ONT Re: Just In Time Logic
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JITL. Note 10
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| Chapter 3. Four Methods of Settling Opinion
|
| If the settlement of opinion is the sole object of inquiry, and if belief is
| of the nature of a habit, why should we not attain the desired end, by taking
| any answer to a question which we may fancy, and constantly reiterating it to
| ourselves, by dwelling on all which may conduce to that belief and learning to
| turn with contempt and hatred from anything which might disturb it? This simple
| and direct method is really pursued by many men. ...
|
| But this method of fixing belief, which may be called the
| method of obstinacy, will be unable to hold its ground in
| practice. The social impulse is against it. ...
|
| Let the will of the state act then, instead of that of the individual. ...
|
| In judging this method of fixing belief, which may be called
| the method of despotism, we must in the first place allow its
| immeasurable mental and moral superiority to the method of
| obstinacy. ...
|
| But no institution can undertake to regulate opinions upon every subject.
| Only the most important ones can be attended to, and on the rest men's minds
| must be left to the action of natural causes. This imperfection [...] may
| affect every man. And though these affections are necessarily as various
| as are individual conditions yet the method must be such that the ultimate
| conclusion of every man shall be the same. This is called the scientific
| method. Its fundamental hypothesis stated in more familiar language is this.
| There are real things, whose characters are entirely independent of our opinions
| about them; those realities affect our senses, according to regular laws, and
| though our sensations are as different as our relations to the objects, yet by
| taking advantage of the laws which subsist we can ascertain by reasoning how
| the things really are, and any man if he have sufficient experience and reason
| enough about it, will be led to the one true conclusion. The new conception here
| involved is that of reality. It may be asked how I know there are any realities.
| If this hypothesis is the sole support of my method of inquiry, my method of
| inquiry must not be used to support my hypothesis. The reply is this. 1st,
| If investigation cannot be regarded as proving that there are real things,
| it at least does not lead to a contrary conclusion; but the method and the
| conception on which it is based remain ever in harmony. No doubts of the
| method, therefore, necessarily arise from its practice, as is the case
| with all the others. 2nd, the feeling which gives rise to any method
| of fixing belief, is a dissatisfaction at two repugnant propositions.
| But here already is a vague concession that there is some one thing to
| which a proposition should conform. Nobody, therefore, can really doubt
| that there are realities, or if he did, doubt would not be a source of
| dissatisfaction. The hypothesis therefore is one which every mind admits.
| So that the social impulse does not cause me to doubt it. 3rd, Everybody
| uses the scientific method about a great many things and only ceases to use
| it when he does not know how to apply it. 4th, Experience of the method has
| not led me to doubt it but on the contrary scientific investigation has had
| the most wonderful triumphs in the way of settling opinion. These afford
| the explanation of my not doubting either the method or the hypothesis
| which it supposes, and not having any doubt nor believing that anybody
| else whom I could influence has, it would be the merest babble for me
| to say more about it. If there be anybody with a living doubt upon
| the subject, let him consider it.
|
| To describe the method of scientific investigation is the object of this book.
| In this chapter, I shall only notice some points of contrast between it and
| other methods of inquiry.
|
| This is the only one of the four methods which presents any distinction of a right
| and a wrong way. If I adopt the method of obstinacy and shut myself out from all
| influences, no matter what I think necessary to doing this, is necessary according
| to that method. So with the method of despotism, the state may try to put down
| heresy by means which from a scientific point of view seem very ill-calculated
| to accomplish its purpose, but the only test 'on that method' is what the state
| thinks, so that it cannot pursue the method wrongly. So with the 'a priori'
| method. If I endeavor to lay my susceptibilities of belief perfectly open to
| the influences which work upon them, I cannot on those principles go wrong.
| But with the scientific method, the case is different. I may start with
| known and observed facts to proceed to the unknown; and yet the rules
| which I follow in doing so may not be such as investigation would
| approve. The test of whether I am truly following the method
| is not an immediate appeal to my feelings and purposes,
| but on the contrary itself involves the application
| of the method. Hence it is that bad reasoning
| as well as good reasoning is possible; and
| this fact is the foundation of the
| practical side of logic.
|
| C.S. Peirce, CE 3, pp. 24-28.
|
| C.S. Peirce, "Four Methods of Settling Opinion", MS 189, May-June 1872, pp. 24-28 in:
|'Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, Volume 3, 1872-1878',
| Peirce Edition Project, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1986.
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