ONT Re: Extension x Comprehension = Information
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Da Capo ...
| Things are equivocally named, when they have the name only in common,
| the definition (or statement of essence) corresponding with the name
| being different. For instance, while a man and a portrait can properly
| both be called "animals" ('zôon'), these are equivocally named. For they
| have the name only in common, the definitions (or statements of essence)
| corresponding with the name being different. For if you are asked to
| define what the being an animal means in the case of the man and the
| portrait, you give in either case a definition appropriate to that
| case alone.
|
| Things are univocally named, when not only they bear the same name but the
| name means the same in each case -- has the same definition corresponding.
| Thus a man and an ox are called "animals". The name is the same in both cases;
| so also the statement of essence. For if you are asked what is meant by their
| both of them being called "animals", you give that particular name in both cases
| the same definition.
|
| Aristotle, Categories, 1. 1a.1-12.
|
| Translator's Note. 'Zôon' in Greek had two meanings,
| that is to say, "living creature", and, secondly, a
| figure or image in painting, embroidery, sculpture.
| We have no ambiguous noun. However, we use the
| word "living" of portraits to mean "true to life".
|
| Aristotle, "The Categories", 'Aristotle, Volume 1',
| Translated by Harold P. Cooke and Hugh Tredennick,
| Loeb Classics, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.
Al Segno ...
http://suo.ieee.org/email/msg07143.html
http://suo.ieee.org/email/msg07166.html
http://suo.ieee.org/email/msg07186.html
http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg01926.html
http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg02008.html
http://suo.ieee.org/ontology/msg03285.html
Jon Awbrey
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