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Azamat,
You pointed in response to my message on primitives
the advance that Kant proposed moving from "substance" and "state" to concepts
of pure thught that he argued as more foundational. I wanted to follow up in a
pragmatic/Piagetian fashion.
AA>This method is old as the Greek
world, Aristotle drawn such elemental classes as substance, state, quality,
quantity, change, and relation from experience, seemingly from verbal
classification of Greek grammar. And they mold the matrix of human experience
and knowledge, all forms of thought. Alternatively, Kant proposed his table
of categories as pure concept of human understanding with some modifications,
lifting the class of relations over substances. As a result, no good formal and
general ontology can do AA>without substances, states, changes, and
relations.
Kant's
distinction is a good departure point recognizing the constructionist
nature of concepts like "substance" from more primitive things. Piaget's
constructionsist cognitive psycholgy gave us an idea about how some of these
ideas emerge in children as part of development. The psychologist
Ernst . von Glasersfeld came built on Piaget in
his "Radical Constructivism, (see his The construction of
knowledge, Intersystems Publ., Salinas, CA, 1988.). He distinguishes between "ontological reality" and "experiential reality"
in the following way: ontic reality delivers the raw
material out of which our knowledge processing system constructs the familar
modell made up of objects, events, relations, etc. It is these
constructions that are our experiential reality (the order of things
embodied in our knowledge). You can read more about
these ideas in his article "An Introduction to Radical
Constructivism" which is online at :http://www.umass.edu/srri/vonGlasersfeld/onlinePapers/html/082.html
A final connection I would make is back to your position that it isn't
important how concepts are formed in the human
mind:
AA>It is not so
important how the concepts formulated in the human mind, by pure thought,
intutition, experience or experiment, or under divine inspiration. What is
crucial, ontological concepts must represent the basic kinds of reality, they
have to mean real distinctions and AA>differences. And so to be the master
terms whereby any cognitive agent can effectively reason about the
world.
Well this idea
of a "basic reality" gets me thinking back to the old discussions of some
pragmatic base to such basic/objectivity reality. If we use the ontic to
experiental distinction as one of "ingredients" forged by constructionist model
building into mental "product" (concept of substance etc.) then these
mential products (knowledge) can not "represent" reality (the raw material),
instead it must prove to be pragmatgically valid by a "functional fit", that is
by allowing us to attain the goals we happen to have chosen.
In Glaserfeld work this is called the "Model
validation hypothesis" which says;
A good model is not a copy of an independent order, but a working
(viable) formalisation (one which fulfills
the aim for which it is beeing used) of the order which we ourselves
generate in knowledge. So we can't assume that basic
reality is adequately modelled in terms of what we call "objects". Objects are
given to us as "objects of experience" as we develop cognition and only
after we have constructed an order for them in our knowledge.
Thus we can think about objects only after we have ourselves
constructged them. Putting it
in a combination Piaget and pragmatice terms we might say that - A
model (like an ontological model) is not really an abstraction of the observed
system/world reality, but a construction that allows us to interact
succesfully with the observed system/world
reality."
Gary
-----Original Message-----
From: azamat abdoullaev
[mailto:abdoul@cytanet.com.cy]
Sent: Wed 3/23/2005 4:17 PM
To: Gary Berg-Cross
Cc:
standard-upper-ontology@LISTSERV.IEEE.ORG; ONTOLOGY@LISTSERV.IEEE.ORG
Subject: Re: Idealism vs Materialism : Idealism and the
Differentiating Element
Gary,
See my comments below.
Azamat
----- Original Message -----
Sent: Wednesday, March 23, 2005 5:01
AM
Subject: RE: Idealism vs Materialism :
Idealism and the Differentiating Element
Azamat,
Your illustrations helped me
understand your approach to these very difficult topics of
primitive/fundamental ideas that ground an upper ontology.
As in the quantum realm our naked commonsense may not
serve us well here but a consistent exploration of different, fallible
hypotheses of these fundamentals concept should do it.
This might include, to use Thagard’s (1992) related discovery
methods, -data-driven (generalizations from observation and
from experiments with ontologies, abductive processes to explain patterns,
and coherence-driven corrections to resolve contradictions
arising between hypotheses and observation. We then
attempt to restore consistency adapting, removing or
modifying one or more assumptions which are judged contributes to the
derivation of contradiction.
This method is old as the
Greek world, Aristotle drawn such elemental classes as substance, state,
quality, quantity, change, and relation from experience, seemingly from verbal
classification of Greek grammar. And they mold the matrix of human experience
and knowledge, all forms of thought. Alternatively, Kant proposed his
table of categories as pure concept of human understanding with some
modifications, lifting the class of relations over substances. As a result, no
good formal and general ontology can do without substances, states, changes,
and relations.
To put this back, for a moment,
in the philosophical contexts we started with in earlier messages, I
would add an idea from Clarence Lewis ‘s "A Pragmatic
Conception of the a priori," where he rejects Kantian concepts of the
a priori arguing that”
"The thought which both
rationalism and empiricism have missed is that there are principles,
representing the initiative of mind, which impose upon experience no
limitations whatever, but that such conceptions are still subject to
alternation on pragmatic grounds when the expanding boundaries of
experience reveal their felicity as intellectual instruments." Underlining
is mine.
Thus, paraphrasing some of
Lewis’s work and its interpretation by others, what is important about an
hypothesis, including ones on primitive ontological hypotheses, is that it
is a "concept" -- a purely logical meaning -- which we bring to bear on
experience. The concepts we formulate are in part determined by our
immediate, pragmatic interests and in part by the historical nature of
individual experience as researchers. In the sense Sowa has talked about
fundamental scientific laws they are outside our methods (a priori in
a sense) because they order experience in a way that can be investigated
consistently across all of our historical experience and our pragmatic
interests at the time.
It’s a knowledge hypothesis that
this type of ordering would be true of our more
fundamental categorical notions – the ones we need for an upper ontology. We
formulate such upper level concepts based on our experience and the
pragamatics of the time, but our intuition is that we arrive at what we will
call a ontological primitive concept that transcends these pragmatic
starting points.
It is not so important how the
concepts formulated in the human mind, by pure thought, intutition, experience
or experiment, or under divine inspiration. What is crucial, ontological
concepts must represent the basic kinds of reality, they have to mean real
distinctions and differences. And so to be the master terms whereby any
cognitive agent can effectively reason about the world.
BTW, this discussion has mostly
slipped beyond the Idealism vs. Materialism back to one more direct toward
the pragmatics of developing upper ontological topics.
I agree, but never mind. If you
like, just change the subject name.
Best.
1
Regards,
Gary
-----Original Message-----
From: azamat
abdoullaev [mailto:abdoul@cytanet.com.cy]
Sent: Tue 3/22/2005
1:26 PM
To: Gary Berg-Cross
Cc:
standard-upper-ontology@LISTSERV.IEEE.ORG; ONTOLOGY@LISTSERV.IEEE.ORG
Subject: Re: Idealism vs Materialism : Idealism and the
Differentiating Element
Gary,
Let me clear up the matter in a more
illustrative way.
Traditionally, reality is separated into two or
three disjoint divisions of the same rank and
status:
1. as concrete
individuals (as contingent things) and universals (as necessary
things);
2. as concrete
things, collections (or classes or
sets) of concrete things (concrete universals) and abstract, conceptual classes, or universals per
se.
Written in abbreviated forms, the above may be
presented as the CC (concrete and conceivable) schema or the CCC
(concrete, collective, and conceivable) perspective of reality; what is
commonly expressed in the natural languages as concrete names, collective
names, and abstract names. Then most existent general and upper
ontologies, like the OWL and SUO, can be assigned to the CC or CCC
schemas, closing the bottom with nothing or nonentity, the top with the
concept of individual thing or entity.
Evidently, we need to consider the things in the
right order of their presentation, neither as an equal-order separation
nor in the inverse order, commencing from the concrete objects,
properties, and events, and specific relations to the abstract ontological
classes of substance, state, change, and relation. The order of things
here makes all the difference; after all, a young woman personality may be
quite different depending on the order of occurrences of her life
experiences: becoming a mother, a college graduation, and becoming a
wife.
We have to lift up
Entity or Thing or Being as the topmost class of all classes complemented
with the concept of nothing (the null class as part of everything, which
has nothing to do with absurdity). The ultimate class of thing or
entity will then denote a single, unitary ontological category having
as its parts the entity classes and the relationship classes, as well as
all the infinite gamut of their instances and occurrences. We thus
attached to the scientific way of considering reality as the whole class
of entity consisting of entity classes and relationship classes, all
together constituting the nature and essence of the individual things in
the real world. So to have a universal ontology, you
have just follow the C/C/C descending model of the world, where sets
and individuals are only instantiations or representations of the
entity-universal, that is, they must be considered of much lower rank in
the ontological status.
Note when sets and
individuals are recognized as basic as universals, we are doomed to create
redundant entities and relationships, i.e., an imaginary world of
nonexistent things, while trying to construct a formal general ontology
language, like GOL, an otherwise interesting
project.
So it looks that
your second reading is closer to the point.
Regarding you
entity classification (or rather object?), maybe it would of use at your
top to divide objects into two wide categories, material,
spatial substances and nonspatial, conceptual objects, and
somehow include the term 'representation' as well, before
'icon'.For more particulars, visit my website: 'Standard Ontology for
Global Intelligent Cyberspace'.
Regards,
Azamat
Abdoullaev
EIS Intelligent
Systems LTD
----- Original Message -----
Sent: Tuesday, March 22, 2005 3:59
PM
Subject: RE: Idealism vs
Materialism : Idealism and the Differentiating Element
Azamat,
>You are raising
intriguing questions regarding meaning and processible ontologies. I
hope my short contribution will make the picture clearer.
Thanks for the kind words.
From what you wrote signs we may share some ideas from the semiotics
realm and connecting this to what you called “ontological linguistics”,
- a new phrase for me, but if its subject matter is “ontological
grammar, syntax, and real valued semantics) this sounds like the issues
that the development of such things as OWL struggle although you might
have to spell out what you mean by and real valued semantics.
AA>In the ontological
language, real meaning is fixed as the semantic values of signs,
determined by the entities and relationships in the real
world.
Are you talking about
relating signs to the set-theoretic (logical) aspect of an
ontology? That is using signs in the ontology
construction as a formal logical system composed of
its objects-primitives, classes, individuals, and properties, logical
syntax (notation techniques, formation and transformation rules), and
formal semantics (model theory), such as the OWL is doing?
Another way of speaking
about this is to imagine using “sign meaning” to
develop a “meaningful” primitives Entity, Thing etc. the kinds of
objects with fundamental definitions, axioms and those “real-world
semantics” you mentioned. This
allows a common interpretation by humans and systems of the ontological
theory and its truth conditions in the world of
things, entities, or beings.
BTW, given
that we want to discuss signs and symbols our ontology will include
concepts like “contentbearing objects: such as in the small taxonomic
part shown below (just to connect to the linguistic part of
ontology)
•
Entity
Physical
Object
ContentBearingObject
Icon
SymbolicString
LinguisticExpression
WrittenLinguisticExpression
Text
Sentence
Phrase
Word
Morpheme
Regards,
Gary Berg-Cross
-----Original Message-----
From: azamat
abdoullaev [mailto:abdoul@cytanet.com.cy]
Sent: Mon
3/21/2005 4:11 PM
To: Gary Berg-Cross
Cc:
standard-upper-ontology@LISTSERV.IEEE.ORG
Subject: Re:
Idealism vs Materialism : Idealism and the Differentiating
Element
Dear Gary,
You are raising intriguing questions
regarding meaning and processible ontologies. I hope my short
contribution will make the picture clearer.
To have correct understanding of
knowledge, meaning ought to be viewed as a meaning relation
between signs (symbols, words or ideas, thoughts) and things in the
real world. Any relation by nature is two-sided or bi-directional
(from signs to things as well as form things to signs). The
ontological perspective comes out here as most fundamental; for it is
mapping the real structures to the sign structures (which include
conceptual structures). This is the subject matter of ontological
linguistics (ontological grammar, syntax, and real valued semantics),
which shouldn't be mixed with its complement, linguistic ontology. In
the ontological language, real meaning is fixed as the semantic values
of signs, determined by the entities and relationships in the
real world. Once the sign structures with their associations in
a certain domain knowledge are sorted out as truly conforming to the
ontological structures, you can enjoy a machine-processible
ontology.
The second issue is inherently connected
with the successful resolution of the first one.
Materialism-Idealism distinction is the
result of an innate tendency of the human mind to all sorts of
dichotomy and duality. This opposite division is a bad heritage
of classic metaphysics, born by the confused polarity of all things as
abstract, ideal realities (froms, ideas) and material,
physical realities. The practice of modern science is inclined to
deny as the only reality either ideas or matter, where one exists
as subordinate to another. The task of general formal ontology is
to view the abstract entities and the concrete things as
two parts of one real world, as two distinct domains of
reality, the universe of matter and the universe of mind, somehow
interrelated to each other. And the concepts of mind and matter
should be synthesized not within materialism or idealism but rather
within a general ontological theory encompassing both parts
as distinct levels within an all-comprehensive hierarchy of
things.
After all, to comprehend the general
rules, principles, and mechanisms of such relationships
(ideality-actuality) is the challenging undertaking for
all who signed up for ontology classes.
Regards,
Azamat Abdoullaev
EIS Intelligent Systems LTD
----- Original Message -----
Sent: Monday, March 21, 2005
4:35 PM
Subject: RE: Idealism vs
Materialism : Idealism and the Differentiating Element
This discussion,
along with Re: nature -> "human brain" -> "language terms"
==>> knowledge ?,
has
wandered over considerable ground but a question
was raised along the way about “how then we should model
meaning?.”
One issue was
can "knowledge" ("reality" yes, but not "knowledge") exist
independently of the brain?
A simple
counter question occurred to me, “if such knowledge can[t be defined
how why are trying to build processable ontologies ?
Isn’t that a endeavor to capture meaning outside of the
brain?
John Sowa
covered this in passing, noting that our computer applications
include “knowledge”
JS> First,
knowledge is certainly codifiable in a way that
solves a great
many problems. Every program ever written
does that, and
there are an enormous number of very
successful ones. But
each of those programs solves a
particular special case.
The problem we face is to
relate those special cases by general
principles.
JS>And that is where the difficulties
lie.
Peirce’s distinction between REAL and TRUE
may be helpful to some of us in ontological
community discussion with an aim to building up usable knowledge
.
Perice "The real, then, is that which,
sooner or later, information and reasoning would finally result in,
and which is therefore independent of the vagaries of me
and you. Thus, the very origin of the conception
of reality shows that this conception essentially involves the
notion of a community, without definite limits, and capable of a
definite increase of knowledge" (CP 5.311).
To elaborate further this is now he
addressed the distinction between opinions on the true, and the real
in "How to Make Our Ideas Clear ":
"The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all
who investigate, is what we mean by the truth, and the object
represented in this opinion is the real. That is the way I would
explain reality" (CP 5.407). ….
Peirce continues later with
"reality is independent, not necessarily of thought in
general, but only of what you or I or any finite number of men may
think about it," ….(that), "though the object of the final opinion
depends on what that opinion is, yet what that opinion is does
not depend on what you or I or any man thinks" (CP 5.408).
underlining is mine for emphasis
Which brings
me, at least, back to John’s opinion that he
accuracy of any scientific hypothesis
JS> does
not depend
> on who or what discovered it or
on any methods of thinking,
> any techniques
of problem solving, or any apparatus
that
JS> he, she, or it might have used to
arrive at the hypothesis.
I can understand this in light of
Peirce’ efforts to define clear thinking, which we need in Ontology
building.
To conclude with yet another Peircian quote.
Here’s one he used on the path to a 3rd way
between the realists and idealist.
The philosophical problem is to resolve two contradictory
claims about the basis of reality:
- the
principal thesis of realism - there is a reality that exists
independently of our representations of it or
- Idealism claim that what we perceive as
real dependent is upon our (usually expressed
as mental) representations of “it”.
As James Liszka
observed the clash of the two theses is nicely expressed in Peirce's
"Consequences of the Four Incapacities
":
"...there is no thing which is in-itself
in the sense of not being relative to the mind, though things which
are relative to the mind doubtless are, apart from the relation"
(5.311).
Liszkae called this 3rd way a discursive
realism to distinguish it from the later effort of
Rorty or Foucault, in which there is neither a
privileged discourse, nor can any representational system that can
mirror a reality external to such a system - what
might be called the discursive idealism. Someone
may able to drawn up the realism to idealism continuum, which seems
to be as embedded in our discussions as the ontology
continuum.
Gary Berg-Cross
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