

Dampers with Forward Traffic Isolation

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Introduction

ATS (P802.1Qcr)

- Bounded delay, robust, integrated policing

Related work

- Concept know: DJ-Regulators/Dampers
- Bounded delay **and** bounded jitter without global synchronization/[g]PTP
- Challenge: Integrity, Traffic Isolation


This Slidedeck

- How it works: Rate-based Shaping (ATS) vs. Damping
- Pros and Cons
- Forward Traffic Isolation (new)

No Goal: Let's do this in P802.1Qcr

Dampers

Initial Assumptions and Simplifications



Symbols


s_k : Shaper with associated with Bridge k
 $q_{TX/RX,k}$: FIFO queues associated with Bridge k
 $d_{A,i}$: Delay of the i^{th} frame from A (s_Z to s_A)

1. **Perfect cables:** No propagation delays
2. **Simple Bridges:** No delays in relays & MACs and cables, no oscillator variations, no numeric imprecision, no gates, no preemption, etc.
3. **Two-level queuing model:** FIFO \rightarrow shaper \rightarrow FIFO
4. **Single hop:** Bridge A \rightarrow Bridge B
5. **Two traffic classes:** Shaped class (High), Best Effort (Low)
6. **Simple traffic:** Periodic small frames, sporadic large best effort frames

Trust me 😊


- Most of these are just to keep subsequent slides simple. E.g., dealing with oscillator variations, numeric imprecision, etc. would just expand math and this slide set.
- Some aspects need further investigation.

Rate-based Shaping (e.g., P802.1Qcr)




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Damping in a Nutshell




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- $d_{TX,A,i}$: Residence time in $q_{TX,A}$
- $d_{RX,A,i}$: Residence time in $q_{RX,A}$ and S&F


1. **A pre-configured per-hop delay bound $d_{max,k}$**
 - Trust me ... again – not too complicated, cmp. ATS
 - Similar to CQF cycle duration – though it can differ per hop
2. **Define $d_{TX,A,i}$ and $d_{RX,A,i}$**
 - $d_{TX,k,i}$: post-shaper residence time in the upstream Bridge/Station
 - $d_{RX,k,i}$: pre-shaper residence time in the downstream Bridge
3. **Transfer $d_{TX,k,i}$ per frame \rightarrow Dynamic Packet State**
 - Encoding is not the main point here (this is not a Standard!)
 - Data integrity addressed later
4. **Shape differently \rightarrow Force $d_{RX,k,i} = d_{TX,k,i} - d_{max,k}$**
 - I know, S&F, ..., would just add more symbols to my slides (this is not a Standard!)

Damping Illustrated



Symbols

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No delay variation, a.k.a. Jitter!

Pros and Cons

Pros and Cons

Pros



- **Low/no Jitter**
- **No state** (Shaper FSMs):
All information in Dynamic Packet State
- Should work with simplified ATS queuing (“**interleaved shaping**”), i.e. no FIFO queue per flow needed.
- [g]PTP **Hardware re-use**

Cons

- **Increased Overhead** for Dynamic Packet State
- FCS re-calculation per Hop required
→ **Decreased data integrity**
- No state (Shaper FSMs):
→ **No protection and isolation** against malicious traffic/**babbling idiots!**

Protection & Isolation

Babbling Idiot Impact (e.g., Frame Repetition)



Note: No BE frames and S&F delays shown (unnecessary for illustration).

1. Case: Conventional Networks

The edge (=Station) is considered problematic, the core (=Bridges) is considered to never fail (or if it does, only fail silent is considered).

- Protection: Edge Bridge Ports only
(i.e., Bridge ports connected to Stations)
- State: Edge Bridge Ports only
(# of Streams from a single Station is limited)

2. Case: Dependable Networks

It doesn't matter whether Station or Bridge. Devices can fail arbitrarily according to their failure rate (MTBF, etc.). And we don't know how (i.e., babbling idiot behavior) ...

- Protection: Every Bridge Port
(no matter whether it's a Station or a Bridge upstream)
- State: Every Bridge Port in every Bridge
(“Per-stream Filtering and Policing” in every Port)

Is this an Issue? – Depends on the Network

1. Case: Conventional Networks

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Issue Summarized

Faulty cross-traffic disrupts traffic on fault free paths

Goals

1. Protect traffic on fault free paths against faulty cross-traffic
2. Though 100% protection requires (up to) per-flow state, get close to this level with less state

No Goals

Distinguish between faulty and fault free traffic across the same (faulty) bridge

never fail

2. Case

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Forward Traffic Isolation (FTI)

– Key Concepts

1. PSFP+ on edges only
 - Flow meters, but using delay-maximized timings (more accurate, jitter gone prior to checking)
 - Max. SDU size filtering
2. Additional Validation Data in Frames
 - Part of Dynamic Packet State (DPS)
3. Exploit Redundant HW on Paths
 - Example: One bridge with 10^{-6} failure/h \rightarrow two nodes with $\sim 10^{-12}$ failure/h
 - FTI interleaves along the path – validation data tunneled through the next (potentially faulty) Bridge downstream
4. Validation Data is Signed
 - Asymmetric: Read/verify with public key, modification requires private key
 - Important notes:
 - Signature algorithms against HW faults, not necessarily against intelligent/human attacks \rightarrow less computation, several literature on this topic
 - Symmetric signatures (e.g., CRCs) are possible, but with more DPS and “clever” key distribution \rightarrow subsequent slides stick to asymmetric concepts

Failure Assumptions


1. One “Box” fails at a time

We can support more, but this one is simple and enough for illustration, plus system failure probability already goes notably lower.


2. A faulty box cannot find out the private key another fault free box

A faulty box has a private key, but this is different than the private keys of its upstream neighbors 1 and 2 hops upwards. It cannot “find out” the other boxes’ private key by e.g. random hardware faults.


FTI - Keys, Roles, Dynamic Packet State (DPS)




FTI – Illustration and FSMs




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 $\Delta_{k,m}$: Diff. between k 's and m 's local time (k 's view)




Failure Scenarios


Goal: Capture malicious traffic immediately after the faulty device. Merge point not shown subsequently, though capturing immediately after the faulty is enough.

Note: Compared to earlier slides, the blue path contains the faulty node.

FTI – Faulty T, excessive burst




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


→ Caught by PSFP+, Committed Burst Size exceeded!

FTI – Faulty T, bad etime in $v_{T,i}$




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


→ Caught by FTI Check, T's offset $\Delta_{A,T}$ known by A!

FTI – Faulty A, excessive burst




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


Caught by FTI Check:
 → T's offset $\Delta_{B,T}$ known by B!
 → T's $v_{T,i}$ values cannot be "faked" by A!

FTI – Faulty A, excessive burst



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


In fact, it doesn't matter whether A's frame is too early or too late. A cannot "fake" T's $v_{T,i}$ information, $v_{T,i}$.etime in particular. A does not know T's private key. Same for $v_{T,i}$.length (not illustrated).


Caught by FTI Check:

- T's offset $\Delta_{B,T}$ known by **B**!
- T's $v_{T,i}$ values cannot be "faked" by **A**!

FTI – Faulty A, bad etime in $v_{A,i}$




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 - $\Delta_{k,m}$: Diff. between k 's and m 's local time (k 's view)



Caught by FTI Check:
 → A's offset $\Delta_{B,T}$ known by B!

FTI – Faulty B, excessive burst



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- $\Delta_{k,m}$: Diff. between k's and m's local time (k's view)

Caught by FTI Check:
 → A's offset $\Delta_{C,A}$ known by C!

Note: Case just to simplify illustration how FTI operates along the path

Further Aspects

Not shown in earlier slides

Further Aspects (1)

Key Distribution

Either static, or via a protocol. A protocol has not been presented, though this is not so critical, given it is the slow, not so critical, path (control plane).

Public Key Identification/Lookup

On frame reception, the associated public key for $v_{k,i}$ values must be identified. This aspect wasn't covered, though it can be an extra field of $v_{k,i}$ not covered by the signature (think of the following: If a faulty node in the middle "fakes" this field, a wrong public key is selected and signature check fails).

$v_{k,i}$.etime Overflows and Timeouts

Each FSMs times out if the time range of $v_{k,i}$.etime is exceeded. The FSMs then fall back to unaligned state. The A faulty node can exploit this, however, it can at most send one bad frame per time range. The resulting maximum noise caused by such a node consumed considerable low bandwidth, though this bandwidth appears ok for worst-case consideration.

Further Aspects (2)

Missing Frames

Due to FCS errors, different routing, etc. a frame sequence upstream can be incomplete at the next two hops downstream. This is no issue, the exact sequence can contain gaps. It's just $\Delta_{k,m}$ state variables that are updated less frequently.

Dual-hop Upstream State

Consider Bridge A has 1000 ports, connected 999 Talkers, and to Bridge B downstream, which is a small 3 Port Bridge. B would require 1000 $\Delta_{k,m}$ state variables just to serve these 1000 talkers. However, Bridge A will comprise multiple Chips, ASICs, etc. which can reasonably independent from each other in terms of reliability. There can be multiple FTI check and update points in Bridge A (e.g., one per ASIC), thus massively reducing the required $\Delta_{k,m}$ state variables in Bridge B (i.e., think of every ASIC in Bridge A is a Bridge itself).

FTI in other Areas

Though dampers provide higher delay-performance, there is e.g. a DPS-based asynchronous Cyclic Queueing and Forwarding derivate (<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-qi-ang-detnet-large-scale-detnet/>). FTI can be applied here, too, just think of eligibility times with “low resolution” (i.e., cycle numbers).

Dampers

- Low jitter asynchronous traffic shaping
- Stateless in Bridges
- Dynamic Packet State is used → Integrity is an Issue

Forward Traffic Isolation

- New concept for traffic isolating against babbling idiots
- No 100% solution - residual errors hard to quantify – but qualitatively high degree of protection from an engineers point of view
- Moderate state requirements (i.e., topology dependent, limited to two hops) – typically significantly lower than per flow state
- Scheme applicable in other Areas

Thank you for your Attention!

Questions, Opinions, Ideas?

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