SUO: Re: RE: Thirdness vs Local Inconsistencies; was Ontology, Epistemology, Semiotics
Dear Collegues,
Suppose it will be interesting for the community to know that a two volume
book of Charles Senders Peirce are issued in Russia -
http://www.ozon.ru/context/detail/id/113070/
Best,
Leonid
================================
Leonid Ototsky - http://ototsky.mgn.ru ,
Chief Specialist of the Computer Center,
MMK - http://www.mmk.ru ,
Russia
================================
----- Original Message -----
From: "Richard Cooper" <rich@valutech.com>
To: "Tom Johnston" <tjohnston@acm.org>; <cg@cs.uah.edu>; "Jon Awbrey"
<jawbrey@att.net>; "SUO" <standard-upper-ontology@ieee.org>; "John F. Sowa"
<sowa@bestweb.net>
Cc: "Nicola Guarino" <guarino@loa-cnr.it>
Sent: Wednesday, September 10, 2003 2:59 AM
Subject: SUO: RE: Thirdness vs Local Inconsistencies; was Ontology,
Epistemology, Semiotics
>
> Thanks, Tom, for validating my subjective perceptions about the
> discussions we're having. Now I don't feel so all alone!
>
> Having experienced some religious fanatics in my youth, I am always
> distrustful of idols; they always have feet of clay, but its
> tough to find the clay sometimes. I have no doubt there is
> value in Peirce's work, but finding it has been a bit difficult
> so far.
>
> I still feel we can get more mileage out of a more objective
> discussion of the issues raised by the Peirceans, and I'll repeat
> the definition I used below here:
>
> > In representing all of these concepts, can't
> > we separate any application into
> >
> > 1) Those terminal assertions and rules that relate
> > to the subject matter as a set of consistent logical
> > knowlege bases only,
> >
> > 2) Those nonterminal assertions and rules that
> > relate what some agent believes about 1) or 2),
> > in its own set of consistent kbs,
> >
> > 3) Those nonterminal assertions and rules that
> > relate possible hypotheses about 1) and 2) and 3)
> > in yet a third level of consistent kbs?
> >
> >
> > So these three levels of knowledge can be further
> > decomposed into how much of 1) is referenced by
> > 2) and 3), and how much of 2) is referenced by
> > 3), and how much of 3) is referenced by 3). It
> > seems to me that the Peirceans, believers,
> > multiple worlders and concurrentists can then use
> > the same vocabulary in any discussions we may
> > have.
> >
> >
> > If this satisfies all intuitions of all parties,
> > it sure makes things clearer to me. But if I'm
> > missing some significant issues with this tripartite
> > decomposition, please exlain what's missing.
>
> I'm not trying to deny Peirce as the origin of these
> concepts - its OK with me if he's the one, and its OK
> if he isn't. His work sounds very original and
> integrative, and I would like to get a better
> understanding of it. So many Peirce admirers can't
> be completely wrong, especially since so many of them
> have clearly been strong contributors to this list.
>
> Thanks,
> Rich
>
>
>
> Tom Johnston wrote:
> > Richard:
> >
> > I applaud your attempt to clarify some of these Peircean concepts, and
> > especially your way of going about it. What I mean by that
> > latter point is
> > that, having read at least a good handful of the passages
> > from Peirce that
> > Jon has provided us with, I have concluded that Peirce is
> > like Whitehead (in
> > whose metaphysics I was deeply immersed for about two years) in this
> > respect, that both systems (in the grand system-building
> > sense of the word
> > used of such philosophies as those of Aristotle, Aquinas,
> > Kant and Hegel)
> > are hermeneutic. By "hermeneutic", I mean that they tend to
> > explain one
> > technical expression in terms of other technical expressions,
> > producing a
> > semantic web of technical expressions that are tightly knit
> > to one another,
> > but only loosely connected (relatively speaking) to either
> > ordinary language
> > or to the technical lingua franca of the current
> > philosophical community.
> >
> > "So much the worse for the current philosophical community",
> > I can hear Jon
> > (and John) saying. But the point is that systems of thought which are
> > strongly hermeneutic are, sociologically speaking, like
> > systems of religious
> > belief. The cost of entry to the belief system is high
> > (because of (a) the
> > greater emphasis on the internal linkages among the technical
> > terms of the
> > system, and (b) the lesser emphasis on linkages to the
> > containing language
> > (ordinary language, the language of current academic
> > philosophy, etc)). But
> > once you've paid the entry fee and crossed the barrier, i.e.
> > once you have
> > grokked the system and not only interpret the world in its
> > terms, but also
> > directly experience the world in its terms, then provided
> > that the system is
> > a good one (internally consistent, broad range of
> > application, and "rich"
> > (in a sense I would like to elaborate on someday, having to
> > do with the
> > subjective sense that in explaining one particular thing, one is also
> > providing strong support for the system's explanations of many other
> > particular things)), as I am sure Peirce's is, one becomes more than a
> > scholar familiar with the system, or even a researcher
> > hanging it on his
> > conceptual toolbelt. One becomes a true believer.
> >
> > Because true believers, as a psycho-semantic phenomenon,
> > actually experience
> > the world in terms of their chosen system, and do not merely
> > believe that
> > the system is a good interpretation of experience the "direct
> > reports" of
> > which would be couched in extra-theoretic language, they become good
> > witnesses but bad advocates, like those missionaries who
> > sometimes come
> > knocking on our doors. One is impressed by the passion, often
> > impressed
> > enough to look into what it is that so passionately possesses
> > them. They are
> > witnesses to the power of their faith, of those particular "memes" (to
> > borrow a term originated by Richard Dawkins, which is now a
> > field of study
> > with its own journals) that have "infected" them.
> >
> > But to be good advocates, they must be able to describe the
> > experiences we
> > are all trying to account for in terms comprehensible to
> > their audience,
> > i.e. to those not yet converted, i.e. to the rest of us. They
> > must make
> > their systems less hermeneutic, not by weakening the internal semantic
> > connections which make the system so internally strong, but by adding
> > semantic links which cross the system's boundaries and relate
> > inter-theoretic terms and assertions to extra-theoretic ones.
> >
> > This is exactly what you are trying to do in your recent
> > exchanges with Jon,
> > IMHO. It's what I've tried to do in some exchanges with Jon
> > vis-a-vis Quine
> > and Peirce. When we get the Peirceans among us out of their
> > true believer
> > "witness" mode, and into their professional
> > philosophical/logical/computer
> > scientistical mode, we all benefit. We get them to use their
> > hard-won "deep
> > structure" familiarity with Peirce's system to lower the cost
> > of entry for
> > the rest of us.
> >
> > I believe there is gold in them thar Peircean hills (I don't
> > quibble at
> > mixing metaphors, as you can see), and with Jon and John's
> > help, I expect to
> > find a few nuggets. You are helping them help us.
> >
> > So, thanks.
> >
> > Tom
> >
> >
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: owner-standard-upper-ontology@majordomo.ieee.org
> > [mailto:owner-standard-upper-ontology@majordomo.ieee.org]On Behalf Of
> > Richard Cooper
> > Sent: Monday, September 08, 2003 4:57 PM
> > To: cg@cs.uah.edu; Jon Awbrey; SUO; John F. Sowa
> > Cc: Nicola Guarino
> > Subject: SUO: Thirdness vs Local Inconsistencies; was Ontology,
> > Epistemology, Semiotics
> >
> >
> >
> > It seems to me that the Thirdness concept of
> > peirceans, belief systems in CS, multiple
> > worlds in FOL, and modal truths in temporal
> > logic have something in common. Perhaps we
> > are treading on each other's buttons without
> > adding useful energy to the discussion.
> >
> > In representing all of these concepts, can't
> > we separate any application into
> >
> > 1) Those terminal assertions and rules that relate
> > to the subject matter as a set of consistent logical
> > knowlege bases only,
> >
> > 2) Those nonterminal assertions and rules that
> > relate what some agent believes about 1) or 2),
> > in its own set of consistent kbs,
> >
> > 3) Those nonterminal assertions and rules that
> > relate possible hypotheses about 1) and 2) and 3)
> > in yet a third level of consistent kbs?
> >
> >
> > So these three levels of knowledge can be further
> > decomposed into how much of 1) is referenced by
> > 2) and 3), and how much of 2) is referenced by
> > 3), and how much of 3) is referenced by 3). It
> > seems to me that the Peirceans, believers,
> > multiple worlders and concurrentists can then use
> > the same vocabulary in any discussions we may
> > have.
> >
> >
> > If this satisfies all intuitions of all parties,
> > it sure makes things clearer to me. But if I'm
> > missing some significant issues with this tripartite
> > decomposition, please exlain what's missing.
> >
> > Thanks,
> > Rich
> >
> >
> >
>