Re: [STDS-802-Privacy] FW: [802SEC] Marriott agrees to $600k payment to resolve FCC investigation into Wi-Fi blocking
Hi,
I am in agreement with Phillip. While this particular regulatory/legal
domain settlement is interesting on its own, I don't see how this
particular "de-authentication frame attack" would be different if the
system used short-lived identifiers as opposed to long-lived
identifiers. It is a security issue as opposed to a privacy issue. And
in this case layer 8 of the stack is doing the enforcement instead of
our technical protocols.
Regards,
-James
On Fri, Oct 3, 2014 at 2:33 PM, Phillip Barber
<pbarber@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> It is a common problem in wireless networks that permit non-authenticated
> state change messaging (for stateful technologies). Most modern wireless
> networking technologies overcome this problem by requiring either ciphering
> of state change messaging or at the very least authenticated signatures on
> state change messaging (hash of CMAC or HMAC digest, for instance).
>
>
>
> I would consider this more of a security issue than a privacy issue. The
> attacker may have no interest in the specific identity of a true user, only
> the need to sniff traffic out of the air and be able to identify a
> consistent identity of the true user such that the attacker can create a
> bogus state change message. I am not sure that privacy could or should
> attempt to address this problem. Security, certainly.
>
>
>
> Thanks,
> Phillip Barber
>
>
>
> From: Dan Harkins [mailto:dharkins@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx]
> Sent: Friday, October 03, 2014 1:05 PM
> To: STDS-802-PRIVACY@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> Subject: Re: [STDS-802-Privacy] FW: [802SEC] Marriott agrees to $600k
> payment to resolve FCC investigation into Wi-Fi blocking
>
>
>
>
>
> I used to work at a wireless mesh company that was putting up a free mesh
> network
>
> in Mountain View, CA. We received complaints about trouble getting on the
> network
>
> when people were in a certain public park. After much investigation it
> turned out that a
>
> company across the street from the park did not want their employees to
> connect to
>
> the free mesh network and set their APs to disassociate anyone that tried to
> associate
>
> to it— it was the "attack rogue AP" option. They apparently thought this
> would only
>
> affect people in their building but it actually affected a large portion of
> the park itself.
>
>
>
> Sounds like what Marriott was doing. And I'm sure Marriott thought it was
> a feature.
>
>
>
> Dan.
>
>
>
> On 10/3/14 10:35 AM, "Zuniga, Juan Carlos"
> <JuanCarlos.Zuniga@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
>
>
> FYI, another misuse of long-lived identifiers. In this case, the Privacy
> Threat is the use of MAC addresses to impersonate users and send the wrong
> packets to the network:
>
>
>
> “After conducting an investigation, the Enforcement Bureau found that
> employees of Marriott, which has managed the day-to-day operations of the
> Gaylord Opryland since 2012, had used features of a Wi-Fi monitoring system
> at the Gaylord Opryland to contain and/or de-authenticate guest-created
> Wi-Fi hotspot access points in the conference facilities. In some cases,
> employees sent de-authentication packets to the targeted access points,
> which would dissociate consumers’ devices from their own Wi-Fi hotspot
> access points and, thus, disrupt consumers’ current Wi-Fi transmissions and
> prevent future transmissions”
>
>
>
> Regards,
>
>
>
> Juan Carlos
>
>
>
> From: owner-stds-802-sec@xxxxxxxx [mailto:owner-stds-802-sec@xxxxxxxx] On
> Behalf Of John H Notor
> Sent: Friday, October 03, 2014 12:09 PM
> To: 802_EC; RR-TAG; REG_SC
> Subject: [802SEC] Marriott agrees to $600k payment to resolve FCC
> investigation into Wi-Fi blocking
>
>
>
> FYI,
>
>
>
> MARRIOTT TO PAY $600,000 TO RESOLVE WIFI-BLOCKING INVESTIGATION. Hotel
> Operator Admits Employees Improperly Used Wi-Fi Monitoring System to Block
> Mobile Hotspots; Agrees to Three-Year Compliance Plan. News Release.
> Adopted: 10/03/2014. News Media Contact: Neil Grace at (202) 418-0506,
> email:Neil.Grace@xxxxxxx EB
> https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-329743A1.docx
>
> https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-329743A1.pdf
>
>
>
> John
>
>
>
> John Notor
> President/Chief Technologist
> Notor Research
>
> Mobile: 1.408.316.8312
>
> Web: www.notor.com
>
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James Lepp
Standards Manager
BlackBerry Limited
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