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Hello all,I'm about to finish my PhD on Wi-Fi tracking . In this thesis, I studied various methods that can render MAC address randomization insufficient to prevent tracking. I've been supervised by Mathieu Cunche, who already made several talks on the topic here.
Based on our observations, we produced a series of guidelines regarding a correct implementation of MAC address randomization. I would like to share these guidelines to this list, as they could be used as a draft for a recommendation to the industry.
The guidelines are the following: 1. The MAC address must be changed in every burst of probe requests. 2. Probe requests must be devoid of unnecessary Information Elements.3. In particular, SSIDs must always be null (see below for the hidden AP case). 4. Sequence numbers must be randomized at the beginning of every burst of probe request, or maintain a fixed value (0). 5. The function generating the random addresses must be of cryptographic level so as to guarantee unlinkability between frames, as its purpose is to protect privacy-sensitive information. It must have a reliable entropy source, as MAC address changes can be very frequent. 6. It must be ensured that the global address is never used for active scanning. 7. The OUI part of the MAC address should preferably be randomized as well. To do so, randomized OUI should have their LA bit set to 1 and should not be registered by a company. 8. Efforts must be done to break timing patterns of probe requests: for instance, random delay can be added between bursts. Additionally, we advise dropping the support of hidden Access Points. They hinder a correct implementation of randomization, as devices need to add identifying SSIDs to their probe requests to discover them. They constitute a bad security practice anyway, as they're based on the broken security-by-obscurity concept. They should be replaced with Access Points using a strong encryption scheme and strong passwords.
These guidelines can be compared to those produced by Martin et al. , which notably also add a countermeasure against an active attack they discuss in their paper.
: https://ploudseeker.com/files/these.pdf : https://arxiv.org/abs/1703.02874v1 Regards, -- Célestin Matte