Re: Motion 19.02 -- explicit refusal to vote
On Oct 31, 2010, at 1:04 PM, Michel Hack wrote:
> Actually, my math (in the P.S. of my non-vote) was flaky too: As soon
> as members/4 (NOT members/2) have voted YES, subsequent NO votes risk
> being counted as YES when the voting deadline approaches, UNLESS the
> number of NO votes manages to overtake the YES votes before the deadline.
As Voting Tabulator, I concur with Michel's analysis.
It IS appropriate, during the voting, for opponents to post messages urging people NOT TO VOTE (and why). Perhaps my "please vote" messages should include an reminder of the power of a non-vote.
At this point, three motions that passed:
M0009.01_ExactDotProduct (26 - 20)
M0013.04 Comparison_Relations (34 - 5)
M0016.01 InfSupAndMidRad (30 - 10)
would have failed had all the "No" votes not voted.
However, I think I read a paper MANY years ago that gave a mathematical proof there is NO system of voting (subject to several "fairness" axioms) which is not subject to "strategic voting," in which you advance your position by voting in a manner contrary to your true wishes, under certain circumstances.
We MIGHT be able to do better, but a perfect voting system will elude us.
>
> (If 1+members/2 YES votes have been received the issue is decided, for
> votes on position papers... except for the fact that we allow votes to
> be changed before the deadline!)
Yes, and I think it is consistent to allow changing a previously case vote to "Not voting."
>
> Michel.
>
> ---Sent: 2010-10-31 18:12:24 UTC
Dr. George F. Corliss
Electrical and Computer Engineering
Marquette University
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