Re: Motion 19.02 -- explicit refusal to vote
On Sun, Oct 31, 2010 at 6:01 PM, Corliss, George
<george.corliss@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> On Oct 31, 2010, at 1:04 PM, Michel Hack wrote:
>
>> Actually, my math (in the P.S. of my non-vote) was flaky too: As soon
>> as members/4 (NOT members/2) have voted YES, subsequent NO votes risk
>> being counted as YES when the voting deadline approaches, UNLESS the
>> number of NO votes manages to overtake the YES votes before the deadline.
> As Voting Tabulator, I concur with Michel's analysis.
>
> It IS appropriate, during the voting, for opponents to post messages urging people NOT TO VOTE (and why). Perhaps my "please vote" messages should include an reminder of the power of a non-vote.
>
> At this point, three motions that passed:
> M0009.01_ExactDotProduct (26 - 20)
> M0013.04 Comparison_Relations (34 - 5)
> M0016.01 InfSupAndMidRad (30 - 10)
> would have failed had all the "No" votes not voted.
>
>
> However, I think I read a paper MANY years ago that gave a mathematical proof there is NO system of voting (subject to several "fairness" axioms) which is not subject to "strategic voting," in which you advance your position by voting in a manner contrary to your true wishes, under certain circumstances.
I think I've read that paper and many others on the same topic. It is
pretty well established that the only perfect voting system is
analogous to the only medthod of keeping secrets in a group: "Three
can keep a secret if two are dead". Similarly, all voting systems can
be perfected by having only one effective voter. But all systems with
more than one effective voter support some kind of gaming.
For me, personally, the issue is not about gaming the voting
procedure. Rather it is about avoiding the "tyranny of the majority"
wherein slightly more than half of the interested parties dominate all
decisions, and those in the (faint) minority must continue to
participate or be expelled from the decision making process.
One way to do that is to begin with material that a very large
fraction, like 90% or 95%, of the members agree upon. Process
everything that can pass that very high bar. Then reduce the fraction
required for approval by 5% or 10% and address the more
contentious/divisive issues. This approach is quite ponderous, but it
does distill out the consensus views fairly effectively and it is very
hard to "game".
It is my belief that this process would be in conformance with the
IEEE policies in the sense that every motion/action/resolution/etc.
passed by the decreasing consensus process would be in passed by the
simple-majortity policies of the IEEE.
>
> We MIGHT be able to do better, but a perfect voting system will elude us.
Well, "the better is the enemy of the good", but is there a commitment
that the existing process is good in the sense of "good enough"? I do
not believe that it is.
>>
>> (If 1+members/2 YES votes have been received the issue is decided, for
>> votes on position papers... except for the fact that we allow votes to
>> be changed before the deadline!)
> Yes, and I think it is consistent to allow changing a previously case vote to "Not voting."
How would you handle such an abstention? Would it qualify such a
non-voter to continue to participate in the decision making process
despite purposefully attempting to defeat proposals by denial of
quorum? This may require a statement or an interpretation from the
IEEE. (Better now than afterward).
Lee Winter
NP Engineering
Nashua, New Hampshire
United States of America
603-595-2608