ONT Re: De In Esse Predication
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DEIP. Note 18
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I need to go back and repair an omission.
It occurs at the point in CP 3.527 where
Peirce writes this:
| It has come about through the agencies of development that man is
| endowed with intelligence of such a nature that he can by ideal
| experiments ascertain that in a certain universe of logical
| possibility certain combinations occur while others do not
| occur. Of those which occur in the ideal world some do
| and some do not occur in the real world; but all that
| occur in the real world occur also in the ideal world.
| For the real world is the world of sensible experience,
| and it is a part of the process of sensible experience
| to locate its facts in the world of ideas. This is what
| I mean by saying that the sensible world is but a fragment
| of the ideal world.
In a marginal note, dating from 1908, Peirce provides us with
an important statement about his take on the "end of inquiry":
| For the simple reason that the real world is a part of the ideal world,
| namely, that part which sufficient experience would tend ultimately (and
| therefore definitively), to compel Reason to acknowledge as having a being
| independent of what he may arbitrarily, or willfully, create.
|
| C.S. Peirce, 'Collected Papers', CP 3.527,
|"The Logic of Relatives", 'Monist', vol. 7,
| pp. 161-217, 1897. Marginal note, 1908.
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