RE: Axiomatic ontology
Dear Rob,
> Russell's example was the set of all sets which don't contain
> themselves.
>
> What about Russell's set? Can it be thought? If so, is it contained in
> your label.
MW: Russell's paradox is an example of a description that does not point
to anything (and logically cannot). It is literally non-sense.
MW: The problem was that there was at the time a version of set theory
that claimed that there was always something referred to by any
description.
MW: It is an interesting historical note to see how this was dealt with,
preferring to keep the principle that everything had a description, but
descriptions were not allowed to be self-referrential, rather than simply
not insisting that all descriptions had to refer to something. A mistake
in my view. But so it goes.
Regards
Matthew West
Reference Data Architecture and Standards Manager
Shell International Petroleum Company Limited
Registered in England and Wales
Registered number: 621148
Registered office: Shell Centre, London SE1 7NA, United Kingdom
Tel: +44 20 7934 4490 Mobile: +44 7796 336538
Email: matthew.west@shell.com
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http://www.matthew-west.org.uk/
> Avril,
>
> You quote me, so I feel I need to reply.
>
> On Jan 28, 2008 6:11 AM, Avril Styrman
> <Avril.Styrman@helsinki.fi> wrote:
> > RF
> > > 1) We should focus on ways to let people establish their
> own naming
> > > conventions for specific purposes (already a popular practice, and
> > > growing with the use and elaboration of "tags".)
> >
> > JS
> > > We have such a name:
> > >
> > > It is "the universe".
> >
> > The point was of course not the tag, but that we have a
> common understanding
> > of what we mean by "the universe": it is simply all there is in any
> > thinkable way. So, that let the tag be Universe then.
>
> It is exactly our understanding of what we mean by "the universe"
> which differs. What I like about "tags" is that they provide the means
> to express that, not that they allow different labels for the same
> idea. Assert that they all express the same idea and you miss my
> point.
>
> Simply put, that there will always be different ways of looking at the
> same thing.
>
> The problem seems to be right down there in what we "mean" by "truth".
> No new label will get beneath it. It seems that every (complete?)
> conception, by the very nature of conception, contains its own
> contradiction.
>
> Russell's example was the set of all sets which don't contain
> themselves.
>
> What about Russell's set? Can it be thought? If so, is it contained in
> your label.
>
> I'm not sure if it is worth my time to continue to argue this though.
> I feel you are bent on elaborating an axiomatic ontology no matter
> what.
>
> Descartes had got to God by now. Perhaps I should just leave
> you to it.
>
> -Rob
>
>