Re: nature -> "human brain" -> "language terms" ==>> knowledge ?
DEAR JOHN AND ALEXANDER,
If I am allowed to interrupt your non-stoping 'fray', let me make some
general comments, which I ask not to misconstrue as criticism.
It seems all the dispute is revolving around two general positions:
1. Science is a sequence of attempts to build better (more accurate and
true) symbolic representations of objective laws and patterns of
relationships, and there is an objective test, standard, or measure of truth
(Alex);
2. Different persons may perceive different subjective impressions from the
same objective phenomenon, and the truthful justification (meaning) of ideas
(concepts, thoughts, or theories) one must look in their practical
consequences, usefulness, practicallity, or workability (John).
Although not contradictory, these assumptions resulted in different views of
things in the world, like that regarding the nature of heat energy
(temperature): 'it's a hot day'; or 'the temperature is 35 C'.
In fact, the matter shouldn't look so complicated as presented, since it can
be resolved as an ontological issue. By its essential nature, temperature is
a physical property, the quantity of hotness or coldness of a matter, while
its subordinate sense is a somatic sensation of cold or heat. As an
ontological entity of heat energy, the temperature may be instantiated as:
absolute zero, freezing point, blood heat, room temperature, high
temperature (heat) or low temperature (cold). As a sensation (perception),
the temperature is sensed as heat, cold or comfort zone, which range may be
quite different for different individuals.
So, all your debate looks to be about two levels of human knowledge:
1. superordinate substantive knowledge based on the world and representing
(or aproximating) things as they are, unbiased by thoughts, emotions,
opinions, mental states, attitudes, feelings, and indifferently to human
uses and practical values (Alex);
2. subordinate (subjective) knowledge biased by mental states and
representing things as they are perceived by human beings, and where truth
is a collectively formed opinion.
If I misconceived something, please correct me.
Regards,
Azamat Abdoullaev
EIS Intelligent Systems LTD
http://www.eis.com.cy
----- Original Message -----
From: "Alexander Povolotsky" <pevnev@juno.com>
To: <sowa@BESTWEB.NET>
Cc: <pevnev@juno.com>; <standard-upper-ontology@LISTSERV.IEEE.ORG>
Sent: Monday, March 21, 2005 7:56 AM
Subject: Re: nature -> "human brain" -> "language terms" ==>> knowledge ?
> Dear John,
>
>>1. For sentence #1, you mentioned possible exceptions, such as
>> a desert climate.
>
>> 2. For sentence #2, you added the qualification that the thermometer
>> is assumed to be working correctly and it's accuracy is known.
>
> The sentence #1 has to do with assessing "truthfulness" of the statement,
> which is coming from the human being, therefore such statement could be
> "subjective". Beyond the "desert climate", you have to also be "aware" of
> many other factors relevant to the possible causes of potential human
> subjectivity such as: a) individual sensitivity to the temperature,
> b)sanity of the individual, c)honesty of the individual, etc.
>
> The sentence #2 has to do with the instrument, which could be easily
> tested and recalibrated.
>
> For me the cases 1. and 2. are far apart (as far as subjectivity is apart
> from the objective reality).
>
>>but the point I was making is that we can never know which, if any,
>>of our theories are absolutely true and which are approximately
>>true.
>
> Agree, but your own example of Einstein vs Newton, demonstrates that
> we could "relatively" assess whether one "flavor" of (mathematically
> expressed) theory is closer to the "absolute true" than another (
> typically older flavor (note that there is no regressions in the long
> run).
>
>>All we can ever know is that within the limits of our
>>current measuring instruments a theory makes predictions
>
> predictions, which are subject of experimental proof ...
>
>>that are adequate to one purpose or another.
>
> In my view, the theories are not judged or proved by their adequacy
> (suitability) to human utilitarian purposes ...
> Some theories may not have any foreseeble practical human usage,
> yet such theories have scientific value.
>
> Thanks,
> Best Regards,
> Alex
>
>
> -- "John F. Sowa" <sowa@bestweb.net> wrote:
> Dear Alex,
>
> As I said before, I would prefer not to use the word
> "objective" because it implies presuppositions and
> qualifications that could lead to misunderstanding.
>
> JS> For example, if you say "It's a hot day", you're more
> > likely to be correct than if you say "The temperature
> > is 35 C." But for many purposes, such as deciding what
> > clothes to wear, the first statement is just as good as
> > the second.
>
> AP> However for the person, who lives in the desert climate,
> > 35 C may be "not so hot", so if you happen to ask that person
> > - he/she might say "It is a cool day", thus proving that such
> > type of answers carry some possibility of personal "subjectivity",
> > while if you see the (correctly functioning) thermometer, showing
> > +35 C, you are undoubtedly getting "objective" experimental data.
> > If you also know that the accuracy of this thermometer is ± 0.1
> > degree C, then you are also having "objective assessment" of the
> > accuracy of the measurement.
>
> Your comments illustrate my point: I gave two short sentences,
> either of which would be adequate for the purpose I had in mind.
> For both sentences, you added further qualifications that might be
> necessary to cover cases that were different from what I intended:
>
> 1. For sentence #1, you mentioned possible exceptions, such as
> a desert climate.
>
> 2. For sentence #2, you added the qualification that the thermometer
> is assumed to be working correctly and it's accuracy is known.
>
> Such qualifications are inevitable for any statement. Instead of
> making a sharp distinction between objective and subjective, I would
> prefer to say that there's a continuum of approximations, which may
> be more or less adequate for different purposes.
>
> AP> Therefore, the "knowledge", supported by the "objective"
> > "measurability", is always "superior" to the one, which is not.
>
> No. If you are trying to decide what clothes to wear, an accuracy
> of 0.1 degree is not "superior" -- it is superfluous. And if you're
> trying to control some chemical process, you might need an accuracy
> of 0.01 degree.
>
> I would prefer to use the word "adequate" rather than "objective".
> We can never have perfect knowledge, so we must always be content
> with a theory that is adequate for our current purpose.
>
> AP> Obviously, Einstein's formula is a better approximation of
> > the particular "objective" Natural Law (than the less accurate
> > Newton's formula) and, therefore, the theory, which supports
> > Newton's formula from the point of view of being *objective*
> > "scientific hypothesis" has been "invalidated".
>
> But the point I was making is that we can never know which, if any,
> of our theories are absolutely true and which are approximately
> true. All we can ever know is that within the limits of our
> current measuring instruments a theory makes predictions that
> are adequate to one purpose or another.
>
> John
>