Re: D1. Separate computer science ontology from philosophical ontology
Hi Philippe,
On Jan 23, 2008 9:55 PM, Philippe Martin <phmartin@phmartin.info> wrote:
> Rob,
>
> > Descartes proof was a proof of existence. But existence is a very
> > problematic concept. For instance, Descartes is now dead, does he not
> > then still exist? Clearly he doesn't exist in the way he once did, he
> > doesn't think any more. But do his thoughts not exist? We are thinking
> > about him, does that mean he exists?
> > Even basing existence in thought (or doubt) it is difficult to say
> > unequivocally that Descartes either exists or does not exist.
>
> Doesn't this difficulty disappear if you define "exists" in a
> sufficiently precise or general way, and hence, if you define the
> terms you use in your statements?
>
> existing_living_person < existing ;
> existing_in_thought < existing ;
> Descartes_the_living_entity < Descartes existing_living_person ;
> Descartes_as_intellectual_symbol < Descartes existing_in_thought ;
I don't think more precise or general definitions will help, no.
If truth itself is subjective it does not matter what we evaluate it
against, the contradiction will follow us.
What we need is a model which says Descartes' both does and does not
exist. More precision alone won't give us that.
I guess more precision will help establish subjective truths. It is
just we will have to concede there are conditions on those truths:
Descartes "exists" in this sense or that sense only. They won't be
universally true.
-Rob