SUO: Re: Lifecycle Integration Schema
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
LIS. Discussion Note 62
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
JA = Jon Awbrey
MW = Matthew West
Matthew,
Different people are used to and understand different languages.
If you would make a list of the items that you think need further
clarification, or translation into other idioms, I will try to do
that to the extent that I am able, on the understanding, of course,
that sometimes technical language is irreducibly demanded by the
technical issues that are involved in the problem.
Jon Awbrey
MW: Yes, but I prefer to use language people are used to and can understand.
MW: Sweetness is a property that some individuals have.
Within our model that would make it a class which
is abstract. The things that were sweet would be
members of that class.
JA: It is common to recognize distinctions among a number of things:
JA: 1. The word "sweetness", the noun form of the adjective "sweet".
MW: I think this would be placed in the representation part of our model.
JA: Sounds like a fine and proper place for it.
JA: 2. The concept "sweetness", something like a noun in the mind.
MW: Well if we are being really technical, I would have said that
this was a concept of the property or set rather than the word.
I would then have said that everything in our model is strictly
an externalisation of this sort of thing, restricted to those
things that represent the world in a 4D way.
JA: If we want to be really really technical, in our philosophical techne,
then we will have to go back to the way that philosophy was done for
all the years that pre-seeded the 20th Century, when some students
of philosophy got bored with doing their philosophy homework, and
so they cooked up a new philosophy that said it was okay to wipe
the slate clean and make it all up fresh out of their own skulls.
One of the finer bits of intellectual real estate that had long
been common intellectual property, before this lack-of-industry
revolution in philosophy, was the idea of a general denotation
or a plural reference, deriving from Aristotle's equivocal use.
JA: The basic idea is that there is a direct many-to-one relation
between things denoted and things denoting, which we may draw
in a "bigraph" or a bipartite graph like this:
denotee_1 o
\
\
denotee_2 o--o denoter
/
/
denotee_3 o
JA: Notice that only the objects denotee_j, for j = 1, 2, 3,
and the sign that is signed "denoter" are parties to this
transaction, per se, simpliciter. That is, there is no set
that is formally recognized as a co-signatory to the contract.
MW: Yes strictly we allow this, but we encourage specifying
the community who use this term for this concept.
JA: Welcome to the club. A generic term for the sign-using agency is the
"interpreter", which can be a person, community, organism, machine, etc.
Sometimes the interpreter belongs to a "community of interpretation" and
sometimes the interpreter fades into the background or the wouldwork that
is commonly known as the "context of interpretation". Within Peirce's way
of doing semiotics, the hypostatic abstraction or the personification that
we here call the context or the interpreter is replaced byits effects on
the signs in play, giving us various structures on the system of signs,
like equivalence classes among or transition relations between signs
and other signs, in the titular role of "interpretant signs".
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o