Re: [STDS-802-Privacy] Proposal on a MAC mediator protocol
]-----Original Message-----
]From: Christian Huitema [mailto:huitema@xxxxxxxxxxxxx]
]Sent: Friday, November 21, 2014 4:07 PM
]To: Paul Lambert; STDS-802-PRIVACY@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
]Subject: RE: [STDS-802-Privacy] Proposal on a MAC mediator protocol
]
]> 48-bits is only the address. The above constructs assume that all
]devices have a longer term Id (128 bits) and public key that is used as
]part of the authentication process.
]
]But then, doesn't having a "long term ID" defeat the goal of privacy?
Long term Id is exposed only when and where you want. It is used to
set-up P2P encryption between devices.
Interesting question ... we need to not confuse privacy with
lack of authentication. In this scenario for wireless devices, we need
to prevent the unencrypted transmission of any long term identifier
(like a MAC address or unmasked static Public Key).
Internal to an authentication process, devices may or may not expose a long term Id.
It's up to the usage if the identity (Public Key, hash etc) is:
- unique for the session (ephemeral id)
- unique to the peer, but used over multiple sessions (private pair-wise public key)
- unique and shared with multiple peers
Seems like new terms / definitions are needed to describe variations in privacy
provided.
- observed location privacy
Passive observation of the communications from a device cannot be used to determine
device or user identity. For example, static MAC addresses can be directly mapped
to a user and may be used to track the persons location. Changing MAC addresses
are one of the necessary mechanisms to support observed location privacy for
wireless devices
- location privacy
- etc
Paul
]
]-- Christian Huitema
]
]