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SUO: RE: Lifecycle Integration Schema




Dear Jon,

See comments below.


Matthew West
Principal Consultant
Shell Information Technology International Limited
Shell Centre, London SE1 7NA, United Kingdom

Tel: +44 20 7934 4490 Other Tel: +44 7796 336538
Email: matthew.west@shell.com
Internet: http://www.shell.com


> -----Original Message-----
> From: Jon Awbrey [mailto:jawbrey@att.net]
> Sent: 30 September 2003 03:15
> To: SUO
> Cc: West, Matthew R SITI-ITPSIE
> Subject: Re: Lifecycle Integration Schema
> 
> 
> o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
> 
> LIS.  Discussion Note 64
> 
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> 
> JA = Jon Awbrey
> MW = Matthew West
> 
> Matthew,
> 
> Collating two exchanges:
> 
> JA: From what I have seen so far, the system that you are 
> proposing is undermined
>     in its first distinction by an "absolute fallacy", that 
> misidentifies subject
>     matters that need to be expressed in relative terms with 
> subject matters that
>     can be expressed in absolute terms.  That is, there is no 
> case being made for
>     the unexamined assumption that abstractness is an 
> absolute property of things,
>     rather than a relative property of things.  The 
> preponderance of the evidence
>     that has developed in these discussions has been that it 
> may even be a purely
>     accidental or arbitrary attribution.  The only way 
> forward that I can now see
>     is to backtrack to the unconsidered distinction between 
> absolute and relative
>     properties of things.
> 
> MW: This I do not follow.
> 
> JA: A practical test of whether a property of a thing
>     is a relative property of a thing is that one needs
>     additional information, beyond that which identifies
>     the thing, in order to make a decision about whether
>     the thing in question has the property in question.
> 
> MW: For example?
> 
> Let me absorb the "absolute fallacy" under the more general
> description of a certain type of "reductive error", whereby
> one attempts to use a data model with too few dimensions,
> or what amounts to the same thing, a relational model of
> too low an arity to preserve the appearances or resolve
> the anomalies of the phenomenon or problem in question.
> 
> We are presently immersed in a poignant example, namely,
> the acute situation of uncertainty that devolves from a
> disagreement about the classification of terms, that is,
> in effect, a disagreement about the application of some
> terms to other terms within a discursive universe, mere
> strings of syntax as well they may be, or, if it's safe
> to say that the terms in the second set denote commonly
> identifiable objects in our universe of discourse, then
> about the classification of the things that are denoted.
> 
> Table 1.  Situation Of Uncertainty
> o---------o----------------------o----------------------o
> | <thing> | <abstract_object_JA> | <abstract_object_MW> |
> o---------o----------------------o----------------------o
> | ego     | 1                    | 0                    |
> | number  | 1                    | 1                    |
> | quark   | 1                    | 0                    |
> | unicorn | 1                    | 0                    |
> o---------o----------------------o----------------------o
> 
> One hypothesis about what has gotten us into difficulties here is that
> we are taking it far too much for granted that there just has to be an
> objective 2-adic relation, indeed, the type of objective function that
> we know as a classification, that is the only acceptable model for the
> underlying reality of the situation.  Taking this for granted, whether
> wittingly or unwittingly, we may fail to give due consideration to the
> possibility that no such 2-adic model will fit the reality of 
> the case.

MW: Well naturally we have different concepts that we happen to have
given the same label to, and now you have developed distinguished labels.
This is just normal. I really don't see the big deal.
> 
> Let !A! be a discursive universe, for now just a set of words, that
> includes the terms "ego", "number", "quark", "unicorn", and let us
> assume that each of these general terms has a non-empty extension
> in some universe of discourse X, that is, a collection of things.
> Furthermore, for the sake of simplicity, let us observe the rule
> that all of the predicates that are listed in the column heads
> of the Table apply equally well to all of the things that are
> denoted by the terms that lead off the rows.  That is to say,
> any instance of an ego, number, quark, or unicorn represents
> its class impartially with respect to the application of the
> predicates abstract_object_JA, abstract_object_MW : X -> B.
> 
> Now, if by some sporadic confluence of the stars, our two 
> random observers
> chanced to compute the very same function under the 
> stem-and-leaf variants
> abstract_object_JA, abstract_object_MW : X -> B, then we'd be 
> justified in
> reducing the data of the situation to a single 
> classification, proposition,
> or indicator function, convening the common stem, 
> abstract_object : X -> B.
> But until that happens, we have no choice but to save what's 
> given, namely,
> the full 3-adic relational data, or a model that preserves 
> its information.

MW: And. There is nothing to stop you having your concept if you
wish. You can even give it the same name if you wish. You can even
say that it is your usage of the term, as distinct from the LIS
usage of the term. So just what is the problem?
> 
> Nevertheless, many dimension-preserving transformations are 
> still possible.
> 
> Jon Awbrey
> 
> o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
> 
>