This provides responses to comments received on the JTC1 ballot of IEEE 802.1Xck-2018 (ISO/IEC/IEEE FDIS 8802-1X-2013/FDAmd 2)

The voting results on IEEE 802.1Xck-2018 (ISO/IEC/IEEE FDIS 8802-1X-2013/FDAmd 2) in 6N17203:

- Passed 9/1/10
- 1 comment received with the China NB NO vote

The comments have been processed in a timely manner using the mechanisms defined and agreed in 6N15606. This document provides the responses from IEEE 802 to the comments by China NB on this ballot.

China NB comment 1 on IEEE 802.1Xck-2018 (ISO/IEC/IEEE FDIS 8802-1X-2013/FDAmd 2):

The response in 6N17060 was noted, but the following technical concerns were not properly solved:
In the referred clauses, this amendment specifies using MACSec (defined by IEEE 802.1AE) to protect the security of the network connected to YANG model data. However, China NB has pointed out the security problems of MACSec for several times during the previous ballots, e.g. 6N15556 and 6N15770.
China also submitted the comments on the new version of 802.1AE (IEEE 802.1AE-2018). Please refer to the comments in 6N17080 (results of 60-day ballot). However, those comments were not accepted properly.
Therefore, China cannot support this amendment to be published as an international standard.

Proposed Change:

(none provided)

IEEE 802 response to CN.1 on IEEE 802.1Xck-2018:

To clarify, IEEE 802.1Xck-2018 (ISO/IEC/IEEE FDIS 8802-1X-2013/FDAmd 2) does not specify the use of MACSec but rather specifies a YANG data model that allows configuration and status reporting for port-based network access control in various scenarios described in IEEE 802.1X-2010 (ISO/IEC/IEEE FDIS 8802-1X-2013).

The documents referenced in the China NB ballot (i.e., 6N15556 and 6N15770) are the Summary of Voting results on IEEE 802.1AE-2006 (ISO/IEC/IEEE 8802-1AE:2013) documents which date from 2012 and 2013; responses to these comments were submitted from IEEE 802 at that time. The general assertions raised in the China NB's ballots were discussed at length in 2013 at an IEEE 802 meeting in Geneva (with IEEE 802 and Switzerland NB representatives in attendance) and in both 2013 and 2014 at SC6 meetings in Seoul and Ottawa (with IEEE 802, China NB and Switzerland NB representatives in attendance). During those meetings, IEEE 802 fully responded to all claims made by both the China NB and Switzerland NB representatives and presented additional information about the design and specification of IEEE 802 technologies. Additionally, at the SC6 meeting in Ottawa in early 2014, the China NB and Switzerland NB representatives committed to providing technical details to justify their concerns. There have been no submissions from the China NB or Switzerland NB and there has been no detailed technical information or discussion shared since that time.

The China NB has repeatedly claimed there are “security problems” however these assertions have not been substantiated, despite requests for further information from IEEE 802. The invitation for a representative of the China NB (as well as representative from other interested SC6 NBs) to attend an IEEE 802 Plenary meeting remains open.

Responses to China NB comments on IEEE 802.1AE-2018 (ISO/IEC/IEEE FDIS 8802-1AE (Ed 2)) will be available in a separate document; however in October 2019, 6N17059 provided the IEEE 802 responses to the China NB comments submitted in 6N17080 (results of 60-day ballot).

IEEE 802 believes that the security defects asserted by the China NB have all been shown to be not valid and will not make changes to IEEE 802.1Xck-2018 without substantiation of these assertions.