anyway, longevity is not always a sign of
> > > > maturity, you
> > > > will agree), but that of the document in its capacity as a
> > > > proposal for being a
> > > > starter.
> > >
> > > MW: This is a clear difference of opinion that we have. You
> > > presume that a starter document must have a certain level of
> > > completeness. I do not. No rules have been set by this group
> > > for the level of completeness a starter document should have,
> > > so you can only be extrapolating from SUMO (in fact IFF was
> > > substantial, but rather incomplete when it was first propsoed).
> > > I think your presumtions are questionable as "rules" of this
> > > group, although you are of course entitled to your own
> > > preferences as to the level a document should be. In the end
> > > the group will decide.
> >
> > I don't believe that this group is an enlighted self-regulating agent.
> I've
> > been nitpicking on occasions because it is my opinion that this group
> should
> > erect higher standards in order to deserve the credits it is pretending
> to. The
> > desidearta I express seem to me rather casual as an ontologist. Of course,
> all
> > I express regarding the methodology of this group is but my opinion, I'm
> no
> > master of ceremony. But I guess this is rather a problem of culture
> reather
> > than opinion. Never the less, it seems to me that this group would be
> better
> > off if proposed material was judged on criteria similar to those by which
> the
> > final product shall be evaluated, rather than dependent upon pleasant
> email
> > exchanges. Let's close the debate if you will.
> >
> > In reply to Mike Pool, you say that we have only our opinions at our
> services.
> > I regard KR both as an enginering and a scientific field, I don't really
> care
> > for opinions. I consider metaphysics as a tool, I really don't care for
> > opinions. As concerns ontology, as a methodological maxim, I tend not to
> assume
> > that I'm dealing with opinion but with theories. Theories deserve to be
> > expounded and someone who offers a theory has to perform this task as a
> duty.
> > Again, let's close the debate, if that was a different one.
> >
> > [...]
> >
> > > >
> > > > > 1. Should there be a 4D ontology as part of the SUO work?
> > > >
> > > > PG: There should be an ability to sustain a 4d ontology.
> > > > I.e., there should be
> > > > an ability to deal with 4D entities. I think there should not
> > > > be any claim
> > > > about which are what.
> > > > Your approach seems to provide a 4D ontology. It is, in my
> > > > opinion, faulty in
> > > > that it commits to 4D. (Not sure what i'm saying is very clear.)
> > >
> > > MW: Committing to 4D is the intent. That is not supposed to commit
> > > the whole SUO effort to 4D though.
> >
> > The first is the real issue. The second is expectable in the context of
> the
> > Sowa coup, so to speak.
> >
> > > > > 2. Is this a good start point? (if not suggest a better one)
> >
> > Obviously, we still don't know.
> >
> > > > >
> > > > > > (I think it would profite the development of OpenCyc based
> > > > > > document more than
> > > > > > that of SUMO). Incidentally, and to gloss on my own soup, it
> > > > > > seems to me that
> > > > > > this is something which could communicate well with one part
> > > > > > of our framework
> > > > > > here (that which Barry Smith as baptized SPAN as you know),
> > > > > > provided we
> > > > > > recognize that terminology is not an issue (I could be hung
> > > > > > on the marketplace
> > > > > > in Leipzig for saying this publicly).
> > > > >
> > > > > MW: Actually it would be even more interesting to see how to
> > > > > communicate with the other part (SPOT?).
> > > >
> > > > PG:
> > > > I'm sure Barry could find something to name SPOT. It's
> > > > SNAP... for snapshot.
> > >
> > > MW: Sorry, I couldn't remember and was too lazy to look it up.
> > >
> > > > It's presentist, 3d, good old fashion Aristotelianism. The
> > > > whole thing in which
> > > > SNAP and SPAN (which is primarily a temporal distinction) are
> > > > articulated is
> > > > BFO.
> > > >
> > > > I think SPAN (our 4D) can handle much of your ontology. Your
> > > > ontology relates
> > > > to SNAP the way SPAN and SNAP relates. In our official
> > > > linguo, your physical
> > > > objects are parts of lives of SNAP entities, they are SPAN
> > > > entities themselves.
> > >
> > > MW: Something like that, but of course 4D just doesn't bother
> > > with the SNAP stuff - representing information just with a SPAN
> > > type objects.
> >
> > Precisely, SPAN in isolation is a pure occurrent ontology. It can be used
> by a
> > 4d ontology without bothering about the other component. The point with
> BFO
> > is that we think it's not enough. That's why we're more interested in how
> the
> > two paradigm relate than in reductionism which is more or less a
> definitional
> > exercise once you have any of the alternative ontologies.
> >
> > > > (Of course, calling them physical objects is pure
> > > > terminological heresy.)
> > >
> > > MW: (Surely the heresy is SNAP :-) )
> >
> > Jesus said 'he who endures to the end shall be saved.' (Matt 4:13) He
> didn't
> > say 'perdure'.
> >
> > > > It
> > > > seems that you handle participation as parthood, which is
> > > > coherent with my BFO
> > > > parsing of your claims. We don't, there's no parthood
> > > > relations between SNAP
> > > > and SPAN (apologies for the terminological endoctrination).
> > >
> > > MW: Correct.
> > > >
> > > > One difficulty is that you have processes with qualities
> > > > (i.e., the t.p. part
> > > > of your car is red). It would be odd for us to think of
> > > > redness as a property
> > > > of your car's life.
> > >
> > > MW: They are not necessarily processes in our ontology, so
> > > this objection makes no sense.
> >
> > Not sure I'm satisfied with this, does that relate to your notion of
> state? See
> > below.
> >
> > > > What we mean is that the car's life is
> > > > that of an entity
> > > > (the car) which happens to be red during the occurrence of
> > > > one of the temporal
> > > > parts of such process (the life). The redness of the car (a
> > > > particular) is on
> > > > the side of continuants.
> > >
> > > MW: Well to justify SNAP you have to decide when you are
> > > going to use them, but 4D sees the world differently, and
> > > does not accept these "rules".
> >
> > Sure, obviously these considerations were not pure 4d talk.
> >
> > > > Now, you can certainly introduce as many process-types as you
> > > > want, but this
> > > > seems rather ad hoc. This is a general feature of processes
> > > > which have their
> > > > properties necessarily and which let themselves best
> > > > interpret as instances of
> > > > classes (class nominalistic properties). I didn't have time
> > > > to look cloesly at
> > > > the way you handle properties, pardon me.
> > >
> > > MW: Properties are classes, individuals are members of them.
> >
> > Thanks for the clarification. The problem of some classes being ad hoc
> stands.
> >
> > [...]
> >
> > > > PG: One of the problem is the way you handle relations
> > > > between physical object.
> > > > It seems that all relations are cases of underlap in a
> > > > process (or activity,
> > > > unless that's too specific).
> > >
> > > MW: Perhaps in SPAN terms, but in our terms they are states that are
> > > related to each other.
> >
> > The point was on the fact that relations between states are forms of
> > underlapping. Now, I might not use your vocabulary adequately. I found
> only one
> > parenthetic mention of the term 'state' as a synonym of 'temporal part'.
> So,
> > not sure if I understand you well.
> > By process, take that I mean 4d entity or process-like entity. Do you used
> > process in the sense of your 'activity' (possible_individual bringing
> about
> > change?) It seems that I intended 'possible_individual'.
> >
> > With respect to underlap.
> >
> > I would expect from your theory that the following holds:
> > - all possible individuals are occurrents / perdurants for those which
> last.
> > - temporal part and aggregation (do you have a mereological sum?)
> preserves
> > this.
> > - participation is a form of parthood (composition)
> >
> > If X is the some of Y and Z, the relation that there is between Y and Z is
> a
> > form of underlap (they are both part of a third individual).
> >
> > Matthew and Pierre met and agreed that Matthew should use the term
> 'endure'
> > rather than 'perdure' in Matt 4:13 (of course the movie is dubbed in
> English).
> >
> > Is the following a correct parse of your theory? (Can you fill in the
> blanks?)
> >
> > (classification Matthew Whole_Life)
> > (classification Pierre Whole_Life)
> > (classification Meeting ?)
> > (composition_of_individual Matthew Meeting)
> > (composition_of_individual Pierre Meeting)
> >
> > How would you account for the 'meet' relation?
> >
> > Is it
> > i) a relation between Pierre and Matthew (two whole life ind)
> > ii) a relation between the respective temporal parts of Pierre and Matthew
> > contemporary with the meeting?
> >
> > i) means that there is another relation actually_meet which is parsed
> along the
> > line ii), i.e.,
> >
> > (meet Pierre Matthew) =def there is a temporal part of Matthew, a, and a
> tp of
> > Pierre, b, which coincide temporally with the meeting such that
> (actually-meet
> > a b).
> > (In fact, we can already expect as a consistent claim that x and y summed
> > together make up the meeting. That participants are parts and that
> individuals
> > are spatiotemporal extents and due to 'extensionality', the sum of the
> > particpants is then identical to the meeting.)
> >
> > Now, what is the relation between these two temporal parts of M and P? The
> one
> > baptized actually-meet? This is a special case of underlap which is a
> relation
> > holding between two individual parts of a third individual. This is
> trivial if
> > meeting = x + y.
> >
> > It seems to me that any relation between possible_individuals will be a
> direct
> > case of mereological underlap when understood as ii) and a slightly
> composed
> > case of underlap, let's say partial_underlap reducible to underlap of some
> > parts (i.e., have_two_parts_which_underlap) when it understood as i).
> >
> > > > While we're at it and to go abck to earlier things about
> > > > participation. Seems
> > > > to me that another problem with the paper is in the very
> > > > claim that activities
> > > > are aggregates of individuals, e.g., a meeting is the sum of
> > > > the participants.
> > > > Not sure that all parts of the participants are parts of the
> > > > meeting the way
> > > > the participants are parts of the meeting.
> > >
> > > MW: The participants are temporal parts rather than whole life
> > > individuals.
> >
> > So, it's case ii. The NOTE on 'participation' is misleading, it suggests
> that
> > this is a particular case.
> >
> > Some true triffles to finish:
> >
> > > > Yet another related issue is that you collapse identity into
> > > > spatiotemporal
> > > > colocation.
> > >
> > > MW: Correct. It seems to be the "norm" with pure 4D ontologies.
> >
> > I thought about it and remembered that you are relationist, and this gives
> you
> > an excuse. ;)
> >
> > > > I think we discussed that already a few weeks
> > > > ago. As I said at
> > > > that time, this is a strong rigidity of your approach
> > > > (incidentally, it is not
> > > > a general feature of 4D).
> > >
> > > MW: It is not a necessary choice I agree, but it is Ted Sider's
> > > choice, amongst others. The rigidity has advantages of course.
> >
> > Rigidity is not good for a SUO, imho. But it might be good for the pushist
> > agenda. I'm surprised that you do not reflect on the fact that Ted Sider
> only
> > expresses his opinion.
> >
> > [...]
> >
> > > MW: Final Draft International Standard. I'm afraid even the previous
> > > version (Draft International Standard) had to be bought. The logs of
> > > the review process are available, but not much use without the base
> > > document.
> >
> > Won't these people dump a few give away copies? One could be shipped to
> > Auckland where ther's apparently no copyright laws. I would subscribe
> again to
> > the ontology list for the occasion.
> >
> > Pierre
> >
> > [...]
> >
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