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Re:	802.15.3 TG3 Security call for proposals		
Abstract	An elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) security suite is defined including a full public key cryptosystem with digital signatures and implicit certificates. Binding between a device's identity and public key using digital certificates may be established manually through direct user intervention, at device provisioning by a distributor or manufacturer, or by a trusted third party.		
Purpose	This document defines the security elements necessary to implement the mandatory and optional elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) security suite.		
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This document provides drop-in text for inclusion in Draft D10 that will fully define the mandatory and optional elliptic curve security suites.

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1.1 ECMQV 283-Koblitz-1 security suite

The following sub-clauses define the security operations that are performed for the security suite ECMQV 283-Koblitz-1. The symmetric operations performed in this security suite are those specified in Sub-clause 11.2.5 {xref}. The public key and authentication operations are specified in the following Sub-clause 11.4.1 {xref}.

1.1.1 Public-key and authentication building blocks

The following cryptographic primitives and data elements are defined for use in all sub-modes of ECMQV 283-koblitz-1.

1.1.1.1 Elliptic curve points

All elliptic curve points shall be represented in polynomial notation as specified in Section 4.1.2.1 of ANSI X9.63-2001 [{xref} X9.63].

1.1.1.2 Elliptic curve point compression

All transmitted elliptic curve points shall be compressed as specified in Section 4.2.2 of ANSI X9.63-2001 [{xref} X9.63].

1.1.1.3 Elliptic curve public key pair

An elliptic curve key pair consists of an integer q and a point Q on the curve determined by multiplying the generating point G of the curve by this integer, i.e., $Q=qG$, as specified in ANSI X9.63-2001 [{xref} X9.63]. Here, Q is called the public key, whereas q is called the private key. The private key shall be represented as specified in Section 4.3.1 of ANSI X9.63-2001 [{xref} X9.63]. The public key shall be represented as defined in Sub-clauses 11.4.1.1 {xref} and 11.4.1.2 {xref}.

1.1.1.4 Elliptic curve ansit283k1

All elliptic curve points used in this security suite shall be points on the curve ansit283k1 as specified in Appendix J4.5, Example 1, of ANSI X9.63-2001 [{xref} X9.63].

1.1.1.5 ECMQV key agreement

The ECMQV key agreement protocol shall refer to the full MQV with key confirmation scheme as specified in Section 6.11 of ANSI X9.63-2001 [{xref} X9.63], with the following instantiations:

1. Each entity shall be a DEV;
2. Each entity's identifier shall be its 48-bit IEEE MAC addresses {xref}; the parameter *entlen* shall have the integer value 48;
3. Each entity shall use the HMAC-scheme as specified in Clause 11.2.4.4 {xref};
4. Each entity shall use the cryptographic hash function as specified in Clause 11.2.4.3 {xref};
5. The parameter *keydatalen* shall have the integer value 128;
6. The parameter *SharedData* shall be the empty string; the parameter *shareddatalen* shall have the integer value 0;

7. The optional parameters *Text1* and *Text2* as specified in Sections 6.11.1 and 6.11.2 of ANSI X9.63-2001 [X9.63] shall both be the empty string.

1.1.1.6 ECC certificates

The ECMQV 283-Koblitz-1 security suite shall use different certificates, depending upon the mode of operation. The security suite uses manual certificates, as specified in Clause 11.4.1.6.1, in Mode 2, ECC implicit certificates, as specified in Clause 11.4.1.6.2, in the Implicit Sub-mode of Mode 3, and ECC X509 certificates, as specified in Clause 11.4.1.6.3, in the X509 Sub-mode of Mode 3.

1.1.1.6.1 ECC manual ‘certificates’

This standard shall use the manual certificate **ManCert** specified as follows:

ManCert=(**PublicKey** || **Subject**), where

1. **PublicKey** shall be the representation of an elliptic curve point, which is a public key as specified in Clause 11.4.1.3 {xref};
2. **Subject** shall be the purported owner of the private key corresponding to the public key represented by **PublicKey**, as represented by its 48-bit IEEE MAC address.

The manual certificate is no ‘real’ digital certificate, since the binding between a public key and its purported owner is to be established and verified by non-cryptographic means.

1.1.1.6.2 ECC implicit certificates

This standard shall use the implicit certificate scheme, with associated implicit certificate generation protocol and implicit certificate processing protocol, as specified in Appendix A {xref}, with the following instantiations:

1. Each entity shall be a DEV;
2. Each entity’s identifier shall be its 48-bit IEEE MAC address {xref}; the parameter *entlen* shall have the integer value 48;
3. Each entity shall use the cryptographic hash function as specified in Clause 11.2.4.3 {xref};
4. The format of the implicit certificate **ImplCert** shall be specified as follows:
ImplCert=(**PublicReonstrKey** || **Subject** || **Issuer**), where
 - a. **ImplCert** shall be the representation of the string IC_U as specified in the implicit certificate generation protocol;
 - b. **PublicReonstrKey** shall be the representation of the public-key reconstruction data *BEU* as specified in the implicit certificate generation protocol, which is an elliptic curve point as specified in Clauses 11.4.1.1 and 11.4.1.2 {xref};
 - c. **Subject** shall be the identifier of the entity *U* that is bound to the public-key reconstruction data *BEU* during the execution of the implicit certificate generation protocol;
 - d. **Issuer** shall be the identifier of the entity *CA* that creates the implicit certificate during the execution of the implicit certificate generation protocol (the so-called Certificate Authority).
5. The format of the string I_U as specified in Step 6 of the actions of the CA in the implicit certificate generation protocol is specified as follows: I_U =(**Subject** || **Issuer**), where **Subject** and **Issuer** are as specified above.

1.1.1.6.3 ECC X509 certificates

This standard shall use the ECC X509 certificate scheme, with associated ECC X509 certificate generation protocol and ECC X509 certificate processing protocol, as specified in PKIX [{xref} RFC 2459, {xref} RFC 3279, {xref} RFC 3280]. These certificates shall contain an elliptic curve public key as specified in Clause 11.4.1.3. The certificate shall use the signing algorithm ECDSA as specified in Clause 11.4.1.6.3.1. For the detailed ASN.1 specification, see Appendix B {xref}.

1.1.1.6.3.1 *ECDSA Digital Signatures*

The ECC X509v3 certificate scheme shall use the ECDSA signature scheme, with associated signature generation protocol and signature verification protocol, as announced in FIPS Pub 186-2 and fully specified in ANSI X9.62-1998 [{xref} X9.62]. The ECDSA key generation protocol shall use the random number generation algorithm as specified in FIPS Pub 186-2, including Change Notice 1 [{xref} FIPS186-2 Rev].

1.1.2 ECMQV Raw 1 sub-mode

ECMQV Raw 1 is a sub-mode of Mode 2 of the ECMQV 283-Koblitz-1 security suite. The cryptographic building blocks for ECMQV Raw 1 are selected from the public-key cryptographic building blocks for the ECMQV 283-Koblitz-1 security suite. The object identifier OID for this mode is specified as in Table 2 {xref} of Clause 14.2.1 {xref}. The following sub-clauses specify the public-key and authentication related objects for this sub-mode.

1.1.2.1 Public-key and authentication data formats

The following table specifies the length and intended meaning of the public-key cryptography and authentication related security suite specific data elements from Clause 7 {xref}. The operations to obtain the variable data values are specified in a separate sub-clause.

Table 12 – Public-key frame object formats

Notation	Length	Value	Description
PublicKeyObjectType	2	See Table 7.4.1.2 {xref}	The numerical value of the ECMQV-Raw-1 public key type in Table 7.4.1.2{xref}
PublicKeyObjectLength	2	43	Length of the ECC Manual Certificate
PublicKeyObject	43	Manual certificate value	Instance of ECC Manual certificate as specified in Clause 11.4.1.6.1
OIDLength	1	10	Length of the DER encoding of the applicable OID
OID	10	OID value	DER encoding of the OID ECMQV-Raw-1 as specified in Table 2 of Clause 11.2.1 {xref}
ChallengeType	2	See Table 7.4.1.3 {xref}	The numerical value of the ChallengeType ephemeral elliptic curve public key in Table 7.4.1.3 {xref}

ChallengeLength	2	37	Length of ephemeral public key
Challenge	37	Point value	Ephemeral public key as specified in Clause 11.4.1.3

1.1.2.2 Public-key and authentication cryptographic operations

The following table specifies the public key cryptography and authentication related operations for the authentication protocol frames as specified in Clause 7 {xref}:

Table 13 – Authentication-related functions

Use	Description
Authorization of public key	Verification of authorization status of the other party, by checking whether the public key information as contained in the manual certificate as specified in Clause 11.4.1.1.6.1 complies with information in the access control list (ACL).
Challenge generation	Communication of random short-term (ephemeral) public key to the other party, to be used for key establishment and for entity authentication.
Key establishment	Derivation of a shared key, based on the ephemeral public keys contributed by both parties and long-term (static) public-keying material of both parties.
Key authentication	n.a.
Proof of possession of private key	Verification that the other party that communicated a static public key possesses the corresponding private key (as witnessed by successful key confirmation).
Mutual key confirmation	Verification of possession of the shared key by the other party, via the computation of a message authentication code over part of the data communicated with the other party.
Mutual entity authentication	Verification of the actual and real-time involvement of the other party during the key agreement protocol.

1.1.3 ECMQV Implicit sub-mode

ECMQV Implicit 1 is a sub-mode of Mode 3 of the ECMQV 283-Koblitz-1 security suite. The cryptographic building blocks for ECMQV Implicit 1 are selected from the public-key cryptographic building blocks for the ECMQV 283-Koblitz-1 security suite. The object identifier OID for this mode is specified as in Table 2 {xref} of Clause 14.2.1. The following sub-clauses specify the public-key and authentication related objects for this sub-mode.

1.1.3.1 Public-key and authentication data formats

The following table specifies the length and intended meaning of the public-key cryptography and authentication related security suite specific data elements from Clause 7 {xref}. The operations to obtain the variable data values are specified in a separate sub-clause.

Table 14 – Public-key frame object formats

Notation	Length	Value	Description
PublicKeyObjectType	2	See Table 7.4.1.2 {xref}	The numerical value of the ECMQV Implicit 1 public key type in Table 7.4.1.2{xref}
PublicKeyObjectLength	2	49	Length of the ECC Implicit Certificate
PublicKeyObject	49	Implicit certificate value	Instance of ECC Implicit certificate as specified in Clause 11.4.1.6.2
OIDLength	1	10	Length of the DER encoding of the applicable OID
OID	10	OID value	DER encoding of the OID ECMQV Implicit 1 as specified in Table 2 of Clause 11.2.1 {xref}
ChallengeType	2	See Table 7.4.1.3 {xref}	The numerical value of the ChallengeType ephemeral elliptic curve public key in Table 7.4.1.3 {xref}
ChallengeLength	2	37	Length of ephemeral public key
Challenge	37	Point value	Ephemeral public key as specified in Clause 11.4.1.3

1.1.3.2 Public-key and authentication cryptographic operations

The following table specifies the public key cryptography and authentication related operations for the authentication protocol frames as specified in Clause 7 {xref}:

Table 15 – Authentication-related functions

Use	Description
Authorization of public key	Verification of authorization status of the other party, by checking whether the public key information as contained in the implicit certificate as specified in Clause 11.4.1.1.6.2 complies with information in the access control list (ACL).
Challenge generation	Communication of random short-term (ephemeral) public key to the other party, to be used for key establishment and for entity authentication.
Key establishment	Derivation of a shared key, based on the ephemeral public keys contributed by both parties and long-term (static) public-keying material of both parties.
Key authentication	Verification of the authenticity of the static key of the other party via reconstruction of the public key hereof from the implicit certificate communicated by the other party and evidence of possession of the corresponding private key hereby (as witnessed by successful key confirmation).
Mutual key confirmation	Verification of possession of the shared key by the other party, via the computation of a message authentication code over part of the data communicated with the other party.

Mutual entity authentication	Verification of the actual and real-time involvement of the other party during the authenticated key agreement protocol.
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1.1.4 ECMQV X509 sub-mode

ECMQV X509 1 is a sub-mode of Mode 3 of the ECMQV 283-Koblitz-1 security suite. The cryptographic building blocks for ECMQV X509 1 are selected from the public-key cryptographic building blocks for the ECMQV 283-Koblitz-1 security suite. The object identifier OID for this mode is specified as in Table 2 {xref} of Clause 14.2.1. The following sub-clauses specify the public-key and authentication related objects for this sub-mode.

1.1.4.1 Public-key and authentication data formats

The following table specifies the length and intended meaning of the public-key cryptography and authentication related security suite specific data elements from Clause 7 {xref}. The operations to obtain the variable data values are specified in a separate sub-clause.

Table 16 – Public-key frame object formats

Notation	Length	Value	Description
PublicKeyObjectType	2	See Table 7.4.1.2 {xref}	The numerical value of the ECMQV X509 1 public key type in Table 7.4.1.2{xref}
PublicKeyObjectLength	2	Variable	Length of the ECC X509 Certificate
PublicKeyObject	Variable	X509 certificate value	Instance of ECC X509 certificate as specified in Clause 11.4.1.6.2
OIDLength	1	10	Length of the DER encoding of the applicable OID
OID	10	OID value	DER encoding of the OID ECMQV X509 1 as specified in Table 2 of Clause 11.2.1 {xref}
ChallengeType	2	See Table 7.4.1.3 {xref}	The numerical value of the ChallengeType ephemeral elliptic curve public key in Table 7.4.1.3 {xref}
ChallengeLength	2	37	Length of ephemeral public key
Challenge	37	Point value	Ephemeral public key as specified in Clause 11.4.1.3

1.1.4.2 Public-key and authentication cryptographic operations

The following table specifies the public key cryptography and authentication related operations for the authentication protocol frames as specified in Clause 7 {xref}:

Table 17 – Authentication-related functions

Use	Description
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Authorization of public key	Verification of authorization status of the other party, by checking whether the public key information as contained in the X509 certificate as specified in Clause 11.4.1.1.6.3 complies with information in the access control list (ACL).
Challenge generation	Communication of random short-term (ephemeral) public key to the other party, to be used for key establishment and for entity authentication.
Key establishment	Derivation of a shared key, based on the ephemeral public keys contributed by both parties and long-term (static) public-keying material of both parties.
Key authentication	Verification of the authenticity of the static key of the other party via verification of the signature provided in the X509 certificate communicated by the other party.
Mutual key confirmation	Verification of possession of the shared key by the other party, via the computation of a message authentication code over part of the data communicated with the other party.
Mutual entity authentication	Verification of the actual and real-time involvement of the other party during the authenticated key agreement protocol.

APPENDIX A

1.2 Implicit Certificate Scheme

This section specifies the ECQV implicit certificate scheme based on ECC supported in this standard.

Implicit certificate schemes are designed to be used by three entities – a Certification Authority *CA*, a certificate requester *U*, and a certificate processor *V*, where *U* wants to obtain an implicit certificate from *CA* in order to convey *U*'s public key to *V*.

Here implicit certificate schemes are described in terms of a certificate generation protocol, a certificate processing operation, and associated setup and *CA* key deployment procedures. *CA*, *U*, and *V* shall use the schemes as follows, when they wish to communicate.

CA, *U*, and *V* should use the setup procedure to establish which options to use the scheme with. *CA* should use the key deployment procedure to select a key pair and *U* and *V* should obtain *CA*'s public key – *CA* will use the key pair during the certificate generation protocol, *U* will use the public key during the certificate generation protocol, and *V* will use the public key during the certificate processing operation. When *U* wants to obtain an implicit certificate, *U* and *CA* should perform the certificate generation protocol to obtain a key pair known to *U* and an implicit certificate *IC*. Finally, when *V* wants to obtain *U*'s public key, *U* should convey *IC* to *V* and *V* should apply the certificate processing to *IC* under *CA*'s public key to obtain *U*'s public key. *V* concludes that the public key is genuine, provided *U* provides evidence that it possesses the corresponding private key.

The specification of ECQV in this document relies heavily on the mathematical foundations and cryptographic components specified in Sections 2 and 3 of [SEC1].

The setup procedure for ECQV is specified in Section 8.1, the key deployment procedure is specified in Section 8.2, the certificate generation protocol is specified in Section 8.3, and the certificate processing operation is specified in Section 8.4.

1.2.1 Scheme Setup

CA, *U*, and *V* shall perform the following setup procedure to prepare for the use of ECQV.

1. An infrastructure shall have been established for the operation of the scheme – including a certificate format, certificate processing rules, and unique identifiers. An example of such an infrastructure is described by PKIX [PKIX-X509].
2. Each entity has an authentic copy of the system's elliptic curve domain parameters $D=(p,a,b,G,n,h)$ or $D=(m,f(x),a,b,G,n,h)$. These parameters shall have been generated using the parameter generation primitive in Sections 3.1.1.1 or the primitive specified in Section

3.1.2.1, both of [SEC1]. Furthermore, the parameters shall have been validated using the parameter validation primitives in Sections 3.1.1.2 or Section 3.1.2.2 of [SEC1].

3. The CA shall have decided which cryptographic hash function to use when generating implicit certificates. Let *Hash* denote the hash function chosen, and let *hashlen* denote the length in bits of the output value of this hash function. Each entity shall have an authentic copy of this hash function.
4. Each entity shall be bound to a unique identifier (e.g. distinguished names). All identifiers shall be bit strings of the same length *entlen* bits. Entity *U*'s identifier will be denoted by the bit string *U*. Entity *V*'s identifier will be denoted by the bit string *V*. Entity *CA*'s identifier will be denoted by the bit string *CA*.
5. The CA shall be bound to a static public key pair associated with the system's elliptic curve domain parameters *D*. The binding process shall include the validation of the static public key as specified in Section 3.2.2 of [SEC1]. The key binding shall include the unique identifier *CA* for the entity involved.
6. Each entity shall have decided how to represent elliptic curve points as octet strings (i.e., compressed form, uncompressed form, or hybrid form).

1.2.2 Key Deployment

CA, *U*, and *V* shall use the following key deployment procedure to prepare for the use of ECQV.

1. *CA* shall establish a static elliptic curve key pair (W_{CA}, w_{CA}) associated with *D* to use with the certificate generation and processing protocols. The key pair shall be generated using the primitive specified in Section 3.2.1 of SEC 1.
2. *U* and *V* shall obtain in an authentic manner the elliptic curve public key W_{CA} selected by *CA*.

1.2.3 Implicit Certificate Generation Protocol

This section specifies the protocol for generating implicit certificates (self-certified public keys).

Figure 12 illustrates the messaging involved in the use of the certificate generation protocol. *CA* and *U* shall generate an implicit certificate for *U* using the keys and parameters established




Figure 12 – Implicit Certificate Generation Scheme

during the setup procedure and the key deployment procedure as follows:

Input: None.

Output for CA: An octet string IC_U , which is U 's implicit certificate, and an elliptic curve public key W_U corresponding to the elliptic curve domain parameters D , which is U 's public key.

Output for U: An octet string IC_U , which is U 's implicit certificate, and an elliptic curve key pair (W_U, w_U) corresponding to the elliptic curve domain parameters D , which is U 's public key pair.

Actions: U proceeds as follows:

1. Select a random ephemeral elliptic curve key pair (Q_U, q_U) associated with the elliptic curve domain parameters D . The key pair shall be generated using the primitive specified in Section 3.2.1 of SEC 1. (q_U is referred to as U 's private request value; Q_U as U 's public request value.)
2. Convert Q_U to an octet string Q_{EU} as specified in Section 2.3.5 in SEC 1, and send it to CA.
3. Obtain the values IC_U and se from CA. Compute the hash value $H = Hash(IC_U)$ using the established hash function. Derive an integer e from H following the conversion routine of Step 5 in Section 4.1.3 of [SEC1].
4. Verify the content of IC_U according to the established infrastructure. This includes verifying the contents of the certificate, e.g., the subject's name and the validity period.
5. Derive BEU and I_U from IC_U according to the procedures of the established infrastructure.
6. Derive W_{CA} from I_U , according to the certificate format specified during the setup procedure.
7. Convert BEU to an elliptic curve point B_U as specified in Section 2.3.4 of SEC 1 and convert se to an integer s as specified in Section 2.3.8 of SEC 1.
8. Compute the secret key $w_U := s + q_U \cdot e \pmod{n}$ and the public key $W_U := w_U G$.
9. Reconstruct the public key $W_U' = e B_U + W_{CA}$.
10. If $W_U' = W_U$, accept the certificate and output the computed key pair (W_U, w_U) and the implicit certificate IC_U ; otherwise output *reject*.

Actions: CA proceeds as follows:

1. Verify the authenticity of the request received from U according to the procedures of the established infrastructure. The checks performed shall include, as a minimum, checking that U is indeed the origin of the request, and checking that U is authorized to obtain a certificate.
2. Receive Q_{EU} from U and convert it to an elliptic curve point Q_U as specified in Section 2.3.4 in SEC 1.
3. Select an ephemeral elliptic curve key pair (Q_{CA}, q_{CA}) associated with the elliptic curve domain parameters D . The key pair shall be generated using the primitive specified in Section 3.2.1 of [SEC1].
4. Compute the elliptic curve point $B_U := Q_U + Q_{CA}$.
5. Convert the elliptic curve point B_U to an octet string BEU as specified in Section 2.3.3 in SEC 1.
6. Construct the ‘to-be-signed-certificate’ data, which is an octet string I_U . I_U shall contain identification information according to the procedures of the established infrastructure and may also contain other information, such as the intended use of the public key, the serial number of the implicit certificate, and the validity period of the implicit certificate. The exact form of I_U depends on the certificate format being used.
7. Construct according to the procedures of the established infrastructure U 's implicit certificate, which is an octet string IC_U . IC_U should contain I_U and BEU . The exact form of IC_U depends on the certificate format being used.
8. Compute the hash value $H = Hash(IC_U)$ using the established hash function. Derive an integer e from H following the conversion routine of Step 5 in Section 4.1.3 of [SEC1].
9. Compute the integer $s = q_{CA} e + w_{CA} \pmod{n}$. (s is referred to as the private-key reconstruction data.)
10. Convert s to an octet string se as specified in Section 2.3.7 of SEC 1, and send IC_U and se to U .
11. Compute $W_U = e B_U + W_{CA}$. Output the implicit certificate IC_U and the elliptic curve public key W_U .

1.2.4 Implicit Certificate Processing Operation

V shall process U 's implicit certificate using the keys and parameters established during the setup procedure and the key deployment procedure as follows:

Input: U 's purported implicit certificate IC_U .

Output: U 's purported public key W_U .

Actions: V proceeds as follows:

1. Verify the content of IC_U according to the established infrastructure. This includes verifying the contents of the certificate, such as the subject's name and the validity period.
2. Derive BEU and I_U from IC_U , according to the certificate format specified during the setup procedure.
3. Derive W_{CA} from I_U , according to the certificate format specified during the setup procedure.
4. Convert the octet string BEU to an elliptic curve point B_U as specified in Section 2.3.4 of SEC 1.
5. Compute the hash value $H = Hash(IC_U)$ using the established hash function. Derive an integer e from H following the conversion routine of Step 5 in Section 4.1.3 of [SEC1].
6. Compute the public key $W_U = e B_U + W_{CA}$.

After performing the certificate processing operation, V can conclude that W_U is genuine, provided U evidences knowledge of the corresponding private key w_U .

APPENDIX B – ECC X509 Certificates

The IETF profile PKIX of X.509 certificates can be found in RFC 2459 and in the draft RFC 3280 (soon to be published). The various algorithm identifiers necessary to use ECC with PKIX can be found in the draft RFC 3278 (soon to be published). In this standard, the values of specific variable fields will be considerably restricted, as follows.

In this standard, all optional fields in **TBSCertificate** shall be omitted. These fields are **IssuerUniqueID**, **subjectUniqueID**, and **extensions**.

In this standard, certain fields in **TBSCertificate** and **Certificate** shall be fixed:

1. The **version** field in **TBSCertificate** shall be Version 1 (value: 0) certificates.
2. The **signature** field in **TBSCertificate** and the **signatureAlgorithm** field in **Certificate** both have the same value. As specified in RFC 3278 for certificates signed using ECDSA, both these fields shall be the **AlgorithmIdentifier** whose **algorithm** field is the object identifier **ecdsa-with-SHA1** and whose **parameters** field is omitted. The value of both these fields is thus a sequence 1 element, the object identifier above. (Note: The object identifier above is **ecdsa-with-SHA1**. For this standard, ECDSA with SHA-256, rather than ECDSA with SHA-1, shall be used. Here, SHA-256 is as specified in FIPS Pub 180-2 [{xref}FIPS 180-2]. At this moment, **ecdsa-with-SHA-256** does not have an assigned object identifier yet, however.)
3. The **validity** field in **TBSCertificate** shall have a fixed value, as follows. The default validity period shall be from the first second of January 1, 2000 until the last second of December 31, 3000. **GeneralizedTime** shall be used.
4. The **algorithm** field in **SubjectPublicKeyInfo** in **TBSCertificate** has a fixed value. As specified in RFC 3278 for certificates signed with ECDSA, this field is an **AlgorithmIdentifier** whose **algorithm** field is the object identifier **id-ecPublicKey** and whose **parameters** field has type **EcpkParameters**. In this standard, the **ImplicitlyCA** choice for **EcpkParameters** shall be used.

In this standard, the following fields shall be determined in a particular way, as follows. The fields **issuer** and **subject** in **TBSCertificate** are both of ASN.1 type **Name** and shall include exactly one attribute that uniquely identifies the issuer and the subject, respectively. The **type** field of this attribute shall be the object identifier

$$\text{device-id} ::= \{ \text{ieee-802-15-3 xx yy} \},$$

where **ieee-802-15-3** is the object identifier for IEEE 802.15.3 and where **xx** and **yy** are two pre-determined values (we take **xx**=1 and **yy**=1). The **value** field of this attribute shall have type

OCTET STRING. The octet string shall be the unique 48-bit IEEE MAC address of the issuer or subject.

APPENDIX C – References

2. Definitions, Abbreviations, and References

2.1 Definitions and Abbreviations

Our definitions follow those as defined in [ANSI X9.63-2001, §2.1].

2.2 Symbols and Notation

Our notation follows [ANSI X9.63-2001, §2.2].

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