ONT Re: Quine -- Two Dogmas Of Empiricism
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TDOE. Note 3
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| 1. Background for Analyticity (cont.)
|
| Meaning, let us remember, is not to be identified with naming.
| Frege's example of "Evening Star" and "Morning Star", and Russell's
| of "Scott" and "the author of 'Waverley'", illustrate that terms can
| name the same thing but differ in meaning. The distinction between
| meaning and naming is no less important at the level of abstract
| terms. The terms "9" and "the number of the planets" name one
| and the same abstract entity but presumably must be regarded as
| unlike in meaning; for astronomical observation was needed, and
| not mere reflection on meanings, to determine the sameness of the
| entity in question.
|
| The above examples consists of singular terms, concrete and
| abstract. With general terms, or predicates, the situation
| is somewhat different but parallel. Whereas a singular term
| purports to name an entity, abstract or concrete, a general
| term does not; but a general term is 'true of' an entity,
| or of each of many, or of none. The class of all entities
| of which a general term is true is called the 'extension'
| of the term. Now paralleling the contrast between the
| meaning of a singular term and the entity named, we
| must distinguish equally between the meaning of a
| general term and its extension. The general terms
| "creature with a heart" and "creature with kidneys",
| for example, are perhaps alike in extension but unlike
| in meaning.
|
| Quine, "Two Dogmas", p. 21.
|
| W.V. Quine,
|"Two Dogmas of Empiricism", 'Philosophical Review', January 1951.
| Reprinted as pages 20-46 in 'From a Logical Point of View',
| 2nd edition, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1980.
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